On 29 June 2012, a group of armed men opened fire on an NRC convoy in the IFO II section of Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. Travelling in the convoy were, among others, NRC’s then Secretary General and Regional Director for the Horn of Africa. Several staff members suffered gunshot wounds and one driver was fatally injured. Four NRC staff members were abducted and taken across the border into Somalia; they were rescued and returned to Kenya four days later.
In 2015, one of the abducted staff members, Steve Dennis, took NRC to court, and the Oslo District Court subsequently found NRC guilty of gross negligence in the preparations of this VIP visit to Dadaab. While NRC does not agree we were grossly negligent, NRC admitted employer liability.
We cannot erase what happened, but the organisation has learned, and continues to learn, from this case. NRC has never claimed that we could not have done a better job prior to, during and after the Dadaab attack. We have always, and will always, admit that we need to learn from this very serious incident.
We deeply regret that we were not able to protect our staff from the attack – there is nothing more important to NRC than the safety and wellbeing of our employees. NRC operates in war and conflicts zones around the world, and we endeavour to take all reasonable steps possible to protect our staff from both physical and psychological injury. Strengthening our duty of care systems continues to be a priority.
Read Secretary General Jan Egeland's op-ed that was published in the Norwegian newspaper VG on 7 November 2017.
Key questions related to the Dadaab attack and court case
The attack in 2012 and the court case triggered discussion around staff safety and duty of care in the humanitarian field. NRC welcomes this debate and we will continue to share what we have learned from this serious incident. Many questions have been asked – and are still being asked – around this incident in 2012. Below are some of the most frequent questions and NRC’s response.
What is the most important thing you have learned from the Dadaab attack?
The court case confirmed that NRC does, overall, have a strong and healthy safety and security culture. We have built on what is good and have endeavoured to learn from identified weaknesses. The Dadaab incident has given direction to our organisational learning and the development of our security and staff care systems. Much has been done to strengthen security and risk management in the organisation since 2012.
We regularly hold security trainings, and a certified Hostile Environment Awareness Training course, for staff who work in hostile environments. We have strengthened our risk analysis and risk management systems as well as our risk and crises management trainings.
Humanitarian work can be challenging and we know that many of our colleagues witness brutality and hardship that, over time, can lead to physical and mental harm. We therefore try to ensure that our employees are aware and as prepared as possible for difficult circumstances they may encounter. To mitigate the risk of injury, NRC provides training in first aid and offers information on stress handling so that staff can take care of themselves as well as colleagues.
NRC is constantly working to strengthen our medical and psychosocial systems and insurance packages. Medical providers are identified in all country offices and areas where we work. If local psychosocial providers are not available in specific areas, all staff members have access to global providers. We also have minimum standards for duty of care that are mandatory for all country operations.
The Dadaab attack and the court case have been an opportunity for managers and staff to discuss how we can build a stronger culture of trust and achieve the best risk management, security work and staff care possible. Only through our combined knowledge and efforts can we maximise impact and reduce risks. This is also the reason NRC has decided to talk about our weaknesses and the court case.
What has been done for the affected staff?
Staff follow-up after critical incidents is based on the individual needs of the people involved. A serious incident affects each individual differently and follow-up must be tailored to meet each one’s concrete needs.
Those directly involved in the Dadaab incident received immediate medical support and were offered counselling. NRC covered medical costs in line with the insurance packages we had in place at the time.
Some staff members think the support was sufficient, while others believe NRC should and could have done more. NRC keeps learning from these experiences and the feedback we receive.
The court awarded Steve Dennis compensation for legal costs, incurred medical expenses, loss of income and future loss of income due to occupational disability. All compensation was based on documented expenses or statements by medical personnel. In addition, Dennis was awarded an amount for punitive damages. The total amount was approximately the same as offered by NRC during the pre-trial settlement negotiations.
Following the court’s judgement, NRC evaluated ways of further compensating other affected staff members, so that all those directly involved could be equally compensated. This included extending punitive damages to all directly affected staff. In 2016, all of those affected, including our Kenyan staff, were contacted individually to inform them about the outcome of the court case and to ask if they had further needs for medical and psychosocial support. At that time we also offered payments for punitive damages.
NRC is still in dialogue with some of the staff affected by the Dadaab incident and the family of the driver who died. We have managed to reach a compensation agreement with the driver’s family and will continue to offer our support in the years to come. These dialogues are bound by confidentiality and NRC will therefore not disclose further details.
Why did the staff affected receive different levels of compensation?
Our lawyers in Oslo and Nairobi have worked together to ensure we use the same objective criteria when determining the levels of compensation. The factors that have determined the difference in compensation between Kenyan staff and Steve Dennis are:
1. salary at that time (Steve Dennis had an international contract)
2. three Kenyan staff are still employed and have therefore not lost any income as a result of the attack
3. different degrees of injury and different levels of actual medical costs
In addition to the payment of punitive damages and compensation, all affected staff have been given a renewed opportunity to ask questions and voice their concerns. We know that this incident will be part of their lives forever. But if there are issues that they would like to raise, it’s crucial for us to listen and to help if we can.
What have you done for the family of the driver who died?
The loss of one of our staff members has had great impact on the organisation. NRC expresses our deepest condolences to his family.
The driver’s family was compensated according to our insurance policy at that time, with additional ex gratia payments by NRC and financial support from colleagues. At our request, the family was contacted in 2016 by an independent Kenyan counselling centre to ask how they felt they had been treated by NRC and if there was need for further support. As a result, we have come to a new agreement with the driver’s mother, offering her more compensation.
Some of the affected staff say they feel NRC has not adequately followed up after the incident. Is this true?
In the aftermath of the incident, NRC tried to adapt our follow-up to accommodate each individual colleague according to how they were coping. Some were satisfied with the support given, others feel NRC should have and could have done more. We have tried to learn from the feedback we have received, and continue to receive, from affected staff.
How could this attack happen?
The Secretary General was visiting Dadaab in June 2012 to highlight the dire situation in Daddab following the 2011 famine and the need for increased humanitarian funding. It’s important to stress that it is not possible to determine whether an incident could have been avoided or not, regardless of what risk mitigation measures had been introduced. However, there are now suspicions that too many people knew about the visit. This increased the level of risk by making it more possible for potential attackers to plan around specific details.
Why did you not use an armed escort during the visit?
The decision against an armed escort was made by experienced managers and field workers based on knowledge of the situation on that particular day in that particular context. The same managers who decided not to use an armed escort were part of the convoy that was attacked.
At the time, the trend of attacks by criminal or pro-Al Shabaab elements in Ifo II (the camp visited) was:
- a history of ever increasing and sophisticated use of violence with road bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in particular, and light arms
- an intention, as warned by UN and other agencies, to carry out attacks against Kenya and Kenyan interests
An armed escort would have entailed Kenyan soldiers accompanying the NRC convoy. It was thought that this might endanger the neutrality of the convoy and thereby jeopardise the convoy’s security. The risk of being targeted by an IED was assessed to be higher with an armed escort than without.
Neither MSF nor the Red Cross used armed escorts in Dadaab at the time of the incident.
Why didn’t you have an external evaluation after the incident?
In the aftermath of the attack, NRC conducted a very detailed internal after-action review of what happened before, during and after the visit. The objective was to uncover weaknesses in the planning and execution of the visit and to learn from the incident. The report provided around 130 recommendations to further strengthen NRC’s safety and security work. All of these key action points from the report have been implemented.
Since the review was conducted by NRC staff, we asked an external security consultant to provide an independent assessment of the review process and the report itself. He concluded that the report was “thorough, honest and transparent”. NRC’s management therefore decided that an additional full external review would not provide substantial new information.
After the attack, NRC also commissioned the Security Management Initiative to conduct an independent, external review of our global security management systems. We examined our staff care systems with a view to strengthen NRC’s organisational and individual security culture, our information security, our staff training and our insurance systems. We have since partnered with the Headington Institute to strengthen our ability to prevent trauma and to follow up on staff who suffer psychologically as a result of being deployed to war and conflict zones.
NRC continually works to strengthen our duty of care, including security systems and staff care. Staff security is crucial, both for individual employees and for the organisation’s ability to deliver assistance to the world’s most vulnerable populations. We have minimum standards for duty of care that are mandatory to implement in all country offices.
How do you avoid putting staff at risk?
NRC works in 31 countries, most of which are caught up in war and conflict, so we can never eliminate all risk. As an organisation, we are committed to providing assistance to forcibly displaced people and meeting their immediate humanitarian needs. NRC recognises that balancing risk management with the humanitarian imperative is often a dilemma. Our duty of care standard is supposed to help staff understand what NRC expects to be in place as a minimum. Our security systems and plans, risk assessments, induction, trainings, performance management, whistleblowing system and information sharing reduce the chances for something going wrong, and enables staff to handle things better should incidents occur. We have seen that these preparations have saved lives.
Can NRC staff say no to going on missions?
Yes. NRC staff members have the right to withdraw from situations where they feel insecure without suffering disciplinary action. This is explicitly stated in our terms of employment for national and international employees.
Our security procedures and Code of Conduct state that NRC staff members have both a right and an obligation to speak up if they feel that security issues are not being properly addressed. This right includes the right to decline missions until the security concerns are properly addressed.
NRC strives to practise “informed consent”, meaning that the employee must be informed about the context, risks, and their role and responsibilities before starting a job with NRC or going on a mission. Colleagues are briefed by security staff when they begin working for the organisation or when going on field trips where they are not familiar with the context or where the situation on the ground has changed. Through our performance management system, staff are followed up by their line managers. We are continuously working on how to improve briefings, information sharing and training.
If a staff member has concerns, our procedures recommend that they inform their line manager or use our complaint mechanisms, which bypass line management and allow staff to directly raise their issues with more senior management. If necessary, they can contact our Head Office HR or Security Section directly.
Why did you end up in court?
Although there were a number of efforts to settle prior to the court case in 2015, it was not possible to reach an agreement with Steve Dennis.
While we did not agree with Steve Dennis on several issues, we should have endeavoured to have a more open dialogue with him and we should have offered him more support to secure compensation earlier. It is important for NRC to learn from this and better communication with staff is a key learning point.
NRC admitted weaknesses in the planning of the 2012 visit both prior to and during the court case. The After Action Report (ARR) concluded that: “The lack of information security prior to the incident was identified as an important factor that might have increased the risk towards NRC staff.” This was repeated in court.
It has been really important for NRC to learn from this process and to do everything possible to avoid another similar situation. To be better at communicating with staff is just one of the very important things that we have learned from this case.
