Colombia's bloody history
1819: Bolívar’s dream
Bolívar’s dream of a federal Latin America quickly crumbled, and Gran Colombia, consisting of Colombia, Venezuela, Panama and Ecuador was dissolved after Bolívar’s death. The elite in Colombia ensured a regional division of power in the country, while the state apparatus remained weak – a rather unfortunate combination and a hallmark of later developments in Colombia.
The traditionally dominant political parties, the Conservative and the Liberal parties, were formed already in the 1840s, long before there were any national political projects from the elite. This reflected a major axis of conflict: the relationship between the periphery and the centre.
The Conservatives had their foundation in the landowning classes. They wanted stronger centralism and were closely linked to the Catholic Church. The Liberals wanted a greater degree of federalism and had the greatest support within trade and crafts. For the Conservatives, the state and the Church were guarantors for keeping the social order and status quo, and they were strongly against the Liberal’s wishes of modernisation.
1850: The fight for land
The fight for land has been a common thread through the whole of Colombia’s troubled history. In 1850, publicly owned land constituted 75 per cent of the land area. Towards the end of the century, large areas of land were distributed to private owners, very often through corruption or the use of violence. The armed groups, who the major landowners used to take over the land, were in many ways the predecessors of the “modern” paramilitary groups that emerged a century later.
Colombia remained an economic backwater at the end of the 1800s and did not develop a large enough basis of resources to build a nation in a land that was created for federalism. The country had no export commodity which earned enough foreign capital, so that one dominating elite emerged. Colombia kept the old, traditional hierarchal values, while most other Latin American countries at the end of the 1800s had strengthened the state apparatus and conducted liberal economic and political reforms.
1886: “The Conservative Republic”
In 1886, Colombia had a centralistic constitution that was as authoritarian as the 1863 constitution was liberal. After decades of liberal rule, the role of the church was restored and it gained great power, not least over the education system. The president’s power was strengthened and a permanent army was established. The Conservative Republic (1885–1930) was the first attempt at a national political project by the landowning classes. Nevertheless, there were dark clouds on the horizon.
When coffee prices collapsed in the 1890s, and members of the Liberal party were excluded from important positions, tensions came to a head. It was the Conservatives who were victorious in the War of a Thousand Days (1899–1902). This civil war led to great destruction, with 100,000 people killed and economic ruin. The country was greatly weakened and the government was powerless when Panama seceded, encouraged by the United States. The War of a Thousand Days was the last major conflict of the 1800s, but only the first of the 1900s.
1910-1950: A nation takes form
Colombia entered the 20th century with one of the least developed economies in Latin America. However, during the next three decades of the 1900s, the price of coffee went up, and this created a financial platform for forming a nation from a fragmented republic. The development produced a basis for a national market, and in the long term for a national industry. The period from 1910 to 1950 was the time of the smaller coffee grower, before the production became dominated by the large coffee tycoons from the 1960 and onwards.
Gradually, major international companies entered the arena. Of particular importance was the United Fruit Company from the US who invested in banana production on the Atlantic coast.
The economic changes had social implications. An active labour movement emerged and there was a renewed fight for land amongst the farmers. The first socialist parties and unions saw the light of day. In 1928, 1,000 banana workers were killed after a military attack.
1930-1946: “The Liberal Republic”
The rise of the export industry and modernisation did not happen at the expense of the traditional elite. Society was still resting on authority and the existing social and economic order, and there were no sectors within the elite that organised themselves through the state. Elections were dominated by client practice. The local elite ensured the “correct” election result through corruption and buying votes. However, the demand for social change grew and the radical wing of the Liberal party began flirting with the labour movement in the 1930s.
During the Liberal Republic (1930–46), limited attempts were made to create a more active state on social issues. The main aim was to create stable conditions where capitalist development could take place. The eight-hour day was introduced in 1934, and the right to unionise was part of the constitution in 1936.
Nevertheless, the unions remained weak, particularly in the private sector. Not until 1931 did the farmers gain the right to join a union, and in several places they came into direct conflict with the authorities because of increased prices of land. But the farmers’ battle was rarely, if ever, linked with the struggle of the workers in the cities. The farmers were also divided when the landowners formed alliances of loyalty to smaller farmers locally that transcended the class differences.
Life in the countryside in the 1930s
The following is a summary of information obtained through interviews with older Colombians in the last 25 years.
Despite attempts at political reform in the 1930s, little changed for the large majority of Colombians living in the countryside. The lucky ones owned a small plot of land, but the job of cultivating it was hard and the future prospects few. The farms were often remotely situated, and farmers carried large sacks of potatoes, cassava and corn for hours to reach the market.
Most people at the time had a natural economy. All kinds of fruit and vegetables were produced on these small plots of land. Any possible surplus was sold, and the money used to buy sugar, panela (a form of unrefined cane sugar) and rice.
Besides chicken, which most farmers had on their farm, people seldom ate meat. If someone was ill, they had no medicines or doctors. They had to rely on their homegrown herbs. Home birth was the norm, and most regions had a self-taught midwife who travelled between villages providing the women a minimum of security.
Children walked barefoot until they were 12 or 13. The sun was their clock. Dentists didn’t exist and people brushed their teeth with herbs. Their mattresses were made from corn husks and homemade matting. Lice and fleas were normal, and mice and scorpions often wandered into bedrooms. Bedtime was usually around seven or eight, an hour after the sunlight started to wane. Every morning, around five, the rooster would alert everyone that it was time to get up. The sun and sheep-fat candles were the main sources of light.
These smallholders had very few rights. They sent their children to larger farms at 12 or 13. At home there were too many mouths to feed.
This was the situation in both conservative and liberal villages. The smallholders had common challenges. But rather than uniting, they often end up killing each other. The elite at the time forcefully cracked down on any reform they viewed as threatening to their privileged position.
1947: Jorge Eliécer Gaitán
At the end of the 1930s, state intervention was reversed and fertile ground for economic liberalism was established. The social reforms had faced resistance from the Conservative party and scepticism from the Church and the army. , often with the support of local businesspeople, and polarisation increased.
The liberal politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán represented a more socially responsible capitalism and a participatory democracy. He mobilised the masses and trumpeted a national vision that transcended sectoral interests. This was unheard of among the elite where politics first and foremost was a business strategy.
In 1947, Gaitán became the leader of the Colombian Liberal Party, and in February 1948, he addressed more than 100,000 people in Bogotá who were protesting against violence. He didn’t mince his words when criticising the established elite:
“In Colombia there are two countries: the political country which concerns itself with elections, its bureaucratic sinecures, its business interests, its privileges and influences… The political country and the oligarchy are one and the same. The national country, the people who think of their work, of their health, of their culture… We belong to the national country, to the people of all parties who are going to fight against the political country, against the oligarchies of all the parties.”
Two months later, he was assassinated, and with him the political alternative. Democratic latitude for the labour and farmer movements did not exist. The old party loyalty was soon reestablished, and the social and political fight was reduced to local party conflict. Colombia had begun its disastrous journey towards La Violencia.
A statement from an elderly man I interviewed approximately ten years ago describes its outbreak: “My father was in Bogotá when the riots erupted. It was raining heavily and the water filled up the streets. It was coloured red by the blood.”
1948-1957: La Violencia
Violence erupted and atrocities took place. This is the darkest chapter in the history of Colombia. The violence continued in the name of the parties, village against village, and peasant guerilla against the army. One Liberal guerilla leader who began fighting with the Communists was Pedro Antonio Marín, who later adopted the name Manuel Marulanda Vélez and became the leader of the guerilla movement known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
La Violencia lasted from 1948 to 1957 and cost 200,000 people their lives. Between one and two million people were displaced. Some 150,000 crossed the border to Venezuela, while others sought refuge in the cities and settled in the lowlands of Los Llanos. Many smallholders fled the countryside because of the terror by criminal gangs, who served a function, and large landowners were able to add several acres to their properties. A total of 200,000 plots of land changed owners during this period.
The elite secure power
The same elite who had held power prior to La Violencia now secured full control, especially after the violent conflict during the 1958 agreement that was reached between the leaders of the Conservative and the Liberal parties. The popular movements that were burgeoning during the rise of Gaitán had been crushed. Instead, peasants had killed each other on behalf of the elite.
The two main parties were to change power every four years and all-important official posts were shared between them. There was no room permitted for social protests outside the parties. In addition, the army was considerably strengthened through extensive support from the US. After World War Two, Colombia was among the most important allies of the US in Latin America and contributed, amongst other things, with a large contingent of soldiers during the Korean War.
The 1960s: The guerilla gains momentum
We have reached the 1960s, the period when more recent conflicts, which in many ways are a continuation of former conflicts, began.
In the countryside, the divisions remained strong after La Violencia. Many people had fled and the modernisation of the agriculture sector caused many farmers to resign. They had nothing to compete with against the large producers of rice, sugar and cotton, which were to cover the increasing demand as the cities grew. But the smallholders were behind most of the production of basic goods such as corn and potatoes. The all-encompassing political question was the distribution of land. The lack of political will to do anything about this would have dramatic consequences in the decades that followed.
FARC emerged in 1964, in the wake of the army’s operations against armed peasant militia led by the Communist party. They had not been granted amnesty after La Violencia. During the early years, FARC operated defensively and offered the farmers protection against the big landowners. For the farmers, communism was a way of survival rather than a political ideology. The state was absent in large areas, and FARC spread from its principal areas in Caquetá, Tolima, Meta and Guaviare to Magdalena Medio, Cauca and other places.
The guerilla movement known as the National Liberation Army (ELN) was founded in January 1965 and gained a good deal of sympathy after the radical priest Camilo Torres joined them later in the same year. While FARC was seen as an orthodox communist movement, ELN attracted liberation theologians and radical socialists. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, more guerilla movements were established, for example EPL (Maoist), M-19 (with a base among intellectuals from the middle classes) and Quintín Lame (with roots among the indigenous people).
Resistance against the status quo
What then is the cause of the spiralling violence in Colombia during this period? In 1960s intellectual circles, many started searching for alternatives to the two-party system. The state was unable to handle the social changes. There was very little room for democracy, social polarisation continued in rural areas and the number of poor people in the cities increased in line with a rapid urbanisation. Already by 1964, some 50 per cent of the population lived in the cities, where the informal economic sector became a lifebuoy for the poorest.
As in earlier periods of Colombian history, the political order did not modernise in line with the economic development. Rather than integrating more people into society, more people were excluded, both politically and socially. The exclusivity of the elite reflected the extreme concentration of power and wealth in society. The private sector was very strong, and the state acted mostly as its facilitator. Family dynasties dominated both within business and politics: without the “correct" surname you stood no chance of becoming a general, regardless of how many years you had been a soldier in the jungle.
The Church had resolved its relationship with the Liberal party in 1958, but urbanisation and increasing secularisation undermined its influence. The army appeared more autonomous and prioritised the fight against the guerillas which it thought destabilised social order.
The 1970s: The drug cartel makes an entrance
The political, social and economic challenges were many, but the situation would be complicated further by the arrival of the drug cartels towards the end of the 1970s. The drug trafficking routes, originating from the coastal areas in Colombia, had long been seen as the most lucrative in the whole of Latin America. While tobacco, liquor, emeralds and marijuana were the most important goods in the 1950s and 60s, cocaine took over as the most important contraband at the end of the 1970s.
The biggest drug cartels in Medellín and Cali were vertically structured organisations that controlled everything from production and transport domestically to the sales abroad. As the cartels’ economic and organisational power increased, their influence became visible throughout Colombia. Journalists, judges, politicians, military and others in positions of power were on the cartels’ payrolls. In 1985, drug barons offered to pay off Colombia’s $14 billion foreign debts in exchange for amnesty. But when the Medellín cartel grew political ambitions and directly threatened the elite’s position in power, their days were numbered. The Cali cartel followed.
The 1980s: Paramilitary flourishing
Even so, the drug lords created something that was to live on. In 1981, they established the first “modern” paramilitary group, MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores – Death to Kidnappers). The drug cartels used this group not only for protection against the guerilla, but also to chase smallholders from their land and eradicate all opposition in the areas they took over. The percentage of land owned by the few increased.
The fact that it was politically motivated violence that increased dramatically in the 1980s refutes the myth that the violence in Colombia was first and foremost linked with the drug trade itself. In 1989, when mafia-related violence was at its highest, 385 drug related killings took place, while 2,479 civilians were killed for political reasons the same year.
In the 1980s, several guerilla groups were greatly debilitated and signed a ceasefire. Demobilised members of FARC and sympathisers formed the political party Unión Patriótica (UP) in 1985, hoping to ride the wave of popular protest movements that arose in the 1980s. But the UP was seen as FARC’s political arm. During only a few years, 3,000 UP members were killed, including their presidential candidate in the 1990 election, Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa.
M-19, who had stormed the Palace of Justice in 1985 in an attack where 11 Supreme Court Justices and 90 civilians were killed, signed a peace agreement in 1989 and laid down their arms.
1990-2000: Flight from the countryside
The cocaine trade reinforced the social problems. Violence and corruption intensified the political tensions, creating economic imbalance and more displaced people in the country. It also paved the way for alliances that had bloody consequences. The paramilitary groups were not only employed by the mafia. The big landowners and parts of the military apparatus came to ask for their services.
In the 1990s, the Colombian government finally admitted the enormous humanitarian challenges that the violence and armed conflict had created. The flight from the countryside to the large cities increased dramatically. The civilian population found themselves between a rock and a hard place. FARC’s methods, such as kidnapping, extortion and deeper involvement in the drug trade, isolated the movement politically.
At the same time, the paramilitary, protected by strong forces in Colombian society, could continue their killing sprees and terror. As the conflict between the guerillas and the army spread to more areas, the indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations increasingly became victims of displacement. In 1991, a new constitution was adopted, underlining Colombia as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state, with rights for minority groups such as the indigenous and the Afro-Colombians. This had little effect in practice, as these groups usually stayed in areas without a state presence.
The UN enters the arena
Colombia had long been a relatively isolated country, and the authorities hesitated as long as possible before airing their dirty laundry in public. Not until the latter part of the 1990s did the heavyweight UN agencies, such as the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) and the UN Office for Human Rights, open their offices in the country. In the agreement between the Colombian government and UNHCR, it was stated that UNHCR was there to support the Colombian government’s ability to handle the displacement situation.
In 1994, when the peace process was blossoming in Central America, Francis Deng, Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, visited Colombia. Before his arrival, he had asked the Colombian government for displacement statistics. The answer he got was that no such statistics existed. But through international aid organisations, he was told the figure was estimated to be 300,000. By 2004 the number was over three million, in 2015 over six million, and in 2024 the figure varies vetween 5.1 to 8.2 million, in addition to the several hundred thousand refugees living in neighbouring countries.
Peace talks
In 1998, FARC was assigned an area the size of Switzerland by then President Pastrana in exchange for starting negotiations. Little came of this, and the government saw with scepticism that FARC used the area to keep kidnapped prisoners hidden and to build up their armed forces. The talks collapsed in 2002. In the same way FARC used the experiences of Unión Patriótica from the 1980s to express their scepticism towards the government’s security guarantees, the government refers to the period between 1998 and 2002 to prove that FARC is not genuinely concerned with peace.
The big military buildup to combat the drug trafficking came in 2000 when the overall strategy for the US involvement, Plan Colombia, was passed by US Congress. When Álvaro Uribe won the presidential election in 2002, the government opted for an even stronger military solution against the guerillas. Several leading guerrilla commanders were killed, but there was no final military breakthrough – even though safety in parts of the country had improved and the state presence was strengthened.
2010: Santos’ key to peace
Confrontation is a keyword to describe Uribe’s policies. All hope for dialogue with the guerilla movements evaporated. Through methods such as paying informants, mass arrests and establishing peasant militias, the civilian population was increasingly drawn into the armed conflict. Paramilitary terror increased, while FARC increased the number of kidnappings, the use of landmines and the forced recruitment of children. The demobilisation of paramilitary groups between 2003-2006 was positive, but their structures remained and new groups quickly reorganised. An increasing number of people in Colombia realised that the only way out of violence and displacement was dialogue.
Few believed in major political change when Juan Manuel Santos won the presidential election in 2010. But Santos, who had served as Defence Minister under former President Álvaro Uribe and came from the established elite, quickly set a new and conciliatory tone. Whereas Uribe was the president of the cattle barons and landowners, Santos stood for modernisation and will to reform, where the keywords were peace, equality and education. “I have the key to peace in my pocket,” Santos declared in the autumn of 2010. Since then, he showed his ability to bring out the key and use it.
The difficult peace
One of Santos’ most important contributions during his presidency was to acknowledge that there was an ongoing armed conflict in the country. And his tone was more conciliatory than President Uribe’s. The law of the victims (Ley de Victimas) was adopted in 2011 before negotiations between the government and FARC had started. The law’s ambitious objective was to facilitate the return of millions of families to their properties or give them compensation. But the flaws quickly became evident. Many of internally displaced people were met with violence when they returned, and hundreds of local leaders received death threats from armed groups.
In October 2012, representatives of the Colombian government and FARC met for peace talks in Oslo. After they returned, negotiations continued through the winter. A five-point negotiation plan was formulated:
- Land reform
- FARC’s future political participation
- A strategy to combat drug-related corruption and the cocaine production which financed the conflict
- Ceasefire and disarmament
- Transitional justice and rights of the victims
For the first time in years, one could sense some movement in the protracted conflict. The number of internally displaced people in Colombia had since the millennium been among the highest in the world. Hostilities and displacement mainly happened in the countryside, and many of the displaced found their way to the poorest neighbourhoods in the large cities. At this time, 94 per cent of Colombians fleeing were living below the poverty line and 77 per cent were in extreme poverty.
The fighting impacted indigenous people and Afro-Colombians the hardest, because their territories were often remotely located, but also strategic in terms of coca production and smuggling, which attracted armed groups. A big challenge during the peace process was the fact that there were several armed groups, including illegal groups that did not have a place at the negotiating table. The situation was complicated, and the population was divided in its view on the issue.
The peace agreement
Santos’ re-election in 2014 was pivotal for the continuation of the peace process. A second breakthrough was made when an agreement on more and more comprehensive rights and guarantees for the political opposition in Colombia was made. But transforming FARC, Latin America’s oldest guerilla movement, to a political movement was one of many challenges facing Colombia.
In December 2014 FARC declared a one-sided ceasefire and in 2015 the movement announced that it would stop recruiting minors. In March the same year, the government and FARC agreed on the removal of landmines, and shortly thereafter President Santos announced that the government would stop bombing FARC camps.
On 26 September 2016, a long-awaited peace agreement was signed by the Colombian government and FARC. The historic agreement led to President Juan Manuel Santos being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016. But despite the agreement, there were still many hurdles to overcome.
That same year, the agreement met its first challenge. In a referendum, a majority of the Colombian population declined the peace agreement, and new talks were necessary. After several adjustments the parties agreed, and in 2016 the agreement was ratified by the Colombian Congress.
Opposition to the agreement was strong among those led by former President Uribe. Among the rest of the population, uncertainty about what the agreement entailed was the prevailing feeling.
Opposition to the peace agreement
The signed peace agreement quickly turned out to not be enough. Everything depended on its implementation. While FARC carried out their disarmament obligations, the registration progress in areas involving local authorities and the government were slow. Many demobilisation camps were given insufficient support, and frustration increased among former FARC soldiers that had then given up their weapons. Several aspects of the peace agreement also took longer than expected to be passed through the Colombian Senate.
In the meantime, increasing numbers of demobilised FARC soldiers and social leaders were killed. The only ones capitalising on this development were those factions of FARC that hadn’t accepted the peace agreement, namely the dissidents. They continued their armed fight and many demobilised FARC soldiers joined them. Others were recruited to criminal groups. As a result, violence and cocaine production increased.
In August 2018, Ivan Duque Márquez, from the right-wing party Centro Democratico, was sworn in as Colombian President. President Duque inherited big challenges: 1.7 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants, increasing levels of violence, large social protests, and eventually the Covid-19 pandemic. In addition, he represented a party with a history of opposition to the peace agreement and its implementation under the Duque government.
At the end of 2021, five years after the peace agreement was signed, millions of Colombians were still displaced within the country. The power vacuum left by FARC in areas they had controlled was filled by criminal gangs, ELN guerillas, the FARC dissidents and paramilitary groups. Moreover, unemployment was high and nearly 40 per cent of people were living in poverty.
In the run-up to the presidential election in 2022, there was an evident dissatisfaction among the population caused by slow economic development and the defective peace agreement. The conditions were in place for new ideas to come forward.
New president: aimed change
Gustavo Petro was elected as Colombia’s first left-wing president in 2022 because he promised peace, the levelling of social differences, economic growth, fighting corruption and drug smuggling, full implementation of the peace agreement, and better integration of minorities. In addition, he wanted to normalise relations with neighbouring Venezuela.
But Colombia’s polarisation quickly forced President Petro’s hand as he balanced different interests. He chose dialogue and invited different actors to the task of lifting the country out of its troubles. But this came at a cost. He met many challenges to realising his own political objectives because his government coalition consisted of parties that did not share his political promises.
Many of President Petro’s proposed reforms have been killed or put on hold in Congress. And there have several scandals involving him and his family. The local elections last year were a blow to Petro’s coalition, Pacto Historico.
Looking to the future, much will depend on President Petro’s ability to reduce inflation and whether he has the political capital to ensure the presence of government institutions throughout the country, and prioritise development in rural areas. Development of rural areas and fair land distribution is part of the peace agreement. Combatting coca production is a social and economic challenge, not a military one, where the farmers’ needs must be prioritised.
Colombia at a crossroads
There are still many areas of Colombia where peace is absent. Nearly eight years on from the peace agreement, there are areas with little or no government presence. The government’s policies have not translated from paper to reality. At the time of writing there are 8 recognized internal conflicts taking place in Colombia
In order to speed up change, Petro invited all armed groups, including the criminal ones, to take part in dialogue. This was a bold strategy with significant downsides, but at the same time very important for millions of people forced to flee due to violence and conflict.
During the presidential election, Petro managed to mobilise areas populated by indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, where he had strong support. Petro also teamed up with Francia Marquez as Vice President, the first ever black, female politician appointed to such a high office in Colombia. It will be interesting to see whether Petro’s government will be able to meet the expectations of the minorities in Colombia. It is essential to establish peace and state control in these areas, in order to allow the indigenous and Afro-Colombian people to enjoy their rights.
However, the problems are complex. Signing peace treaties between the state and armed groups is one thing. Establishing peace between the different armed groups is something completely different. During recent months, we have seen non-state armed groups are increasing their geographic presence across the country and in border areas of neighbouring countries with significant humanitarian consequences for the civilian population. At the same time, peace negotiations with ELN are moving slowly, while peace talks with dissidents are almost frozen.
Colombia has for many years been among the nations most impacted by internal displacement. IDP figures are quite controversial. The numbers vary between 8.2 million (Victims Unit) and 5.1 (IDMC). More than a million of these were forced to flee after the peace agreement was signed in 2016.
The population's expectations remain high, peace must be built from the bottom up and its dividends must be tangible in all communities affected by the armed conflict.
(Richard Skretteberg is Senior Adviser in the Norwegian Refugee Council.)