

THE GAZA SCORECARD

Israel Fails to Comply with U.S. Humanitarian Access Demands in Gaza



NOVEMBER 2024

Executive Summary

Despite intensive diplomatic engagement by the United States and other countries, Israel has consistently failed to uphold its legal obligation to facilitate adequate humanitarian relief for civilians in Gaza during its ongoing military operation there. People are being [starved in Gaza](#): Israeli military operations have denied them critical food aid and basic necessities, which has, in turn, caused conditions approaching famine for [800,000 Palestinian civilians](#) across Gaza. Conditions are worst in Gaza's north, where Israel launched a major operation in October that has cut off humanitarian aid to the area.

On October 13, 2024, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense issued a letter demanding that Israel make concrete progress within 30 days on measures to reverse the spiraling humanitarian situation. These demands align with U.S. legal requirements under Section 620i of the Foreign Assistance Act, which requires that the President halt security assistance to any foreign government that restricts U.S. humanitarian aid. These are legislative requirements that will outlast specific Biden administration policies or initiatives, like the October 13 letter, and will apply to the incoming administration under President-elect Trump. These requirements are also germane to other countries' engagement with the Israeli government: these concrete metrics, demonstrating its failure to comply with U.S. law, underscores its failure to meet its obligations under international humanitarian law as well.

This scorecard provides an independent assessment of Israel's compliance with those concrete metrics, and by extension its compliance with U.S. and international law. The humanitarian community urges the U.S. government and other governments to hold Israel accountable for its legal obligations, emphasizing that non-compliance should have significant consequences for bilateral security relationships, including suspending the transfer of lethal arms. As this report makes clear, Israel is violating its legal obligations with impunity, at enormous human cost for Palestinian civilians in Gaza.

Main Findings

Israel's actions failed to meet any of the specific criteria set out in the U.S. letter. Israel not only failed to meet the U.S. criteria that would indicate support to the humanitarian response, but concurrently took actions that dramatically worsened the situation on the ground, particularly in Northern Gaza. That situation is in an even more dire state today than a month ago.

The principals of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee now assess that “the entire Palestinian population in North Gaza is at imminent risk of dying from disease, famine and violence.” The findings of this scorecard underscore Israel’s failure to comply with U.S. demands and international obligations. Israel should be held accountable for the end result of failing to ensure the adequate provision of food, medical, and other supplies to reach people in need.

Methodology

This scorecard measures Israel’s compliance with the humanitarian measures explicitly outlined in the U.S. Secretaries’ letter dated October 13, 2024. The findings are based on the observations and experience of humanitarian organizations on the ground and on available public data and secondary sources. The evaluation provides an independent, objective, and transparent analysis of Israel’s actions—or lack thereof—on improving the humanitarian situation in Gaza within the specified 30-day deadline. It highlights the direct consequences of Israel’s non-compliance on civilian lives and welfare.

Background

The humanitarian situation in Gaza has deteriorated to its worst point since the war began in October 2023. The ongoing Israeli blockade and intensive military actions have led to widespread destruction of infrastructure, severe shortages of food, water, and medical supplies, and the displacement of nearly 2 million people. Hospitals are overwhelmed, operating under dire conditions with the healthcare system on the brink of collapse due to resource depletion and continuous, targeted attacks. The obstruction of aid and commercial entry by Israel has directly resulted in increased mortality rates and unnecessary suffering among the civilian population.

Israel’s consistent failure to address urgent humanitarian needs raises serious questions about its adherence to international humanitarian law and its obligations as an occupying power. Israel’s refusal to ensure unimpeded access for humanitarian aid, protect civilian infrastructure, and facilitate essential services has had a devastating impact on Gaza’s civilian population.

In response to these issues, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense issued a letter on October 13, 2024, demanding that Israel make progress on specific measures to improve the humanitarian situation within 30 days to avoid potential policy and legal repercussions. The letter and its list of concrete measures address many of the most essential challenges and roadblocks to improving the humanitarian situation in Gaza. However, they do not capture the full scope of Israeli actions and conflict dynamics that are preventing the delivery of aid and leading to a further deterioration of the conditions on the ground. The current situation in Northern Gaza is a case in point.

Northern Gaza

In October, Israeli forces launched a new military operation against remaining Palestinian armed groups in the governorate of North Gaza, which includes the municipalities of Jabalia, Beit Lahiya, and Beit Hanoun, subsequently cutting off humanitarian aid and besieging the region's then-remaining 200,000 civilians. On October 6, Israeli authorities designated all of North Gaza as a combat zone and ordered the entire civilian population to evacuate. Since then, aid workers have been largely prevented from accessing North Gaza. Humanitarian deliveries to North Gaza ceased entirely in the first two weeks of October, while only a small amount of assistance has been delivered to neighboring Gaza City during that period.


An estimated 100,000 people have been displaced from North Gaza to Gaza City and between 75,000 and 95,000 people remain besieged in North Gaza without medical or food supplies. The Israeli military reported that 11 trucks of food and supplies were delivered to North Gaza on November 7, but the World Food Program reported that not all of them reached agreed drop off points. All of North Gaza's remaining hospitals have been attacked by Israeli forces, with some staff detained or forced to flee, vital equipment and aid supplies destroyed, and patients left without access to basic care in a conflict zone.


Israeli rights groups criticized the Israeli government for implementing the first stage of a so-called "Generals' plan," an initiative put forward by retired Israeli generals designed to empty northern Gaza and turn it into a closed military zone. On October 16, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield observed that the United States is closely monitoring the situation in Northern Gaza amid concern about risk of a "policy of starvation." The U.S. Department of State warned on October 25 that insufficient humanitarian assistance was getting to North Gaza to people who needed it and that Israel has "not fully implemented all of the changes that we called for in that letter."


The effectiveness of international diplomatic efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza hinges on the willingness of the United States and other countries to push Israel to comply with these priorities. Continued non-compliance exacerbates civilian suffering and further undercuts the credibility of international legal frameworks and of U.S. law. The failure to meet humanitarian needs and respect international humanitarian law are already being repeated in Lebanon. Therefore, it is imperative that Israel takes immediate and substantive actions to meet its obligations under international and U.S. law and that the international community, particularly the United States, holds it accountable for those commitments.

Explanation of Grades










The assessment utilizes a traffic light system to indicate levels of compliance for each measure:











Red  : Non-compliance, significant delays, or backtracking. This score reflects outright failure to take meaningful action to address an issue, which actively worsens the humanitarian situation. The actions associated with a red score have direct and severe impacts on civilian lives, contributing to increased suffering and loss.

Yellow  : Partial or inconsistent implementation. This score indicates efforts that are substantially insufficient and/or applied inconsistently or inordinately delayed, resulting in deficient relief for civilians.

Green  : Full or significant progress. This score denotes substantial compliance with the required humanitarian measures, leading to observable improvements in the situation on the ground.

Scores by Measures

Requirement	Grade
Enabling a minimum of 350 trucks per day to enter Gaza, upholding your prior commitment to allow assistance to flow consistently through all four major crossings (Erez West, Erez East, Gate 96, and Kerem Shalom), as well as opening a new fifth crossing.	
Instituting adequate humanitarian pauses across Gaza as necessary to enable humanitarian activities, including vaccinations, deliveries, and distribution, for at least the next four months.	
Allowing people in Mawasi and the "humanitarian zone" to move inland before winter.	
Enhancing security for fixed humanitarian sites and movements.	
Rescinding evacuation orders when there is no operational need.	
Facilitating rapid implementation of the World Food Program winter and logistics plan to repair roads, install warehousing, and expand platforms and staging areas.	
Ensuring Israeli Coordination and Liaison (CLA) officers can communicate with humanitarian convoys at checkpoints and assign division-level liaison officers from Southern Command to the Joint Coordination Board.	
Removing restrictions on the use of container and closed trucks and increasing the number of vetted drivers to 400.	
Removing an agreed list of essential items from the dual-use restricted list.	

Providing expedited clearance processing at the Port of Ashdod for Gaza-bound humanitarian assistance.	
Ensure the commercial and Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) corridors function at full and continuous capacity by:	
Waiving customs requirements on the JAF corridor until the UN is able to implement its own process.	
Allowing the JAF to enter Gaza through the northern crossings and others as agreed.	
Reinstating a minimum of 50-100 commercial trucks per day.	
Ending the isolation of northern Gaza by reaffirming that there will be no Israeli government policy of forced evacuation of civilians from northern to southern Gaza.	
Ensuring humanitarian organizations have continuous access to northern Gaza through northern crossings and from southern Gaza.	
Take all possible steps to prevent adoption of Knesset legislation that could remove certain privileges and immunities from the United Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and its staff, prohibit official contact with UNRWA, and alter the status quo regarding UNRWA in Jerusalem.	
Allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to individuals detained in connection with the conflict and re-engaging in dialogue with the ICRC immediately.	
Establish a new channel to raise and discuss incidents of civilian harm. We request the initial virtual meeting for this channel to be held by the end of October.	

Enabling a minimum of 350 trucks per day to enter Gaza, upholding your prior commitment to allow assistance to flow consistently through all four major crossings (Erez West, Erez East, Gate 96, and Kerem Shalom), as well as opening a new fifth crossing.

Score: 


350 Trucks per Day

Israel has failed to enable a minimum of 350 trucks per day to enter Gaza. With five days remaining in the 30-day review period, just over [1,000 total trucks](#) had crossed into Gaza, an average of just 42 trucks a day. On some days, as few as six trucks have entered across all available border crossings; and only two days saw more than 100 trucks enter.

While Israel reported 229 trucks crossing in one day in early November, those reports could not be verified on the ground, and remain clearly below the U.S. benchmark of 350 trucks per day.

Prior to October 2023, an average of 500 trucks entered Gaza each working day—more than nine times the current volume—an amount insufficient to meet needs even before the escalation of hostilities. The Biden administration’s target of 350 trucks per day already fails to represent the assessed level of aid needed to respond at scale.

NO. OF HUMANITARIAN TRUCKS BY CROSSING PER DAY



Assistance Flows at All Four Major Crossings

Israel has not upheld its commitment to ensure consistent assistance flows through all four major crossings. Erez West/Zikim, Erez East, Gate 96, and Kerem Shalom/Karem Abu Salem have seen a wide range of trucks allowed in per day during the reporting period, [averaging 16, 0, 9, and 16 trucks per day](#) respectively. Erez East has seen no trucks enter during the reporting period. A needed and requested fifth crossing, Kissufim, has not yet opened despite pledges from Israel that it would. See more below.

According to WFP, all northern border crossings [were closed](#) during the first weeks of October, leaving people cut off from essential food and supplies. While Erez West was [re-opened on October 15](#), stringent security checks, delays at holding points, and multiple inspections limit its utility. On most days during the reporting period, trucks came in through only one or two crossings. On only four days did trucks come in through three crossings. Not a single day saw all four available crossing points used.

Israeli policies restricting the number of trucks per week and imposing new customs taxes have further constrained the Jordan Corridor's capacity, sometimes stopping its operations altogether. The Kerem Shalom/Karem Abu Salem crossing – only partially functional – faces frequent security issues inside Gaza, including looting by armed groups, which complicates aid delivery. WFP reports indicate the Jordan Corridor operates at a [minimal capacity](#), with limited truck availability. To meet Gaza's urgent needs, WFP has called for sustained daily convoys of 50 trucks and freedom of movement across Gaza as a better alternative to the irregular pattern of convoy movements.

Additional Border Crossing

As of publication, Israel has not opened any new border crossings. On November 8, Israel announced that it would be opening the long-proposed Kissufim crossing point, but the exact date was unclear. Kissufim could support WFP operations in southern Gaza by providing direct access to Deir al-Balah. However, without allowing more vetting for drivers to operate on the fence road, UN agencies and aid organizations will not fully benefit from the opening of Kissufim. The lack of progress on this front continues to hamper aid delivery in areas of critical need.

Instituting adequate humanitarian pauses across Gaza as necessary to enable humanitarian activities, including vaccinations, deliveries, and distribution, for at least the next four months.

Score: 

Israel has not complied with the October 13 demand for adequate humanitarian pauses to allow essential humanitarian activities in Gaza, including vaccinations, deliveries, and distribution. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the third critical phase of Gaza's polio vaccination campaign, set to begin October 23, was [postponed](#) due to escalating violence, bombardment, mass displacement, and the absence of assured, consistent pauses across northern Gaza. The third phase finally started on November 2, but with no access to North Gaza governorate, and was marked by the [bombing of a vaccination center](#) during a humanitarian pause.

During the reporting period, humanitarian agencies have submitted daily requests for equipment and staff movements. Based on field interviews, more than 50 percent of these were rejected, and another 23 percent failed due to insecurity. In the month of October, only 11 percent of goods that reached warehouses were distributed because of restrictions on movement and violent looting. Moreover, since the siege of North Gaza, aid agencies were systematically denied access to the area.

Allowing people in Mawasi and the humanitarian zone to move inland before winter.

Score: 

Only a limited number of people in Mawasi and the Israeli-designated "humanitarian zone" have been allowed to move inland as of the end of the 30-day assessment period. On October 26, Israel announced an 11-square-kilometer expansion of the zone in Mawasi it designated for displaced Palestinian civilians. The zone now covers [19 percent](#) of land area in Gaza. NGO staff report that only original residents of Khan Younis who were displaced to Mawasi West have been able to return to Khan Younis East following the expansion of the zone. This group includes only around 35,000 people.

Enhancing security for fixed humanitarian sites and movements.

Score: ●


Israel not only failed to take demonstrable actions to improve security for the humanitarian response, but also worsened security risks for humanitarians. Israeli forces repeatedly attacked humanitarian sites and frontline responders during the 30-day period. Three-quarters of the way through the U.S. monitoring period, the principals of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee published a [statement](#) concluding “humanitarians are not safe to do their work.” This remains the case.

Attacks led to deaths of aid workers across northern, central, and southern Gaza and disrupted life-saving aid operations. At least [14 aid workers](#) have been killed since October 3, including at least four documented during the 30-day period, while others were injured.¹ Two municipal well operators and four water engineers were also attacked and [killed](#), despite the engineers’ approval for their mission from Israeli authorities and their use of a clearly marked vehicle. At one hospital, over half of the staff were detained by Israeli forces, including [one MSF surgeon](#) and [five MedGlobal-affiliated staff](#). The Palestinian Civil Defence force [halted all operations](#) in North Gaza, including firefighting, search and rescue, and emergency medical assistance, following attacks on them and detention and injury of members.

During the reporting period, fixed humanitarian sites and other civilian infrastructure also came under attack. Israeli forces attacked all three of the remaining hospitals in North Gaza, forcing one out of service and rendering the other two “minimally functional.” One of the two is now [inaccessible](#) and [may be forced to cease operations](#), while the other faced “[effective destruction](#).” The attacks on hospitals destroyed recently delivered medical supplies, medical equipment, ambulances, and electricity systems. Attacks hit numerous sites being used for aid distribution and service delivery, including a [school-turned-shelter](#) that was going to be used as a polio vaccination site the next day, an [UNRWA distribution center](#) as people were trying to access food, at least [30 schools](#), and a [primary health center](#) while the polio vaccination campaign was underway there – and within an area under a humanitarian pause.

¹ On October 15, an Israeli airstrike [killed](#) an aid worker working for Juzoor for Health and Social Development while performing his duties at a medical point in Al-Falouja in Jabalia, northern Gaza. On October 18, an Israeli airstrike in northern Gaza [killed](#) a staff member of Mercy Corps’ Gaza Sky Geeks team. On October 24, an airstrike on a home in Khan Younis, southern Gaza [killed](#) an MSF aid worker. On October 23, an Israeli airstrike hit a UNRWA vehicle, [killing](#) the staff member traveling in it, in Deir Al-Balah, central Gaza. On November 2, the personal vehicle of a UNICEF staff member working on the polio vaccination campaign came [under fire](#), reportedly by a quadcopter, while driving through Jabalia - Elnazla. On November 1, two staff members of Caritas Jerusalem were [injured](#) during shelling in Al-Nuseirat refugee camp, central Gaza.

Rescinding evacuation orders when there is no operational need.


Score: 

While operational necessity is outside of the scope of humanitarian agencies to assess, Israel's evacuation orders are not compatible with international law, which should be the primary metric by which they are evaluated.

Regardless, during the 30 day time-period, [only one evacuation order was rescinded](#). This was done to expand the so-called "humanitarian zone" – an area that has proven to be unsafe with inadequate services and aid. In general, relocation areas have not provided safety, adequate shelter or essential services, and there has also been no guarantee that displaced populations will return after hostilities end—all of which must be in place for evacuation orders to be permissible under International Humanitarian Law.

Meanwhile, Israel implemented five new orders in October. On November 7, Israel issued a sixth new evacuation order in the North, affecting displaced people who fled to this area from Jabalia and the surrounding area over the past month. Since October 2023, only four of the [65 evacuation orders](#) imposed on civilians have been rescinded. Today, roughly 80 percent of the Gaza Strip remains under evacuation order.

Facilitating rapid implementation of the World Food Program winter and logistics plan to repair roads, install warehousing, and expand platforms and staging areas.

Score: 

Israel has failed to facilitate rapid implementation of the WFP winter and logistics plan. Despite promises to facilitate access, Israel continued to impose extreme limitations on entrance to Gaza. Ongoing attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure and the creation of conditions that rendered areas lawless have prevented WFP and partners from implementing any winterization.

Israel denied all WFP movement requests necessary to complete road repairs; as well as requests to erect new warehousing and requests to expand logistic platforms and staging areas. Israel also rejected throughout the month multiple requests submitted daily to transport winterization materials, including blankets, heating supplies, and clothes. On October 29, WFP warned that the current lack of food and supplies ahead of winter could soon lead to "[catastrophic consequences](#)," including famine.

UNFPA [reported](#) as of October 31, "as winter approaches, millions of people in Gaza have no adequate shelter, no warm clothing and bedding. All barriers to bring in winterization items must be removed."

Ensuring Israeli Coordination and Liaison (CLA) officers can communicate with humanitarian convoys at checkpoints and assign division-level liaison officers from Southern Command to the Joint Coordination Board.

Score: ●

CLA officers do not communicate with humanitarian convoys at checkpoints, and no division-level liaison officers from Southern Command have been assigned to the joint Coordination Board. Despite promises and agreements otherwise, the UN and partners have neither the ability to coordinate with Southern Command nor the ability to communicate with operational troops on the ground or at checkpoints. Since the closure of the JLOTS project in July 2024, the IDF instituted terms of reference for a 'Joint Board' that explicitly prohibits engagement of UN and other partners with Southern Command and operational forces on the ground.

Removing restrictions on the use of container and closed trucks and increasing the number of vetted drivers to 400.

Score: ●

Israeli authorities have failed to remove restrictions on the use of container and closed trucks or to increase the number of vetted drivers to 400. Repeated efforts to secure approval for container and closed trucks have met with refusal by Southern Command, COGAT, CLA, and other Israeli authorities. Since May of this year, WFP has submitted 315 driver names on a rolling basis to the Israeli military for approval to use the 'fence road' built by Israeli forces. Leading up to and during the reporting period, only 30 have been approved.

Even if the use of closed trucks were allowed, it would not solve the problem of organized looting and civil unrest, nor would it ensure the safety of trucks on roads that have been repeatedly destroyed by Israeli shelling. Ongoing violence targeting

contracted drivers, trucks, and civilian infrastructure (roads), coupled with lawless conditions (created by desperation and war-profiteering because of a lack of supplies and a too-large gap between needs and provisions), has both prevented aid agencies from increasing the number of drivers – and vetted drivers. UN drivers have routinely been shot at, beaten, and abducted. In the reporting period in question, one driver was killed.

Removing an agreed list of essential items from the dual-use restricted list.

Score: 

The list of restricted dual-use items remains non-transparent and ad hoc, with NGOs continuing to report inconsistencies in what is or is not allowed on any given day. Field-based interviews indicate that a small amount of UNICEF water and sanitation supplies were allowed, but make up less than 5 percent of what was requested or required. More broadly, basic communications equipment, personal security equipment, office and logistical equipment including vehicle repair parts, and related items included as part of basic global standards for humanitarian agencies remains highly restricted, if not denied.

Providing expedited clearance processing at the Port of Ashdod for Gaza-bound humanitarian assistance.

Score: 

Israeli authorities have failed to consistently expedite clearance processing at the Port of Ashdod. Most organizations moving aid through the port report no changes in the extended timeframe required to move goods. There have been a few reports in the past week of aid agencies successfully receiving expedited clearance through Ashdod but this does not appear to be applied to all humanitarian groups and it remains unclear if this is a genuine change in policy. On October 29, [WFP noted](#) that cargo typically remains at Ashdod for about a month before it can be transported to Gaza. NGOs report that the customs clearance process ranges from within a day to a full week. After customs clearance, there is an average wait time of one week for transit approval from COGAT/CLA to transfer the cargo to one of the designated Gaza crossings. If there are missing documents, the process may be delayed by an additional week.

Ensure the commercial and Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) corridors function at full and continuous capacity by:

Score: 

There has been little to no progress during the reporting period on ensuring the commercial and JAF corridors function at full and continuous capacity. Aid through the Jordanian corridor has not increased, and there has been no commercial access during the reporting period in question.

Humanitarian-led convoys remain capped at around 50 trucks per movement, similar to levels observed before the September blockage. Humanitarian actors reported at least three movements through the corridor during the reporting period. On October 16, one convoy comprising 20 trucks carrying food and WASH supplies bound for northern Gaza arrived in Erez West after moving through the Jordan corridor. Subsequently, one convoy with some 50 trucks moved through the corridor on both October 28 and October 29. This limited frequency and capacity confirm that there has been no real improvement in the corridor's operation despite commitments to increase access.

Waiving customs requirements on the JAF corridor until the UN is able to implement its own process.

Score: 

Israel introduced a specific and problematic customs clearance requirement in the summer of 2024. That requirement was waived during the reporting period. This was an important step. Ongoing monitoring is needed to ensure this is permanent. However, overburdensome clearance processes still remain for humanitarian organizations. Some organizations have reported being forced to pay customs fees whilst others, notably those entering under USAID agreements, have not.

Allowing the JAF to enter Gaza through the northern crossings and others as agreed

Score: 

The Jordanian Armed Forces Government to Government (JAF G2G) overland aid delivery corridor is ostensibly functional, but nowhere near capacity as bureaucratic obstacles and [targeted violence](#) severely limit the channel. Because this is a government to government corridor, NGOs have limited visibility to the program. Further, the mechanism is reliant on commercial trucks, which throughout the reporting period, Israel has blocked.

Reinstating a minimum of 50-100 commercial trucks per day.

Score: 

International humanitarian actors have not observed a single entry of commercial trucks since September 30. Commercial goods are critical for complementing the humanitarian response. They deliver a variety of staple goods such as flour, oil, biscuits, milk, tomato sauce, pasta, salt, tea, and water, amongst other items. Before the recent stoppage of commercial entry, most basic needs were met through the market, not humanitarian assistance. The ongoing restrictions on commercial access are contributing to the critical shortages of basic commodities in the market and driving up inflation while decreasing purchasing power and the quality and quantity of goods available for purchase. It should also be noted that the demand for 50-100 commercial trucks per day would not itself be sufficient to meet the massive needs.

Humanitarian staff are now reporting that markets are practically empty, and what is available is extremely expensive. Fruit, vegetables, and meat are very difficult to find, while even flour and sugar are scarce. Due to the complete stoppage of commercial entry, the market is on the verge of collapse and civilians are unable to meet their basic needs, with many unable to get their hands on any aid or goods to purchase.

End the isolation of northern Gaza by reaffirming that there will be no Israeli government policy of forced evacuation of civilians from northern to southern Gaza.

Score: 

Israeli forces continue to besiege North Gaza and [have ordered civilians to leave – including patients from the main hospitals](#) – demonstrating its intention to forcibly evacuate civilians in practice. Over the past four weeks, starting just before the reporting period and continuing throughout, an estimated [100,000 people](#) have been displaced from North Gaza governorate to Gaza City. Between 75,000 and 95,000 people remain in North Gaza, according to the most recent estimates by the UN and its partners.

However, very few people have crossed into southern Gaza and recent attempts have resulted in [several mass casualty incidents](#). Most of the displaced are unable to move due to extreme heavy fire, aerial bombardment, and drone blasts. Residents who have attempted to leave have been injured or killed, including on designated routes, and experienced separation and detention. Israel has also delayed and denied the [medical evacuation of children](#). Those who remain risk being killed by Israeli forces or starved to death.

As the UN's Human Rights chief [noted on October 25](#), "the Israeli Government's policies and practices in northern Gaza risk emptying the area of all Palestinians," and the military operation is rendering it unlivable with no guarantee of return, while southern Gaza remains unsafe and unfit for lawful evacuation.

Ensuring humanitarian organizations have continuous access to northern Gaza through northern crossings and from southern Gaza.

Score: 

Israeli authorities have failed to ensure continuous access to northern Gaza for humanitarian organizations during the reporting period. One of the main restrictions imposed on aid volume through Erez is limited hours of operation: the crossing is only open for cargo offloading from 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. One humanitarian provider coordinating a pending shipment of 2,261 pallets of non-food items – around 100 truckloads – expects the delivery into Gaza to take about a month to complete. This is because only 10 trucks are able to enter on any given day, and some days are fully booked for other shipments. Additionally, Erez is closed on Saturdays and for holidays. In the month of October, Erez was closed for nine days due to holidays.

Access to northern areas from within Gaza is even more restricted. [OCHA reports](#) that in the month of October, Israeli denials of humanitarian aid movements to northern Gaza through Al Rashid checkpoint have increased by 115 percent. OCHA had limited success in facilitating a few shipments, primarily of critical items such as medicines, polio vaccines, and fuel. Israeli authorities facilitated only 11 percent of movements from southern to northern Gaza through Al Rashid. One humanitarian provider reported that all attempts to move aid between the north and south of Gaza, in either direction, have been denied. Access to northern Gaza from points south remains extremely restricted, with very few approvals granted by Israel for humanitarian movements in recent weeks.

Across Gaza as a whole, Israeli denials of movement more than doubled in October from September. Israeli authorities directly denied or impeded 58 percent of aid movements, while another 4 percent were canceled due to logistical or security obstacles in the territory under Israeli occupation.

Take all possible steps to prevent adoption of Knesset legislation that could remove certain privileges and immunities from the United Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and its staff, prohibit official contact with UNRWA, and alter the status quo regarding UNRWA in Jerusalem.

Score: 

On October 28, 2024, Israel's Knesset voted to ban UNRWA from operating within Israel and Palestinian territories and to ban contact between UNRWA employees and Israeli officials. On November 3, Israel officially [notified the UN](#) that it was ending its 1967 agreement allowing UNRWA to operate. UNRWA plays a crucial role in delivering emergency relief and health services to millions of Palestinians. Its removal will have devastating humanitarian consequences.

Allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to individuals detained in connection with the conflict and re-engaging in dialogue with the ICRC immediately.

Score: ●

During the reporting period, Southern Command did not meet with ICRC representatives to engage on issues around civilian harm and international humanitarian law. This continues a long-time Israeli policy or practice of denying ICRC regular access to civilian populations outside hospitals in Gaza and access to detainees in Israel.

More broadly, ICRC faces the same restrictions of other NGOs and the UN, and are similarly affected by violence targeted at civilians, civilian infrastructure, and created conditions for lawlessness/looting. ICRC was able on November 2, for the first time since the start of October, to transfer some patients from Indonesian hospital to Shifa hospital. This single approval, however, does not equate to cooperation under international humanitarian law.

Establish a new channel to raise and discuss incidents of civilian harm. We request the initial virtual meeting for this channel to be held by the end of October.

Score: ●

At the time of this report, this has not been fulfilled. On November 7, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller [stated](#), "It [the new channel] didn't take place by the end of October. We're working to land the meeting and expect it to happen in the coming days or week or two."