



NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL

EVALUATION REPORT



Mid Term Evaluation of DFID CHASE Support
for NRC Programmes

TFM Consult

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NRC Mid-term Evaluation DFID CHASE funded programmes

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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Disclaimer:

Full responsibility for the text of this report rests with the authors. In common with all evaluation reports commissioned by DFID and/or NRC, the views contained in this report do not necessarily represent those of DFID or NRC or of the people consulted.

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Abbreviations

AID	Advocacy and Information Department Oslo
BAJ	Bridge Asia Japan
BSC	Balance Score Card
CAD	Core Activity Database
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CC	Core Competencies
CD	Country Director
CHASE	Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department
DFID	UK's Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic Congo
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EFSD	Emergency Food Security and Distribution
FAM	Finance and Administration Manager
FAO	United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPAF	Global Poverty Action Fund
HAP	Humanitarian Action Plan
HLP	Housing, Land, Property
HO	Head Office (Oslo)
HQ	Head Quarters (Oslo)
ICLA	Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGA	Income Generating Activity
INGO	International NGO
IP	Implementing Partner
IPR	Independent Progress Review
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NAO	National Audit Office
NFI	Non Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NOK	Norwegian Krone
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAA	Protection and Advocacy Advisor
PAD	Population affected by displacement
PC	Programme Coordinator
PD	Programme Director
PEAR	Programme of Expanded Assistance to Return
PM	Programme Manager
PNIP	People in Need of International Protection
PPA	Programme Partnership Arrangement
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
TL	Team Leader
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency (UN High Commissioner for Refugees)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

USAID	US International Cooperation Agency
VfM	Value for Money
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
YEP	Youth Education Pack

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Executive Summary

This report describes the outcomes and the process of the mid-term evaluation of the NRC's DFID CHASE funded Programme that runs from April 2011 till April 2014 and is implemented in seven countries and through two global programmes. The evaluation was carried out between April and July 2012 by an international independent evaluation team, consisting of five members, all with experience in complex programme evaluations and expertise in programme finances, law, advocacy and a humanitarian programme expert as team leader. Findings, conclusions and recommendations are presented in this main report with separate reports for the evaluated countries and the IDMC.

Introduction and methodology

The evaluation team drafted an inception report describing the methodology, the workplan, assumptions and evaluation criteria and questions. With this report as guideline, mutually approved with the NRC Evaluation Committee, the team visited three country programmes (DR Congo, Colombia region and Myanmar), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) in Geneva and NRC's Headquarters in Oslo, where the Advocacy section of the AID department is also based.

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation report was to review the progress and future potential of DFID's support to NRC's programmes, to verify the information contained in the annual reporting process between NRC and DFID, while reviewing the quality and process of reporting in general, and to draw general recommendations together with two to three recommendations per focus area that could be implemented within the remaining 18 months of funding. Specific attention was paid to *value for money, additionality, learning and innovation*, and to what extent *gender, protection, environment and connectedness* were mainstreamed in the Programme design and implementation.

The evaluation was constrained by several factors: i) Implementation time: most programmes were only 8 to 12 months underway and actual implementation sometimes even shorter; ii) Access to direct beneficiaries was seriously hampered in two of the three countries by security (DRC) and failure to obtain the necessary permissions (Myanmar); iii) Complexity of programmes / focus areas: especially the IDMC and AID programmes, but to a certain extent also the Colombia Regional Refugee programme are wide-ranging programmes that are difficult to apprehend in the short time available.

The research methodology applied was combining both quantitative and qualitative methods, using desk study and document review, key stakeholder interviews and beneficiary focus groups discussions and interviews. Data collection was done by the individual evaluators and centrally processed, serving to fill in predefined evaluation matrices. Due to the inaccessibility of a large proportion of beneficiaries, the intended house-hold survey was not carried out and as only a relatively small number of beneficiaries were interviewed, a comprehensive summary table of responses to evaluation questions is not provided either. In evaluating the data the evaluation team used primarily the contribution analysis concept. To analyse the Value for Money concept a specific methodology was developed: i) measuring cost-efficiency analysis, consisting of a variance analysis and a cost comparison of peer programmes; ii) assessing the management of the various programmes looking at procurement, planning, financial and M&E systems, leverage and delivery processes.

Two adaptations to the original evaluation plan were made: i) the Global Advocacy activities on Humanitarian Access, Housing, Land and Property were assessed in conjunction with similar activities of IDMC and the country programmes; ii) to limit the measurement approach to the Value for Money (VfM) assessment to a cost-efficiency analysis only, to skip the cost-effectiveness analysis as proposed and described in the Inception Report, but to add the management assessment.

Findings:

The Programme is considered very relevant as it represents and responds to ever-existing priority needs of the targeted groups. Beneficiary selection was properly carried out according to pre-defined and well-established vulnerability criteria and NRC is stimulating other humanitarian actors to work in its slipstream, either by replicating the quality of its work (e.g. Myanmar), or by stimulating others to work in remote areas (Colombia region). The Programme combines also humanitarian field activities with advocacy efforts, thus addressing needs at different levels. Most of the shortcomings are in the design of the Programme: i) a scattered and large number of locations and a multitude of programmes and activities within the countries reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of the Programme; ii) the utilisation of generic needs assessments for the overall Programme instead of country/location specific problem definitions and needs assessments makes the Programme not sufficiently specific; iii) limited funds per programme and targeting a too small number of beneficiaries reduces cost-efficiency; iv) the

Programme logical framework needs revision of OVIs and output formulation and to be cascaded into sub-frameworks to enhance internal coherence and management on the basis of result-based work plans.

NRC is rather strongly involved in the implementation of its projects, hence less investing in meaningful partnerships, impeding the organisation somewhat to adopt a more long-term and inclusive approach and to bridge to a more 'developmental' kind of assistance. NRC is also not fully profiting from the multi-annual DFID funding. Instead of programming its interventions on a 3 year basis, the programme planning is now done on a yearly basis. Long(er)-term planning and programming would increase its cost-efficiency and effectiveness. The programme, in general, coordinates reasonably well with similar interventions, but NRC is perceived in Myanmar and DRC to work more in isolation, not so much engaging in structural partnerships with other (NGO) humanitarian actors.

NRC delivers quality outputs (e.g. shelters in Myanmar, food stores in DRC, legal assistance in Colombia region) and distinguishes itself thereby from other humanitarian actors. NRC is also distinctive as an NGO for its unique IDMC activities and only comparable to UNHCR with the regional refugee programme because no other international organization provides this service in Colombia. NRC is, however, regarded by its peers less distinctive and more operating in isolation, making its role less effective in advocacy. Structuring the coordination between AID, country programmes and advocacy initiatives undertaken by IDMC and a new Global Advocacy Policy are signs of improvement. NRC is reaching its Programme milestones, but progress towards programme outputs is difficult to assess as output indicators are not objectively measurable or precisely formulated.

Certain impacts as a result of programme's activities are already visible: i) IDPs are more protected and become more "visible" by the information from IDMC's data base; ii) advocating for PADs and providing legal assistance leads to more appropriate assistance, conditions and eventually durable solutions for PADs; iii) Prospects of multiplier effects could also already be noticed. Some unplanned positive side-effects could already be observed as well (e.g. land rights for non-assisted beneficiaries) though some interventions are not thoroughly analysed on their long-term effects (e.g. IGAs in DRC, negative effect of providing new housing on social cohesion in targeted villages - Myanmar). Mitigation of unplanned negative side effects is not yet in place.

Cross-cutting issues

Gender mainstreaming and environmental concerns are not high on the agenda in the Programme and deserve more attention. Gender mainstreaming was not sufficiently incorporated into the programme design nor during implementation phase. Gender related vulnerability is, to a certain extent, taken into account during beneficiary selection and programme design, but to increase gender equality as such not. The programme is therefore classified as G-0 to G-1 (Colombia), according to the OECD Gender Policy Marker. A "*do no harm policy*" has been adopted and applied by the programme, but only few specific environmentally-sound activities are implemented. The protection aspect is inherent to the nature of NRC's humanitarian work and is reasonably well provided in all its modes. Specific advocacy actions could, however, be increased to protect human rights even more, wherever they are non-respected.

The country programmes and IDMC are reasonably well involving local authorities and actors in the implementation of their activities, with the exception of DRC. Beneficiaries, both in programme design and implementation, have, however, a limited say in planning and implementation processes. The current observed low level of ownership among beneficiaries is a sign thereof. The programme design does not contain an exit strategy nor is the potential synergy of cooperating with the private sector explicitly explored. The benefits of e.g. linking beneficiaries to the agricultural value market chain or other commercial pathways in DRC could have been an avenue to increase connectedness and thus durability of the interventions.

NRC understands that feeding experiences and lessons learned back into the organisation is vital to organizational development and programmatic improvement. However, certain aspects of the learning environment in NRC (e.g. monitoring systems, documentation in general) need improvement. Recent changes in Monitoring and Evaluation systems are already promising.

Additionality

NRC has used the DFID funding both for direct inputs as well as for organisational strengthening and learning. The unrestricted and flexible funding has allowed NRC to allocate funds where they were most needed or where no other funds were available: i) to expand a regional refugee programme for Colombians; ii) to pilot more transitional humanitarian approaches; iii) to get access to areas other

humanitarian agencies would not get easily funding for; iv) to contribute to a stable core funding, indispensable for research and advocacy initiatives (IDMC / AID). DFID funding has also favoured the likelihoods of multiplier effects: i) extension of ICLA services in Venezuela to new and often remote areas; ii) the adaptation of high quality provided outputs by other organizations. The evaluation team considers it plausible that above aspects are to a large extent the result of the specific DFID PPA funds and that they demonstrate that the funding has assisted the organisation to deliver enhanced, otherwise not achievable results.

Value for money

Value for money was assessed using two approaches: Measurement of cost efficiency, evaluating a variance analysis and a cost comparison of peer organisations, and assessing the overall Management of the various programmes. In using both approaches it was possible to countercheck the respective observations and data. The evaluator found no major variances in between the two methodologies and considers the NRC's PPA funded programme overall as reasonable Value for Money. However, there were some shortcomings observed: i) Evidence about the cost-efficiency of the three country programmes is mixed; ii) The existing budget system does not encourage optimizing cost-efficiency; iii) NRC does not enforce strict budget discipline, which limits the scope for improving cost-efficiency; iv) Some of the existing reporting and monitoring mechanisms do not offer sufficient and adequate management information to the field; v) Instructions in Financial and Logistical handbooks are not always applied to their full extent; vi) Learning and innovation is not properly embedded in the organisation, all diminishing cost-efficiency benefits.

Conclusions

NRC is regarded as a competent and reliable actor, well-reputed by its peers, national partners and counterparts as a strong defender of PNIP and a leader in matters legally related to forced migration. It delivers high quality humanitarian assistance (HA) outputs, but is less distinctive where it comes to connecting HA to transitional or longer-term development initiatives and in general in advocacy activities, apart from these that are implemented by IDMC.

The Programme is still highly relevant as the identified needs of the target group(s) are enduring and pressing, and well-embedded in on-going programmes as most of NRCs Core Competencies are represented in the Programme. However, this embedding, the spread-out over many countries and the diversified approach make the Programme in itself also less visible and manageable as a Programme and reduces its cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness. It is therefore advised to provide independent and separate funding to country programmes in future comparable PPA funding, instead of trying to force a multitude of programmes into one overarching, somewhat artificially designed Programme.

There are also some flaws in the actual Programme design itself (see *Findings*), and some of these can be corrected in the remaining time in applying the relevant recommendations. Others are only amendable in an extension or a consecutive phase of this Programme.

Cost efficiency can be improved and thereby the overall Value for Money. Concentration solely on cost efficiency is, however, hazardous as cost-effectiveness needs to be taken into account as well. It is assumed that NRC will score higher than average in that respect and it is therefore advised that NRC will endeavour to carry out some kind of such a cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit analysis in the future.

Although no hard evidence is available and with the above considerations in mind, the evaluation team considers that there were sufficient elements available and presented to judge that the DFID PPA funds are effectively used so far, in such a manner that their additionality is unmistakable.

Recommendations

Programme design

1. Produce and/or update country specific logframe matrices with SMARTly formulated outcome indicators and revise the overall Programme logframe
2. Improve the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues such as gender, connectedness and environmental issues in the existing or future programme designs

Implementation

3. Improve the relationship with IPs with long-term contracts and capacity building efforts to enhance their organizational, managerial and technical capacities
4. Strengthen coordination mechanisms with UNHCR through joint work plans
5. Engage in multi-year planning and programming increasing cost efficiency and cost-effectiveness and more durable partnerships

6. Intensify and improve training activities for beneficiaries that accompany provided agricultural, IGA and WASH related inputs
7. Improve the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues such as gender, connectedness and environmental issues in the implementation of existing programmes
8. Continue to enhance the advocacy efforts as already started, in combining country, IDMC and AID expertise and linking to other IDP / PAD advocacy initiatives to further improve effectiveness

Value for money

9. Conduct regular comparisons of unit costs of selected activities with peer programmes and monitor actual unit costs vis-à-vis budgeted unit costs
10. Explore the rationale for the differences in cost efficiency compared to other peer organisations and further explore the Value for Money of NRC's programmes in analysing their (cost-)effectiveness
11. Establish mechanisms and/or develop incentives to encourage country programmes to improve the cost-efficiency of their programmes
12. Enforce budget discipline, cost-efficiency awareness and discipline in applying financial and logistic rules and regulations
13. Enhance and streamline the reporting systems and the feeding-back of lessons-learnt into the organisation

General

14. Reduce the number of countries and sectors involved in the Programme and consider even to abandon the effecting of such an overall Programme, whenever an extension of the current Programme is foreseen; Separate and independent funding to existing country or global programmes might be more appropriate and less complicated to execute
15. Develop management and monitoring systems that are more outcome oriented / result-based instead of output-based. Combine these efforts with results-based budgeting
16. Put comparable programmes under one umbrella (logframe) programme and persuade donors to allow for collective financial and narrative reporting.

1. Introduction

In mid- February 2012, NRC launched a tender for a Mid-Term Evaluation to assess the support received from the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID)'s Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE), through the Programme Partnership Arrangement (PPA) to emergency situations and fragile states.

DFID provided funding for NRC programme activities in seven countries: Pakistan; Colombia region (Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela), Iraq, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia. Supported activities in the mentioned countries were divided among NRC's six core competences: Shelter; Food Security; Information, Counselling, and Legal Assistance (ICLA); Education; Camp Management; and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH).¹ And, in addition to the country programmes, DFID supported NRC's global advocacy campaigns and the monitoring activities of the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC).

NRC's overall objective under the PPA CHASE agreement is to contribute to a safer and more dignified life for People Affected by Displacement (PAD), with a focus on conflict induced refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees.

TFM Consult, a Netherlands based consultancy firm, was recruited to conduct an Independent Progress Review (IPR) and to assess the performance of NRC's Programme activities funded through the DFID PPA CHASE agreement at mid-term stage (18 months), officially underway since April 1st, 2011.

1.1 Evaluation purpose

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation report was to review the progress and future potential of DFID's support to NRC's programmes; to verify the information contained in the annual reporting process between NRC and DFID, while reviewing the quality and process of reporting in general; and to draw general recommendations together with two to three recommendations per focus area that could be implemented within the remaining 18 months of funding.

Specifically, the objective of this IPR was to provide an independent assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and results of DFID funded NRC activities at the global and country-specific levels.

Its secondary objectives, considered as cross-cutting themes were:

1. to assess the *value for money* delivered through PPA funded activities
2. to measure *additionality*, defined by DFID as "the additional benefits directly attributable to the activities delivered by the project"
3. to assess the extent to which NRC's activities include *learning and innovation*, with specific attention to organizational development and contextual knowledge development
4. to evaluate whether gender, protection, environment and connectedness have been mainstreamed and the extent to which they are incorporated in the design and implementation of the Programme.

1.2 Evaluation scope and focus

The evaluation has focused on the following areas:

- Country Programme Activities
 - Colombia region: Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela (ICLA)
 - Myanmar (Shelter)
 - DR Congo (Food Security)
- Global Advocacy Campaigns on Humanitarian Access; Housing, Land and Property; and Natural Disaster Response (AID, Head Office in Oslo)
- Internal Displacement Monitoring (IDMC in Geneva)

Although the evaluation focused only on three of the seven countries involved - not chosen by the evaluation team, this choice was considered sufficiently comprehensive in scope.

¹ NRC is currently phasing out one of the six Core Competencies (Camp Management) and will replace it with WASH, thus maintaining a total of 5 CCs.

1.3 External evaluation constraints

Some external constraints affected the evaluation and hence the robustness of the conclusions of this mid-term evaluation, namely:

- **Implementation time:** most country programme implementation activities started about 5 months late, rendering effective implementation periods between around 8 months (e.g. Colombia) and 12 months (e.g. DRC, Myanmar). This delay was caused by various reasons, some beyond implementer's control such as rainy season and access authorization (Myanmar) or security (DRC), others for logistical reasons (new partners needed to be identified: Colombia / Venezuela);
- **Access to direct beneficiaries:** the main intervention area in DRC, Masisi territory, which concentrates more than 85% of the total number of primary beneficiaries, was cut off and therefore impossible to visit, as a result of flaring up hostilities between the different existing fighting groups. Also the large and scattered intervention area of the Colombia region rendered field visits highly time consuming and limited thereby the area to be visited. Lastly the authorities in Myanmar were very reluctant to provide the necessary travel authorisations to visit the programme area in South-east Myanmar so also there only a small programme area could be visited (see also the respective country reports in annex 4);
- **Complexity of programmes / focus areas:** The volume of the work and the vast working area of IDMC and the AID Department in Oslo, the untargeted allocation of the funds and absence of primary beneficiaries and reachable peer organisations in the case of the former, all together reduced the evaluation of these focus areas in practice to a rather superficial encounter instead of an in-depth analysis of their functioning and delivery of results.²

Notwithstanding these limitations and constraints and the fact that the proposed evaluation methodology could not be used to its full extent (see further), the evaluation team trusts to have obtained sufficient information to satisfactorily substantiate its conclusions and recommendations.

1.4 Organisation context

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is an independent, humanitarian, non-profit, non-governmental organisation which provides assistance, protection and durable solutions to refugees and internally displaced persons worldwide. It is the only Norwegian organisation that specialises in international efforts aimed at this target group.

NRC was established in 1946 under the name Aid to Europe, to assist refugees in Europe after World War II. Today NRC is organised as an independent, private foundation. The majority of the approximately 3000 staff members are national employees in NRC's projects in around 20 countries in Africa, Asia, America and Europe. All projects are coordinated from the Headquarters in Oslo. NRC has an annual income of some 125 to 130 mill GBP.³

² This limited ability to evaluate was also partly due to the evaluation criteria as prescribed by DFID's evaluation Manager.

³ <http://www.nrc.no>

2. Evaluation Methodology

2.1 Evaluation plan

The evaluation of the DFID CHASE Support for NRC Programmes was carried out between April and July 2012, and was undertaken by a multidisciplinary and multicultural team of five persons.⁴ Field work was split among the different team members, according to their profile and areas of expertise. The evaluation actually began early April 2012 with desk studies and a visit to NRC Headquarters staff in Oslo (April, 24th-26th), followed by field visits to DRC (April 30th-May 10th), IDMC in Geneva (May 21st-22nd), the Colombia region (May 28th-June 7th) and finally to Myanmar (June 11-20). Prior to the visit to Oslo an Inception Report was drafted including a preliminary evaluation plan and research methodology. As a consequence of the complexity of the various programmes and focal areas, external constraints and the timing, the evaluation plan needed some adaptation over time (see 2.2).

2.1.1 Evaluation questions

In addition to the evaluation questions formulated in the ToR (see annex 1), the evaluation team developed specific and supplementary questions and questionnaires (see annex A, Evaluation criteria, table 1 and 2, and annex C, interview questionnaires/guidelines of the Inception Report - annex 5). The evaluation questions and supplementary questions were more used as a guidance than as a strict protocol, though they lead the evaluation team again in analysing and concluding the obtained data.

2.1.2 Evaluation design and rationale for its design

The proposed evaluation methodology was adapted to the diversity of the programme activities in this IPR and to the specificities of the ToR. The evaluation team started with an extensive desk study and document review of NRC's PPA CHASE funded programme and, more specifically, the targeted areas to be evaluated. The methodology and key research questions were developed in line with an analysis of the evaluation guidelines as developed by Coffey, the Evaluation Manager contracted by DFID⁵, and the Terms of Reference (see annex1) and resulted in and are more in detail described in the Inception Report (annex 5). A workplan was part of the evaluation design.

2.1.3 Research methodology and data collection

The research methodology applied was combining both quantitative and qualitative methods, using desk study and document review, key stakeholder interviews⁶ and beneficiary focus groups discussions and interviews. Data collection was done by the individual evaluators and centrally processed, serving to fill in predefined evaluation matrices (see also 2.1.4 and annex 10). For the assessment of the Value for Money aspects a specific methodology was developed (see Inception Report, annex 5).

2.1.4 Analytical framework

The evaluation team used primarily the contribution analysis concept as described in the PPA evaluation Manager in analysing the data obtained, i.e. in how far is the theory of change and the logic expressed in the logical framework holding true and to what extent have external factors more or less significantly influenced the programme results. A combination of quantitative (e.g. number of shelter constructed, number of rabbits distributed) and qualitative data (e.g. satisfaction of beneficiaries with obtained inputs, level of technical expertise of rabbit breeders) were obtained using data collection methods described in 2.1.3, allowing evaluators to assess all DAC criteria, in particular the effectiveness and potential future impact of the programme activities. The wide variety of activities, programmes and locations prevented the evaluation team, however, to develop and use a standardized beneficiary questionnaire and hence no comprehensive summary table of responses to evaluation questions is provided, other than the table in Annex 9. Yet, the data collected were aggregated per country and per stakeholder and analysed. Finally all data from observations, interviews, discussions and desk studies were analysed at large within the evaluation team using an

⁴ The evaluation team consisted of Ms Mireya Pita and Mr Bert Bosch (TL), both generalists, Mr Michael Reed Hurtado, specialist in IDP and refugee legal matters in Colombia and Mrs Virginia Montes and Mr André Oosterman (backstopping), both financial experts.

⁵ Coffey: Evaluation Manager PPA and GPAF: Evaluation Strategy, February 2012

⁶ **Key stakeholders** are those who can significantly influence or are important to the success of an activity/programme. **Primary stakeholders** are those individuals and groups who are ultimately affected by an activity, either as beneficiaries (positively impacted) or dis-beneficiaries (adversely impacted).

Secondary stakeholders are all other individuals or institutions with a stake, interest or intermediary role in the activity. These might include the host community, the local authority, government officials, NGOs, donors and so on.

evaluation matrix, where the main evaluation questions were assessed using pre-defined judgement criteria and ratings (see annex 10).

2.1.5 Approach to quality assurance of research

The evaluation team endeavoured to use a participatory approach wherever possible. This was accomplished by face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions, including: representatives of NRC staff at Head Office in Oslo, at the IDMC in Geneva, and at various locations in the field; interviews to key, primary and secondary stakeholders; and interviews with a sample of direct and indirect beneficiaries (around 50 per country were planned, with the exception of the Colombia region) in the respective countries. A standard protocol to complement the inquiry lines mentioned in the ToR and an additional “activity specific” questionnaire was designed by the evaluation team, in order to standardize the content of the evaluation report. Unfortunately only a limited number of primary beneficiaries could be interviewed (see 1.3) and an aggregated presentation of the data was therefore considered not justifiable.

Stakeholder identification was conducted as a starting point of the stakeholder selection, often in close consultation with the relevant NRC programme staff. Stakeholder analysis itself, assessing stakeholders’ respective importance and influence to the respective programmes was carried out within the evaluation team, using a table to judge the relative importance and influence of the respective stakeholders, later on transferred into an importance/influence matrix (see country reports for the respective analyses).⁷ This analysis enabled the evaluators to quite simply visualize the power a stakeholder has to facilitate or to impede programme’s objectives.

Finally, triangulation by comparing obtained data from different angles / sources and from different evaluators was structurally carried out as much as possible, within the boundaries of the external and internal (see country reports) constraints.

2.2 Research problems encountered / adaptations made

Especially in the case of DRC and Myanmar the evaluators were hampered by the constraints in access to the actual field implementation sites (see previously), whereby e.g. the planned sample survey of beneficiaries could not (fully) be used.

In the course of the evaluation two adaptations to the original set-up and methodology of this evaluation were set forth, namely:

- To assess the Global Advocacy activities on Humanitarian Access, Housing, Land and Property (HLP) and Natural Disaster Response⁸ of the AID department in Oslo not separately as described in the Terms of Reference, but in conjunction with similar activities of IDMC and the country programmes. It turned out that mainly HLP contributed to the PPA Programme thus far, but that these activities were still rather limited in volume and mostly carried out by or in cooperation with IDMC and the country programmes (see also AID activities described in Additionality, ch. 4).
- It was also decided, in consultation with the Evaluation Steering Committee and the DFID liaison officer, to limit the measurement approach to the Value for Money (VfM) assessment to a cost-efficiency analysis only and to skip the cost-effectiveness analysis as proposed and described in the Inception Report, as this was considered not feasible or desirable at this (mid-term) stage of the programme evaluation. Instead the evaluation team has included now the management assessment approach to further substantiate its conclusions on the VfM aspects.

The findings in this report reflect as closely as possible the issues, concerns, strengths and weaknesses of NRC and NRC’s field work, as pointed out by the interviewed persons and found in the various documents and reports. These data are compiled and analysed by the evaluation team, whereas the team has endeavoured to base the conclusions as much as possible on hard evidence.

⁷ The scoring in this matrix ranges from 1: very little importance or influence to 5: very significant importance or influence to the success of a specific Programme. For *influence* this rating can be broken down into:

1. information is gathered from the stakeholder, but is not involved in the resulting discussions which inform decisions
2. stakeholder is asked for its opinion on programme strategy or implementation
3. stakeholder fulfils only a particular role with limited influence on decision making;
4. stakeholder has a high influence in decision making on programme strategy or implementation
5. stakeholder controls decision making on programme strategy or implementation

The scoring was based on stakeholder interviews (both the stakeholders concerned as well as their peers), observations and data obtained from document reviews.

⁸ Currently called Climate and Natural Disaster Induced Displacement

3. Findings and Results

3.1 Relevance and programme design

Generally speaking, NRC's global programme supported by DFID CHASE funding is very relevant as it represents and responds to ever-existing priority needs of the targeted groups. By trying to assist people affected by displacement (PAD), NRC is indeed reaching in general a population that is highly marginalized and vulnerable, often "forgotten" or of no interest to national authorities and of limited interest to donors.

Beneficiary selection was carried out according to pre-defined and well-established vulnerability criteria in all countries visited. However, in some cases, it was the impression that some beneficiaries were maybe not the most vulnerable, e.g. Myanmar - certain community members because of their long-term IDP status and DRC - because NRC tries to establish links between IDPs and host communities (see further country reports). In the Colombia Programme special attention needs to be paid not to exclude non-Colombian refugees from legal support. These inequities in beneficiary selection are, however, minor and the evaluation team considers beneficiary selection on average appropriate and transparent. A further disaggregation into specific vulnerable groups as mentioned in the NRC DFID Business Case would have given more insight in beneficiary composition.

In designing its programmes, NRC is stimulating other humanitarian actors to work in its slipstream, either by replicating the quality of its work (e.g. Myanmar), or by stimulating others to work in areas where the only existing humanitarian presence is that of church organizations (e.g. Colon, Panama). NRC's approach to humanitarian assistance is unmistakably geared at making people more self-reliant and to increase their self-esteem and dignity.

The DFID funded PPA CHASE Programme combines also rightfully humanitarian field activities with advocacy efforts,⁹ thus addressing needs at different levels in its endeavour to find durable and meaningful solutions.

The eventual impact of NRC's PPA CHASE programme in itself, as presently designed, is, however, foreseen to be somewhat limited, and thus its contribution to a safer and more dignified life of PAD restricted, for several reasons:

- a scattered and large number of locations and a multitude of programmes (IDMC and central advocacy efforts combined with country programmes) and activities within the countries (Shelter and Sanitation / Food Security / Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance), reduces efficacy of the Programme;
- the utilisation of a rather generic needs assessment for the overall Programme instead of country/location specific problem definitions and needs assessments, and the classification of priorities and selection of programme activities according to this generic needs assessment creates a Programme that is not sufficiently specific;
- limited funds per programme and targeting a too small number of beneficiaries (especially Myanmar and DR Congo) reduces cost-efficiency.

With the exception of IDMC with its worldwide database on internal displacement achieving widespread effects, outputs of the Programme benefit only a moderate number of beneficiaries. Even the regional refugee programme in Colombia, with its correct and straightforward strategy, has a rather generic programme design and lacks accurate problem identification, analysis and logical frameworks per country, limiting the possibilities to outreach its activities and impact.

As presently designed, the overall Programme intervention logic is still holding true, although not much coherence in the selection of the wide variety of countries could be traced. While it is understood that NRC preferred a large number of countries to benefit from this specific DFID funding, a more geographical and/or sectoral concentration would probably have benefitted the programme in its entirety, and enhanced its internal exchange and overall consistency. Advocacy initiatives, although very relevant for the programme, are somewhat vaguely described in the programme design and the division in implementation between NRC's AID Department and IDMC not always clear.¹⁰

⁹ Mostly directly carried out in the respective countries, but as well centrally coordinated and supported by NRC's AID department in Oslo. The communication between the newly appointed Protection and Advocacy Advisors (PAA's) in the field and this Department is thereby crucial and highlights NRC's intentions to increase its advocacy efforts.

¹⁰ In the second quarter of 2012 an HLP Advocacy strategy and Plan, and advocacy priorities were established by the AID department, with succeeding AID workplans, explaining now more the various advocacy tasks of respective NRC actors.

With regard to the existing general programme frame matrix, little unity is reflected between its different outputs and output 5 (“provision of expertise on displacement related to natural disasters”), which is likewise not directly linked to the defined programme outcome (“PAD have increased access to protection, quality assistance and durable solutions”). As mentioned before, the outcome indicators do not properly specify the progress towards the achievement of the programme outcome. Moreover, they are not SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound) defined and are in this respect of little use.

Likewise, the defined output indicators and milestones (only looking at number of beneficiaries assisted) are not sufficiently suitable and informative either. The outputs themselves are not precisely enough defined, cannot be sufficiently assessed by the respective indicators (e.g. increased Food Security is not measured by number of people involved in agricultural production)¹¹ and do not necessarily lead to the overall programme outcome. The assumptions are mostly better elaborated and, in general, reasonably well developed (with the exception of the assumption of output 1 and 4). Related risks and mitigation plans are, as far as could be traced, accordingly developed in the various countries and applied.

The current log frame is not very practical for the various programme components either. As it is compounded from the various individual programmes, these (country) programmes need to develop again their own log frames with corresponding indicators and milestones. Outputs will then become Outcomes for the individual programmes and most of the outcome indicators can then be reformulated into results with corresponding new, achievable and measurable indicators. This interlocking of so-called sub-frameworks (or a logical framework in cascade) into the “master” logical framework will enhance internal coherence and facilitate the translation of these sub-frameworks into more manageable result-based work plans. Especially these work plans are presently lacking in most programmes (DRC, Myanmar and IDMC), rendering proper monitoring (and evaluation) less feasible and productive. In structurally applying practical and output/outcome-based work plans, the implementation of programme activities will likely become more efficient and the overall programme purpose more comprehensive and tangible for NRC staff and its IPs.

Although key stakeholders (national authorities, partners and beneficiaries) have only to a limited extent been consulted or involved in the design process (see respective stakeholder analyses in country reports), in detriment of local ownership, most of them support the programme. In all countries visited, IPs were selected in accordance to their competencies through transparent though not standardized procedures, resulting mostly in the selection of fairly high quality partners.

A handover strategy has not been considered as part of the integral programme design, although the programme is often adjusted to the capacity of its stakeholders, implementing partners (IPs) and beneficiaries, with some exceptions (e.g. DRC: windmills/warehouses). In most areas, NRC chooses to be rather strongly involved in the implementation of its projects. This is conceivable in those areas where contact between INGOs and local NGOs/CBOs might put the latter at risk towards country authorities (e.g. Myanmar), or where capacities are seriously lacking. However, it is the impression of the evaluator that NRC’s strong ‘in control’ attitude, stemming from its background in which quick and appropriate relief and rehabilitation results are vital, impedes the organisation somewhat to invest in meaningful partnerships and hence to adopt a more long-term and inclusive approach and to bridge to a more ‘developmental’ kind of assistance.

3.2 Efficiency¹²

NRC is an organization that can count on competent and professional staff in numerous field locations. It is certainly able to attract and to retain these (international) staff on the basis of its good reputation and attractive Human Resource conditions. This undoubtedly has a positive effect on NRC’s overall efficiency as human resources are the core of any humanitarian organisation, in particular in the sometimes remote and often harsh environments NRC is operating in.

NRC is, however, not fully profiting from the advantages brought by the multiannual character of DFID funding. Instead of consistently programming its interventions on a 3 year basis, the programme planning and resource allocation is now mostly done on a yearly basis. A long(er)-term planning and programming would certainly bring NRC a more solid, consistent, cost-effective perspective of their interventions and partnerships (e.g. signing longer term contracts, more economy of scale in

¹¹ The specific Logical Framework of the DRC PPA Programme is in this respect much more suitably defined.

¹² See also 5.2 Evaluation of Cost-Efficiency of Country Programmes

procurement etc.). In addition, the organization seems to be on its way to find a balance between a pure emergency/relief approach (i.e. inputs delivery) and a more transitional (results/outcome-based) methodology. Project management, particularly at field level, sometimes tends to fall into micro-management (e.g. DRC) what diminishes cost-efficiency. Though striving to maintain high quality outputs is understandable, delegation of tasks and responsibilities to IPs is part of capacity building and creates a more equitable partnership environment, ultimately increasing efficiency (and sustainability of the intervention).

Field staff is mostly focused on obtaining quantifiable data and is not trained to measure progress against country-specific outcome targets. Working towards the achievement of the project purpose (PP) is not clearly visible and staff do not seem to understand the actual purpose of the programme and its underlying Theory of Change. This all could be explained by the transition that was noticed in certain programmes (e.g. Myanmar and DRC) from a pure emergency-relief to a more developmental approach, but needs to be addressed to further enhance the effectiveness and future impact of programme activities.

The programme, in general, coordinates reasonably well with similar interventions. In Colombia, for instance, clear complementarities with other projects and regular dialogues with UNHCR exist, although their strategic alliance could even be improved by using more joint work plans. In Myanmar and DRC, it became clear from interviews with peer organisations that NRC is perceived to work more in isolation, not actively inclined to promote structural partnerships with other (NGO) humanitarian actors, apart from the sometimes somewhat enforced relation with UNHCR. The intended partnership in Myanmar with Action Aid and SDC (Swiss Development Cooperation) might, however, be a good step in the direction of closer collaboration.

3.3 Effectiveness

NRC has long-term and more stable funding at its disposal than other humanitarian peers, enabling the organization to engage in programmes (e.g. camp management programmes) that others can't. This circumstance permits NRC to provide distinctive offerings in the humanitarian sector. Examples hereof are for instance the IDMC activities, by itself unique because no other international organization provides this service and in Colombia, NRC is distinctive as an NGO and only comparable to UNHCR with the regional refugee programme and through their legal expertise, recognized for its strong competency.

As for its advocacy role, NRC is, however, regarded by its peers less distinctive although it is clearly involved, known and respected in various protection clusters. While UN organizations consider NRC as an engaged advocate, its actual advocacy efforts are not regarded that visible and determined by other INGOs. They do not consider NRC using its advocacy role to its largest extent and in the most effective manner. Possible reasons for this perception could be the culture of the organization, conceived as a rather unexposed and 'silent' advocacy actor, and the fact that it is only quite recently that NRC has decided to put more emphasis on global advocacy as such.

As NRC is an organization that considers delivery of quality outputs (e.g. shelter in Myanmar, food stores in DRC) highly important, it distinguishes itself also here from other humanitarian actors. Donors are more and more open for this difference in quality, thus stimulating other organisations as well to increase the quality of their outputs. NRC can leverage its strengths to improve humanitarian efforts in cultivating more partnerships; in collaboration with similar organizations; in trying to be more open in sharing its knowledge and expertise, especially when it comes to advocacy campaigns. NRC should be more aware that advocacy in isolation is less effective, and that advocacy campaigns in collaboration with like-minded organizations will increase not only their value but also the visibility and reputation of NRC worldwide. Structuring the coordination between AID, country programmes (the PAAs)¹³ and advocacy initiatives undertaken by IDMC at the IASC (and the global protection cluster) as is described in the new Global Advocacy Policy is a good step forward.

IDMC can leverage its strengths by using its expertise in much wider area by, for instance, wider disseminating its data base. Its impressive knowledge of countries of displacement is useful to many more actors than the ones they currently serve. Their research expertise and capacities could gradually develop into a research institute.

¹³ The recruitment of advocacy advisors at country programmes (PAAs) - in process - will certainly facilitate the AID Department to elaborate more effective (targeted) advocacy efforts.

Although NRC is reaching its milestones and even more than that, the evaluator could not properly assess the likelihood of achieving current Programme Outputs as described in the Programme Logframe. Progress has mainly been reported against defined milestones and output indicators are not objectively measurable or precisely formulated (e.g. # of IDPs *involved* in agricultural production and IGA's, as an indication of increased Food Security). Moreover, they are not always relevant (e.g. one or two SGBV emblematic cases in Colombia documented as a sign of addressing protection needs, appropriate use of shelters as a sign that livelihoods are promoted - Myanmar). As far as milestones are concerned, they are sometimes easily reached (e.g. Colombia: # of persons informed, counselled and assisted - as the three quite different activities are not disaggregated), demonstrating as well that the (only quantitative) targets do not sufficiently reflect the actual effects of and the huge efforts made in the various programmes. External factors have a clear influence on the achievement of the outputs, but because the defined assumptions have mostly been transformed into reasonably well developed risks and mitigation plans, these external factors are considered manageable.

3.4 Impact and Results

The PPA CHASE Programme is progressing towards its intended outcomes, although it is also not easy at this stage to assess to what extent. Some reasons for this inability are:

- At the time of evaluation most programme components are only underway for some 8 to 12 months: with the exception of the IDMC; other programmes had to start up and contracts were signed with a significant delay of several months later than the intended start-up date of April 1st 2011 (see also 1.3).
- Progress should be evaluated against outcome indicators which, as previously explained, is difficult when outcome indicators are ill defined. It would be advisable to define logical frameworks for each country / focal area, cascading into the main LF and to define proxy indicators for the overall outcomes, such as the increase in references in humanitarian literature and invitations received to contribute to important IDP conferences for the IDMC.

Certain impacts as a result of programme's activities are, however, already apparent. Examples of these are the successes in institution building and increased credibility in Colombia, as evidenced by regular meetings and permanent contacts at all levels between the countries involved. The improved shelter/housing facilities in Myanmar certainly also fulfil a need, though it remains questionable to what extent the vulnerability of the beneficiaries will be diminished by the provision of housing only (see further the Myanmar country evaluation). The distribution of rabbits, improved seeds and fertilisers in DRC will as well quite likely improve beneficiaries' immediate food security situation; although this increased food production will probably not have much long-term impact given the fact that it is mainly a one-off input. Suggestions to accommodate these shortcomings are the provision of longer-term and intensified training and improved practices and/or linking beneficiaries to agricultural commercial- systems (e.g. farmer cooperatives, market chains and the like). It is also clear that IDPs are more protected and become more "visible" through permanent information available (IDMC's data base) and attention placed on the situation of PADs (IDMC's web site). In doing so, PADs will receive more assistance, and advocating for PADs rights based assistance (IDMC/AID) should eventually lead to more appropriate assistance, conditions and eventually durable solutions for PADs.

Prospects of multiplier effects could also already be noticed by the adoption of the quality of housing provided by NRC by other humanitarian actors (Myanmar) and by the expansion of legal services to more locations (Colombia).

Some apparently unplanned positive side-effects could already be observed as well: by providing HLP assistance to targeted beneficiaries (with the assistance of experience-based advocacy of AID-Oslo), other non-targeted beneficiaries got their land rights situation improved as well (Myanmar). It could also be observed that more organizations are attracted to provide aid to targeted groups in complementarity to the assistance already provided by NRC (e.g. Colon, Panama). On the other hand, social cohesion in targeted villages might be negatively affected by providing new housing to a substantial proportion of the village population (Myanmar). Those just above the vulnerability threshold, not benefitting from the programme, could quite likely feel placed at disadvantage compared to the benefitting vulnerable persons (see further the Myanmar country report).

With regard to the occurrence of side effects, the evaluation team observed that the interventions in general are not thoroughly analysed on their long-term effects (e.g. provision and exploitation of warehouses/water powered mills to a limited, inexperienced number of beneficiaries - DRC; risk of social conflicts by providing new housing only to IDP community members - Myanmar); limiting legal assistance in the DFID funded programme only to displaced Colombians (Panama), as stated by more

than one IP in interviews, could jeopardize NRC's reputation as an equal provider of assistance, and is against the principles of humanitarian aid.¹⁴

Mitigation of unplanned negative side effects is not yet in place, partly because these effects are still not very noticeable. In this respect, it is observed that the evaluation visit itself already generated more awareness and might induce some mitigation efforts.

3.5 Cross-cutting issues

Adequate mainstreaming of relevant cross-cutting issues in the programme design and implementation, i.e. gender, protection, environment and connectedness aspects, have only been assessed to the extent considered appropriate to and in line with the Terms of Reference and the related evaluation questions (see Inception Report, annex 5) of this evaluation.¹⁵

Gender: The fact that certain outputs include a gender-sensitive indicator (e.g. documentation of SGBV cases, Colombia) and some internal gender training has been carried out, does not effectively and sufficiently demonstrate NRC's practical and strategic gender mainstreaming in the programme design. A thorough gender analysis in the proposed interventions could not be detected during the design, nor during the implementation phase. The mere differentiation of target groups according to sex and age is in that respect considered to be an insufficient indication of a true gender mainstreaming approach.

Nevertheless, it is noted that female beneficiaries, in general, comprise a larger proportion in the programme. However, this fact has probably more to do with the vulnerability criteria applied in the selection of beneficiaries, rather than being an evidence of genuine interest in / promoting specific attention to women's needs and gender related vulnerabilities at field level (e.g. consideration of women's physical conditions; specific facilities for mothers with children and women in agriculture production, etc.). Gender equality is unbalanced in the composition of NRC's field staff, with women underrepresented in management positions in the countries visited (see country reports).¹⁶ The same applies to NRC's IPs, where women are also insufficiently represented in senior posts. This is quite common in the humanitarian context and it is admirable that NRC in most country strategies pays at least attention to gender unbalance and even has set targets (e.g. Myanmar).

A more gender mainstreaming approach incorporated into the programme design or integrated during implementation phase could have led to an improved impact of the programme. As it stands, the likeliness of increased gender equality beyond the programme end is not high. Overall speaking, the promotion of gender equality is not sufficiently embedded in the programme and could, therefore, be classified as G-0 to G-1 (Colombia), according to the OECD Gender Policy Marker.¹⁷

Protection: together with vulnerability, the protection aspect is inherent to the nature of NRC's humanitarian work and thus, cuts across the stages of most country projects. In some cases, special considerations have been made to protect women and minors (e.g. DRC); in other situations, however, specific advocacy actions could be carried out to protect even more the non-respected human rights (e.g. Colombia, where protection concerns are raised by the restrictive nature of national Refugee Status Determination, additional capacity building building/awareness raising, documentation of best practises and applied advocacy efforts could be increased - see the country report). Generally speaking the evaluation team considers protection in all its modes reasonably well provided.

Environment: A "do no harm policy" has been adopted and applied by the programme rather than concrete activities designed to tackle environmental problems. Sensitivity and awareness on displacement related to natural disasters and climate change appear in the programme as one of its specific outputs. With some exception (e.g. Myanmar: intended additional forestation, DRC energy-saving stoves), environmental constraints and opportunities have not clearly been considered in the programme design, or integrated in project implementation. In particular the agricultural income

¹⁴ It is, however, noted that non-Colombians do receive legal assistance, albeit from a programme funded by another donor.

¹⁵ Three of the four cross-cutting issues were added to the ToR by the evaluation team. Additionality and Learning and innovation are separately discussed

¹⁶ The exception being the IDMC in Geneva, where the gender situation is opposite: nearly 80% of all staff, including management positions is female.

¹⁷ Applying the OECD Gender policy marker (G-marker) is in EU cooperation compulsory. Briefly, the scores are: G-0: when gender equality is not targeted; G-1: when gender equality is a significant objective; G-2: when gender equality is a principle or main objective

generating activities in DRC could have been designed with more environmental protection and conservation aspects in mind (see also the country evaluation, annex 4a). Environmentally respectful practices and culture (e.g. recycling, rational use of paper and energy, reducing ecological footprint by local purchasing, etc.), could be taken more upfront as well and systematically discussed with IPs in all projects.

Connectedness: the country programmes and IDMC are reasonably well involving local authorities and actors in the implementation of their activities. DRC being the exception as governmental institutions are still lacking the capacity and transparency needed to meet NRC's code of conduct requirements and continued insecurity is a major barrier to establish durable relations with authorities on the ground.

In general, needs are clearly assessed, but one of the weaknesses noticed is that beneficiaries, both in programme design and implementation, have a limited say in planning and implementation processes (see also the respective country stakeholder analyses). In Myanmar, CBOs had a say at both stages, but in general, involvement in decision making or the design of the programmes is restricted. Offering a choice among a diversity of activities (e.g. DRC beneficiaries choosing between various IGA's such as rabbit breeding and mushroom production) is thereby erroneously considered by NRC as sincere beneficiary participation and increasing their self-reliance. The current observed low level of ownership among beneficiaries is a sign of alert as it decreases the likelihood that beneficiaries will continue making use of project's benefits after the support ends. Admittedly, it is very difficult to genuinely and sustainably assist vulnerable people in humanitarian protracted crises such as DRC and Myanmar, and NRC is doing its best to alleviate at least some of the most pressing immediate needs. Long-term commitment / assistance and sincere interest in durable solutions for the targeted beneficiaries are just some of the ingredients of a possibly successful intervention in these circumstances.

By investing more into capacity building in general and in the organizational and managerial capacities of the IPs, NRC could plan for a gradual phase out of their programmes (e.g. the Colombia ICLA programme). No intention of handing over activities to partners and local authorities could however be noticed or is documented in the programme design. On the positive side, the involvement of a highly reputed academic institute is a good example of NRC's attempt in Colombia to involve local structures in their programme. Likewise are the awareness raising and specific tools provided to institutions dealing with refugee protection (e.g. diploma course on refugee law) through proper training.

The potential synergy of cooperating with the private sector is unfortunately not explicitly explored either, both in the programme design and in the implementation phases. For instance, the benefits of linking beneficiaries to the agricultural value market chain or other commercial pathways in DRC could have been an avenue to increase connectedness and thus durability of the interventions, but also the shelter programme in Myanmar (e.g. construction design, logistical training from expert firms) and even the Colombia Regional Refugee Programme (e.g. involving mobile phone companies, radio stations) could benefit from contacts with the private sector.

3.6 Learning environment

Evaluators have assessed the learning environment of NRC as far as the M&E, the reporting and the documentation system is concerned, with the evaluation questions in mind, and underneath findings are restricted to this part of the learning environment only.

NRC's programmes are regularly externally evaluated, and also other overall learning systems such as global seminars and exchange meetings between programme managers contribute to an - at least from the outside - healthy learning environment. However, when it comes to more basic systems, some comments are to be made: the central monitoring system (CAD) needs again to be revised (see further 5.4.3) and a central M&E system is only recently under development. The evaluation team could neither trace documentation of lessons learnt in the field. Hence the scope for contextual learning, being structurally fed back into the organization and thereby improving programming, was fairly limited according to evaluator's observations and the opinions of senior field management.

NRC is, however, aware of these shortcomings and is prepared to include avenues to accommodate critical sounds and lessons learned in their overall M&E system, to date under revision.

The evaluation team has also observed that there is also little sense to document management decisions and operational changes in a way that the organisation itself can learn from (e.g. hardly no minutes of management meetings, no documentation of the rationale to adapt programmes to changing situations, no structural filing of communication). Although evaluators do not have the impression that

NRC is taking decisions in the field merely on an ad-hoc basis, it is also here advised to pay attention to the development of an institutional memory system, thereby improving the organisational development.

3.7 Partnership Management:

In the countries evaluated, NRC used various kinds and quite different levels of Partnerships: the Colombian regional programme NRC could not function without them and here maybe the most equitable and long-lasting partnerships could be found. Nevertheless these partners still complain that NRC is using only short-term contracts jeopardizing their good relationship and eventually the effectiveness of the implemented Programmes. At the other side of the spectrum are the partners of NRC-Myanmar, CBOs, that are mainly subcontracted to execute a certain job (coordination and field management of the shelter construction) and the partners of NRC-Congo somewhere in between. With the latter also longer-term relations are established, but they lack the exclusivity and high capacity of the Colombian partners and as a result their relation with NRC is more loose and unbalanced. Much time and energy is needed in order to progressively build up trust and a more real partnership as is the situation with the Colombian partners.

It is quite understandable that a relief organization does not build long-term relationships with partners but a more transitional approach will necessitate investing in and developing longer-term partnerships. One of the consequences of short-term relationships is that M&E systems tend to be more geared at controlling partners than at monitoring the quality of their performance and at sharing responsibility and experience towards a common goal. Other consequences are the direct implications in relation to connectedness and ownership aspects of the Programme.

It is advisable therefor that a transition organization, as NRC is in certain areas to become, treats their partners in more equitable terms. There is clearly room for improvement in the way NRC deals with its partners and in the oversight it has over its partner projects and the effectiveness of their relations.

Partner selection process is apparently done more or less according to predefined selection criteria, though an organisation-wide partner policy with describing for instance a transparent and equitable selection process, resulting in high-quality partners being selected, is not (yet) developed.

CONCLUSION

Though the number of IDPs worldwide has diminished slightly there is still a huge need for Programmes such as the DFID funded NRC PPA CHASE Programme, especially in countries where NRC is present and likely will be present for the oncoming years. NRC is also regarded as a competent and reliable actor, well-reputed by its peers, national partners and counterparts as a strong defender of PNIP and a leader in matters legally related to forced migration. The DFID CHASE Programme is therefor still needed and relevant and having the Programme executed by NRC well-chosen.

The multi-annual and unrestricted nature of the funding provides the organization the possibility to enlarge its presence in its field of expertise, and to offer a more "durable" outlook to the Programme. NRC could more consistently take advantage of the opportunity that DFID funding represents. Efforts to orient its management systems towards a more result-based approach, to promote stronger partnership and to enhance local capacities (technical, organizational, managerial), are measures NRC could implement during the second phase of the Programme. These steps would in the end likely enlarge the impact of the Programme.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Focus implementation and monitoring on SMART outcome indicators, by producing and/or updating country specific logframe matrices, with specific milestones to measure and monitor progress of planned change during and at the end of the Programme
- Build a more equal relationship with IPs and promote a real partnership by offering them longer contractual prospects; by involving them into the reorientation of the country programmes; by sharing the same key management tools; by giving them a saying into planning and implementation processes; by encouraging to join in decision making with the participation of direct beneficiaries. In the same logic, develop the alliance established with UNHCR by

strengthening coordination mechanisms through the elaboration of joint work plans wherever found appropriate

- By using NRC's experience and technical expertise, assist IPs into the enhancement of their organizational, managerial and technical capacities. Increase, intensify and improve training activities as "means" to achieve the Programme purpose
- NRC should more consistently take advantage of the opportunity that DFID funding represents by engaging in long(er)-term planning and programming thereby increasing cost efficiency and cost-effectiveness and more durable partnerships
- Continue to enhance the advocacy efforts as already started, in combining country, IDMC and AID expertise and linking to other IDP / PAD advocacy initiatives to further improve effectiveness
- Enhance and streamline the reporting and documentation systems and the feeding-back of lessons-learnt into the organisation

4. Additionality of PPA funding

The DFID PPA CHASE 3 years Programme, as against general short term funding, represents a sound opportunity for NRC to focus more on longer-term, sustainable perspectives, by allowing the organization:

- to programme and plan more strategically (implementation and phase out);
- to build up stronger and more long-term relations with key stakeholders and local partners;
- to better develop local capacities.

NRC has decided in its Business Case (PPA no 416) to use the funding both for direct inputs as well as for organisational strengthening and learning. NRC was not (yet) able to demonstrate the impact of the funding received, though certain results can definitely be attributed to the specific DFID funding (see 3.4). It is advised to systematically develop and use result chains in the various programmes in addition to specific country logical frameworks as well as organisational development indicators to even better demonstrate the additionality of the DFID funding.

The longer-term nature of the funding and NRC's multi-year planning will certainly contribute to improve NRC's overall efficiency (financial, administrative and operational¹⁸), to document their learning process and management decisions and to generate a learning environment both in organizational development as well as in the contextual knowledge. This is an opportunity NRC is taking up, but should try to make even more advantage of.

Specifically, the unrestricted and consequently flexible nature of DFID funding, has allowed NRC to allocate funds where they were most needed or where no other funds were available.¹⁹ In the case of the country activities the funds have served to i) set up a regional refugee programme for Colombians in Venezuela (ICLA), Panama and Ecuador (legal services), ii) to pilot more transitional approaches that in principle will offer the target groups more sustainable perspectives (DRC), and iii) to get access to areas other humanitarian agencies will not get easily funding for, as these areas are quite risky to start-up whatever intervention (e.g. the shelter programme in SE Myanmar). For the IDMC and the global advocacy efforts this funding meant a contribution to a stable core funding, indispensable for research and advocacy initiatives. AID-Oslo stated in particular that the three-year PPA funding had enabled them to spend the first year in consultation with the field and IDMC building a robust and well-informed advocacy approach and activities that reflected the challenges and priorities of NRC's programmes as they respond to humanitarian crises and in protection of the most vulnerable groups.

The unrestricted and long-term nature of the PPA grant has had also a clear positive influence on the refugee programme that was already established in the Colombia region. The DFID PPA funds have contributed to expansion of the existing refugee programme into a more regional dimension, as a regional coordination structure could now be established and working documents regionally standardized. This has made as a result the Colombian refugee population in neighbouring countries more visible before the host governments and the Colombian authorities.

Finally and in terms of impact, DFID PPA funding has favoured the likelihoods of multiplier effects. This is clearly evident in the case of some country activities, like the extension of ICLA services in Venezuela to new and often remote areas, that have additionally pulled in new humanitarian organizations offering complementary services. Furthermore the high quality of the provided outputs (e.g. shelter construction in Myanmar) was adopted by other organizations and further supported by donors.

Although the evaluation team has not performed a complete and genuine contribution analysis and such an analysis could not be traced at NRC either, it considers it plausible that all the above aspects are to a large extent the result of the DFID PPA funds. In the opinion of the evaluation team they demonstrate that NRC has been able to use the DFID PPA CHASE funding in a way they could not have done with other funds. In this respect the evaluation team considers the additionality of these funds unmistakable and the nature of these funds crucial for further successful implementation of the evaluated Programme.

¹⁸ This is well-illustrated for instance by the shelter programme in Myanmar, where bulk purchase and pre-financing of building material contributed to significant cost-reductions

¹⁹ The DFID funding is in certain cases clearly filling the gap between pure emergency and more developmental / transitional funding

5. Evaluation of value for money of NRC-implemented programmes


5.1 Introduction

The first part of this chapter presents the results of a value-for-money (VfM) analysis of the DFID-funded portion of the previously presented NRC-implemented programmes. The analysis covers the period from 31 March 2011 to 30 April 2012, coinciding with DFID's financial year. The second part of the chapter contains a management assessment of the evaluated country programmes and of NRC as a whole in accordance to the Evaluation Manager Strategy.²⁰ Unless stated otherwise, all financial figures are expressed in Great British Pound (GBP).²¹

5.1.1 Definition of Value for Money

As described in the Inception Report (annex 5), we have adopted the definition of VfM that was developed by the National Audit Office (NAO) of the United Kingdom, and is currently in use by DFID. According to the NAO, "Good value for money is the optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcome". VfM consists of three elements: economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Figure 1). To assess VfM, we have measured the cost-efficiency (a measure of outputs in relation to costs) of each of the three country programmes, both in relation to the budget of the programme itself, and in relation to comparable activities of peer programmes. The reason for this approach was the fact that NRC does not measure outcomes at country level, and that it was not feasible to perform a proper cost-effectiveness analysis of the three country programmes. Because of its special nature, an analysis of the costs of the "cross-cutting" IDMC in Geneva is presented separately.

Figure 1: Defining Value for Money



Source: ITAD (2011)

5.2 Evaluation of Cost-Efficiency of Country Programmes

The cost-efficiency of the three country programmes was measured by analysing:

- Differences in budgeted and actual costs, and identifying the main causes of these differences ("variance analysis")
- Differences between the cost-efficiency of an activity undertaken by each programme, and one or more comparable activities undertaken by "peer" programmes.

5.2.1 Variance analysis

The budgeted DFID-funded portion of the 2011/2012 budget of the three country programmes was about GBP 982,000, of which approximately 84% (or GBP 825,000) was administered by the programmes themselves, and the remainder by NRC's headquarters in Oslo (Table 5.1).²² During the reporting period, total actual costs were approximately 13% (or GBP 117,000) lower than total budgeted costs, primarily because the Colombia ICLA programme and the DRC Food Security programme spent together some GBP 100,000 less than budgeted. The main reasons for variances

²⁰ Coffey: Evaluation Manager PPA and GPAF: Evaluation Strategy, February 2012

²¹ Where required, Norwegian Crowns (NOK) and US Dollars (USD) were converted into GBP, using the exchange rate of 1 April 2011 for budgeted costs, and the average rate of 1 April 2011 and 31 March 2012 for actual costs.

²² It is acknowledged that all related expat salaries and PAA (Advocacy Advisors) are included as HO costs. These are in addition to the 7% HO administration costs. It would be advisable to put these costs directly under country-programme's responsibility and budget for transparency purposes.

within individual programmes can be summarized as follows (refer to annex 4e, country variance assessments for details):

- The start of the implementation of the Colombia ICLA programme was delayed by several months. In spite of this delay, the programme achieved more than its planned quantitative outputs for several important activities (1,666 vs. 1500 persons assisted legally, and 882 vs. 500 persons trained) and spent less than 85% of its budget, which means that cost-efficiency to realize these outputs was higher than anticipated. However, the implementation of several other activities (such as seminars and surveys) was behind schedule, which will lower the cost-efficiency level.
- The Myanmar shelter programme delivered 102% of its planned outputs for 2011/2012 (161 instead of 158 shelters) at a much lower unit cost than anticipated when the budget was prepared, which indicates a favourable degree of cost-efficiency. Because the resulting savings were set aside to potentially finance a reforestation programme that was not included in the original budget, and to pre-finance shelter material and NFIs for the following budget year, actual costs nonetheless nearly equalled budgeted costs.
- During the reporting period, the actual cost of the DRC food security programme was substantially lower than its budget. There was significant under-spending in several budget lines, in particular for the cost of project articles, local personnel and travel, whereas at the same time unfinished construction work (a mill and warehouses) was not yet accounted for. Most of the under-spending was the result of savings on project materials (agricultural inputs) that were unexpectedly provided by another donor (FAO). In addition, the programme changed its planned outputs for 2011/2012, which were less costly than planned (see PPA annual report). Because of these major changes to the programme budget it was difficult to assess the cost-efficiency of the programme on the basis of variance analysis only.

*Table 5.1: Results of Variance Analysis of PPA country Programmes (GBP '000)**

Budget Item	Budgeted Cost (B)	Actual Cost (A)	Variance (=B-/A)	Main Explanation for Variance
Administered by:				
Colombia ICLA	326	277	49	Delays in implementation
Myanmar Shelter	236	228	8	Lower than expected unit cost of shelters, offset by costs of intended reforestation programme
DRC Food Security	263	210	53	Significant variance in subsequent budgets, notably savings on project materials (provided by FAO) and reductions in planned outputs
SUBTOTAL	825	715	110	
Administered by HQ**	157	150	7	(no significant variance)
TOTAL	982	865	117	

Source: Consultant, based on programme accounts

* 31 March 2011 – 30 April 2012 (DFID-financed costs only)

** No data for HQ-administrated costs for Myanmar shelter programme, assumed same as budgeted cost

As said, variance analysis studies the budgeted versus the actual costs, to judge performance. The analysis includes an explanation of the difference between actual and budgeted figures as well as an evaluation as to why the variance may have occurred. The purpose of this information is mainly to assist managers in determining what may have gone right or wrong and to help in future decision-making.

5.2.2 Comparison of comparable activities undertaken by “peer” programmes

Variance analysis identifies the main causes of differences between budgeted and actual costs, and thereby the main causes of difference in budgeted and expected cost-efficiency (which measures outputs in relation to costs). To assess to what extent DFID-financed country programmes were cost-efficient in relation to other programmes/projects, we have compared unit costs of broadly comparable activities that were undertaken by both NRC and other development partners in the same year and in the same region, namely workshops, shelter construction and rabbit distribution programmes.²³

²³ It should be noted that the Refugee Programme is quite unique and there is no other programme being implemented with the regional approach and scope of this programme. It was eventually possible to identify some workshop costs and to compare these with the workshop costs of selected “peer” organizations. The evaluator is, however, very much aware of the limitations of choosing such a small and relatively unimportant element of NRC- Colombia’s work.

The results of the analysis can be summarized as follows (see Table 5.2):

- The average cost of workshops organized by the Colombia ICLA programme was about GBP 102 per person per day, which was slightly lower than workshops organized by Plan International, but substantially higher than similar workshops organized by Project Counselling Services (a local NGO).
- At about GBP 665, the average cost of a shelter constructed by the Myanmar shelter programme was almost 50% higher than the average cost of shelters constructed by Bridge-Asia Japan, an international NGO previously subcontracted by UNHCR.
- The average direct cost per beneficiary of the NRC-financed rabbit distribution programme in DRC compared also unfavourably to the cost of similar activities supported by two peer programmes.

It should be noted that the above results are indicative only, because compared activities are not necessarily identical (for example, it is well known and observed that shelters constructed by NRC are of higher quality than BAJ-financed shelters and - unlike peer programmes - NRC facilitated distribution of rabbits accompanied by training). In spite of this limitation, we believe that a comparison with peer programmes remains a useful exercise to identify sources of potential cost savings, especially when the third parameter to assess Value for Money of an intervention, *effectiveness*, dealing much more with the quality of output delivery, can be taken into account as well.

Table 5.2: Results of Comparison with Peer Programmes

Programme	Comparable Activity	Unit Cost Considered	Unit Cost (GBP)		NRC as % of Peer
			NRC	Peer*	
ICLA	Workshop	Cost/Participant/Day	102	57-117	56-115%
Myanmar Shelter	Shelter	Cost/Shelter	665	450	148%
DRC Food Security	Rabbit distrib.	Cost/Beneficiary	21.1	10.5-14.0	134-199%

Source: Consultant, based on programme accounts

* Colombia ICLA: Plan International and PSC (Project Counselling Services). Myanmar Shelter: BAJ (Bridge Asia Japan). DRC Food Security: Coopi and Biobass-FAO.

5.3 Evaluation of Cost-Efficiency of IDMC

5.3.1 Overview

The IDMC is one of the very few if not the only independent international organization that monitors and researches internal displacement structurally and worldwide. Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the IDMC advocates durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced, carries out training activities, and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives. In 2011, the total cost of IDMC's operations was approximately USD 4.2 million, 14% of which was financed by DFID²⁴ and the remainder by various other donors. The financial contribution of DFID (or any of the other donors) is not earmarked for a specific activity (as is the case of DFID funding for the NRC country programmes) but takes the form of general budget support.

5.3.2 Methodology

A typical country programme has a targeted number of outputs, and a budget to finance the outputs (usually based on an assumed unit cost, such as construction cost per shelter). In contrast, the primary output of the IDMC (number of displacements monitored or the number of organisations benefitting from its services) cannot be targeted, but is a result of developments outside the control of the centre. In addition, there is normally not a direct relation between the cost of IDMC's operations (which largely consist of fixed labour costs) and its outputs. For this reason, a cost-efficiency analysis (which relates costs to outputs) was not deemed appropriate. Instead, the average labour cost of the IDMC (which is the centre's primary cost driver) was compared with the average labour cost of other research organizations based in Switzerland. As shown in Table 6.3, in recent years the average gross salary of an IDMC employee was approximately CHF 90,000, or about CHF 7,500 per month. In 2010, the gross monthly wage of Swiss public sectors in the economic branch "scientific research and development" ranged from about CHF 7,200 to over CHF 11,000.²⁵ This suggests that the average gross salary of IDMC workers is on par with average Swiss salaries for comparable professions.

²⁴ This contribution was only partly DFID PPA CHASE funding

²⁵ See http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/03/04/blank/data/01/06_01.html (accessed on 5 July 2012). It is expected that the average wage of IDMC workers is at the lower end of the range, because IDMC also employs supporting staff, who will presumably have lower salaries than researchers.

However, the significant increase in budget in recent years (from USD 2.5 million in 2007 to USD 5.2 million in 2012) has not been commensurate with the increases in staff (from some 16 FTE in 2007 to 28.5 FTE in 2012) and the differences with the salary developments at NRC Headquarters (see annex 4d: IDMC evaluation) raises the concern that this cost-driver is not consistently kept at its lowest level.

Table 6.3: Average Cost per IDMC Employee, 2010-2011

	2010	2011
Number of employees (full-time equivalent)*	26.5	27.0
Average gross salary per employee (CHF '000)**	88.7	91.8

Source: Consultant, based on IDMC records

* Includes full-time consultants

** Gross salaries excluding employer' share in social charges

5.4 Management assessment

The purpose of this assessment is to evaluate the extent to which internal management processes and decisions are properly made and procedures followed, thus enhancing the overall programme implementation efficiency. The evaluators have looked into the efficiency of procurement and planning processes, the existence of and compliance with financial systems and lastly in how far monitoring, evaluation and learning systems contribute to a more cost-efficient performance of the organisation, thereby enhancing its value for money. Cooperation and coordination efforts with other organisations to leverage NRC's activities and to strive for added value are discussed in chapter 4. The way resources are managed and allocated could, unfortunately, not properly be assessed, as the programmes under evaluation did not allocate human and other resources specifically to the DFID PPA programme.

5.4.1 Procurement procedures and plans

NRC's procurement procedures are contained in the Logistic Handbook. The handbook facilitates and guides every step of the procurement process, with the specific purpose of ensuring efficiency, transparency and accountability of funds as well as to ensure that goods and services acquired are of the best quality at the proper price, in the required quantities and at the right time; logistic staff in field missions are held accountable to comply with rules and regulations in the handbook, as well as to perform their duties at the highest ethical standards.

The management assessment performed was based on a review of logistic information and interviews with the logistic staff in the programmes. In general terms, procurement procedures, rules and regulations were followed properly, with the exception of the following:

- The DRC and Myanmar programmes do not produce a specific annual procurement plan. This limits the opportunities to negotiate better prices for goods and services. In addition, the Logistic Manager was not involved in the planning or budgeting of projects, which increases the risk of not properly budgeting for some logistics-related costs.
- The Colombia ICLA programme could not demonstrate that IPs structurally and completely go through the prequalification process specified in the Logistic Handbook to guarantee they have the rules, regulations and procedures needed to ensure satisfactory efficiency, accountability and transparency in their procurement processes. At the same time it was noted that no major irregularities were discovered regarding Colombia's IPs in financial audits of the last years.

5.4.2 Financial systems

Financial procedures, regulations and guidance are described in NRC's Financial Handbook. The Finance and Admin Manager (FAM) in each programme is responsible for budget control, and for the preparation and submission of financial reports to NRC's Head Quarters (HQ). The financial systems assessment was based on a review of available financial information, and interviews with Financial Management Staff.

In general, the Financial Management Staff complied with the Financial Handbook's rules, procedures and regulations; however, there was also some evidence that certain oversight by Financial Management Staff was lacking. This was especially felt in performing monthly budget reviews of the financial situation of the projects, in monitoring the cost trend of the projects and in taking appropriate actions when identifying under/over expenditures. The following cases illustrate these shortcomings:

- Some lack of compliance could be traced in performing budget revisions to reallocate funds between budget lines in conjunction with HQ, especially where it was marked that budget deviated

substantially from actual costs (all countries evaluated). In addition, it was noted that financial staff in general have limited involvement in preparing budgets for project proposals.

- The Colombia Regional Refugee programme was unable to provide evidence of performing a financial review of IPs prior to signing an agreement, to ensure they have appropriate procurement and financial rules and regulations in place (as is required by NRC's Financial Handbook).
- Financial staff could even closer monitor the financial and administrative performance of the IPs (as was previously pointed out by HQ and by independent auditors of the Colombia programme).
- None of the evaluated programmes documented - potentially - significant managerial decisions.²⁶ The lack of information or poor recount of the reasons behind changes in programmes is even more relevant in environments with relatively high management staff turnover, as it is the case for NRC in general and specifically in the countries visited.

• **5.4.3 Monitoring, evaluation, reporting, and learning and innovation**

Reporting is conducted on a monthly and quarterly basis, and the same system in general applies to IPs. However, two important problems with reporting were noted:

- **The Core Activity Database (CAD) reporting is not well-functioning.** Internal monitoring and reporting from field level to HQ is partly done through an ill-functioning data-base. This database contains misleading figures and is not adapted to every programme (e.g. Colombia). As a consequence the figures are confusing and risk being misinterpreted. As currently in place, the system does not store useful information, nor does it provide figures accessible to the field and, consequently, is hardly of any use to the field. It was more than once noted by senior field management that reports in general, but specifically the Balanced Score Card (BSC) and the CAD do not serve their information flow needs, necessary for proper programme implementation, but instead are considered rather repetitive and even counterproductive.
- **Reporting requirements are too diverse and too many.** Reporting (as a consequence of a multitude of donors, all with different requirements and of not pooling unrestricted funds together) was considered too time-consuming and inefficient and in particular the amount of detail and information requested by DFID considered not commensurate with the volume of the funding.

With regard to the articulation with other NRC programmes, no evidence of strong collaboration between the NRC core competencies at field level was found. Conversely and within their core competencies, it seems there is genuine exchange of information and at least yearly there are core-competency meetings and workshops organized by the International Programme Department (IPD). It was noted that this exchange of information was highly appreciated by the field and certainly contributed to an increased organizational learning and capacity building of NRC staff. The contacts with Technical Core Competency advisors at HQ were equally appreciated and supports and improves the capacity in the field undoubtedly as well. Coordination and feedback between the AID department and IDMC on advocacy and policy, as well as a systematic articulation between the advocacy and the IPD departments was, however, less noticeable at field level by the evaluation team. The recent installing of an advocacy system with field-based PAAs, partly as a result of the DFID PPA funding, at the core of the advocacy efforts, has yet to become fully operational and effective.²⁷

NRC is clearly exploring avenues to increase organizational learning and development, for example by regularly subjecting itself to external evaluations and revising its Monitoring and Evaluation system. In addition, it is also evident that the vast amount of knowledge and information available from the IDMC to the field is equally increasing the contextual knowledge of NRC's staff. Nonetheless, it could be noticed that at a less senior field staff level the intention to build capacity is less prominent, though trainings on e.g. human rights protection, gender equality and environmental issues could be very beneficial.

Lastly, NRC's drive to explore innovative ways to increase IDP's opportunities for e.g. food security and alternative income generations (e.g. water powered mill and food stores) is laudable and a direct effect of DFID's PPA funding (see further Ch. 5: *additionality*). These innovations should, however, be properly investigated and screened on their long-term feasibility, impact on and profitability for the beneficiaries or else they will do more harm than they will benefit the target group.

²⁶ Examples of insufficient documented and argued project modifications are the provision of NFIs in the Myanmar programme, and the construction of a water-powered mill and warehouses in the DRC programme, both as a result of cost savings or unallocated funds.

²⁷ Only in the second quarter of 2012 a revised Advocacy Policy Plan and advocacy priorities were established by the AID department, with succeeding AID workplans.

5.5 Conclusions and Recommendations

5.5.1 Conclusions

NRC demonstrates to be very well aware that the Value for Money principle is of major importance to contemporary donors, in particular DFID. It clearly shows understanding of the linkages between costs and the extent to which these costs influence the results set out in the programme log frame. In effect, NRC is applying Value for Money principles already by e.g. internally evaluating the cost-drivers for the various programmes and by comparison of certain unit costs with peer organisations.²⁸ In using both Measurement and Management approaches to assess the Value for Money of NRCs programme, it was possible to compare the respective data and observations. The evaluator found no major variances in between the two methodologies and considers the NRC's PPA funded programme overall as reasonable Value for Money. However, there is still room for improvement, based on the following observations:

- **Evidence about the cost-efficiency of the three country programmes is mixed.** This observation is based on actual vs. budgeted cost efficiency and the comparison of cost-efficiency of selected activities between NRC-financed and peer programmes. The Myanmar shelter programme realized its targeted outputs at considerably lower than expected costs (see country report), whereas various outputs were also achieved at lower than budgeted costs by the programmes in Colombia and DRC. Peer programmes were, however, able to deliver selected outputs (e.g. workshops, rabbits and shelters) at even lower unit costs than the country programmes, although NRC-financed outputs were generally delivered at higher quality than outputs implemented by other programmes. Peer organisation comparisons are a valuable instrument to keep organisations 'sharp' with respect to economy and (cost-)efficiency. However the third parameter to assess Value for Money of an intervention, *effectiveness*, dealing much more with the quality of output delivery, is not assessed in this evaluation (for reasons see 5.1.1) and thus conclusions drawn from these peer organisation comparisons as such should be put in that perspective.
- **The existing budget system does not encourage optimizing cost-efficiency.** Discussions during field visits indicate that programme managers feel they should spend their entire budget to avoid budget reductions in subsequent years. This encourages maximizing outputs (delivering as many outputs as possible within the agreed budget), as opposed to maximizing cost-efficiency (delivering the agreed number of outputs at the lowest possible cost). This may explain why the Myanmar shelter programme intended to spent its cost savings on shelter construction to additional outputs such as a reforestation programme that was not identified in the budget instead of returning these funds to NRC headquarters where they could have been allocated to other programmes. In addition, the information systems of the country programmes do not contain data on unit costs, which suggests that cost budgets are managed without direct reference to output targets.
- **NRC does not enforce strict budget discipline, which limits the scope for improving cost-efficiency.** NRC's country programme budgets are decentralized, with about 84% of total budgets spent at field level. In 2011/2012, all three programmes reported substantial differences between budgeted and actual costs in individual budget categories (see Annex 4e for details). Although the evaluator recognizes the need for flexible budgets in highly volatile environments, the *de facto* absence of spending limits on individual budget categories and the general ease with which budgets are defined and modified, makes it difficult for NRC headquarters to help ensure that budgets are allocated according to the planned outputs.
- **Some of the existing reporting and monitoring mechanisms (e.g. the CAD) do not offer sufficient and adequate management information to the field, which is likely to reduce general efficiency and effectiveness.** The CAD reports and data base are of little or no use to the field and work in this regard even contra-productive as their reliability is questioned and parallel systems are therefore developed and in use. In general, it was reported that feedback from HQ on reporting to the field was lacking and reporting requirements of some donors (e.g. DFID) disproportionate to their relative weight.
- **Instructions in Financial and Logistical handbooks are not always applied to their full extent.** The current monitoring of the financial and administrative performance of the IPs is not up to highest standards and the pre-screening of IPs on their financial capacities and systems not

²⁸ These studies were not considered applicable and appropriate for this evaluation and are therefore not included.

structurally performed. Also the prescribed procurement plan is often not defined or used. NRC risks to diminish its cost-efficiency in failing to comply with these regulations.

- **Learning and innovation is not properly embedded in the organisation, diminishing the likely cost-efficiency benefits.** NRC pays significant attention to learning and innovation, though the latter is not always well thought-through and constructive. Information exchange is beneficial and occurring at expert - mostly international staff - level, though more practical trainings for less senior - mostly national - staff (e.g. on project design, reporting and monitoring) might be even more beneficial to the organisation and render NRC as an organization more cost-efficient.

5.5.2 Recommendations

- **Conduct regular comparisons of unit costs of selected activities with peer programmes.** Such comparisons are sources of potential cost savings, and ensure that NRC's costs remain on par with unit costs of comparable activities undertaken by other programmes. These comparisons should not only contain the direct unit costs but preferably include the indirect costs as well, although it is acknowledged that these data are sometimes difficult to obtain (peers acting as competitors) and definitions of e.g. indirect costs are not unambiguous. It is more widely now encouraged to publish (financial) data, especially in view of the increased attention to transparency and NRC could, as a member of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, take a lead role. Again, these unit costs comparisons would greatly increase their value if they can be linked to cost-effectiveness analysis to assist NRC in analysing and enhancing the Value for Money of its interventions.²⁹
- **Monitor actual unit costs vis-à-vis budgeted unit costs.** NRC uses comprehensive log frames that contain quantifiable outputs with milestones per year. It is recommended to explicitly link the actual cost of a programme to the outputs achieved by that programme. This can be done by establishing a unit cost budget, and by periodically measuring the actual unit cost against the budgeted unit cost. This information could be added to the financial reports that the programmes already submit to NRC headquarters, together with an explanation of significant variances (if any). It is understood that NRC is planning to implement such a output cost monitoring in the new budget monitoring system.
- **Establish mechanisms to encourage country programmes to improve cost-efficiency.** To achieve this objective, it is proposed that NRC will allow country programmes to
 - use the unrestricted DFID funds for the full 3-year programme period and allow to "pool" these funds with other more or less unrestricted funds (e.g. SIDA, NMFA) to facilitate combined reporting and budgeting. This would simplify the implementation of activities, contribute to lower the administrative burden at field level and allow for longer-term contracts with IPs.
 - stimulate cost savings and allow these savings to be carried over in future budget years³⁰ as long as predefined targets and milestones are reached and saved funding is allocated in accordance with the programme purpose. This way, programmes have a clear and long-term incentive to save costs, as long as budgets are realistically defined.
- **Enforce budget discipline and cost-efficiency awareness.** To do this, NRC must enforce full compliance with its established spending rules and regulations. Proper budgeting and realistic unit cost definition is here of course as well vital. On the cost-efficiency awareness aspect it is advisable to involve the financial departments already more in the budget planning and definition phase, instead of using their expertise merely as financial controllers.
- **Enhance and streamline the reporting systems.** The CAD reports and data base should be as quickly as possible validated and its use re-assessed, to reinstate confidence in this reporting system and usability in the field. Reporting systems should be simplified and serve both field and HQ staff. Comparable donors could be requested to allow for collective reporting and pooling their funds.
- **Enforce discipline in applying financial and logistic rules and regulations.** Especially repetitive non-compliance with prescribed regulations such as pre-screening of IDPs and failure to document important management decisions in implementations should have consequences for management staff.

²⁹ An example could be to include e.g. beneficiary appreciation and maintenance costs in an ex-post evaluation of shelters provided by NRC in Myanmar, compared to those provided by peer-organisations.

³⁰ Though most donors do not allow savings to be carried over to future budget years, this could be the case in DFID's unrestricted multi-year funding.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

NRC is a well-respected player and has a strong presence in the humanitarian world. The DFID PPA CHASE funded Programme forms a part of this presence and its ultimate goal to contribute to a safer and more dignified life for Populations affected by Displacement is still very much needed and relevant. The Programme is also nicely embedded in on-going programmes as most of NRCs Core Competencies are represented in the Programme. However, this embedding, the spread-out over many countries and the diversified approach makes the Programme in itself also less visible and manageable as a Programme. Field staff is not very much aware of the Programme in its entirety and not feeling part of it.

As the Programme is part of the various Country activities worldwide, the Programme does not receive a special attention either, meaning it is fully integrated in NRCs country programme operations and control systems. These are known to be solid and professionally carried out with competent and dedicated staff and this programme is no exception to these. However, the design of the programme has some flaws in it, making it less likely that all intended Outputs and the eventual Outcome will be achieved to the largest extent possible. The scattered implementation both geographically and in approach, with relatively small funds per country, combined with relatively small numbers of beneficiaries benefiting from the Programme is one of them. Another is the dissimilarity between the opportunities this long(er)-term funding offers and the Programme is designed and the nature of NRC as an organisation, stemming more from a relief and emergency background. The Programme set-up has the intention to be more transitional in approach, linking relief and rehabilitation more to development, whereas the organisation is still quite hands-on and directive in its operations and e.g. in the relation with its partners and the beneficiaries themselves.

As far as **Cross Cutting** issues are concerned, the evaluation team considers NRC an unexceptional organisation: Gender mainstreaming and environmental aspects are not high on the agenda and deserve more attention. Protection, however, is core business for NRC and its increased advocacy efforts and the continued attention IDMC as an institute is asking for the situation of IDPs worldwide has certainly its impact. The advocacy efforts are still, however, considered too "silent" and could clearly be increased in intensity and perceptibility. NRC is also as an INGO quite dependant on its local implementing partners and as explained, it is evaluator's strong conviction that both NRC as an organisation and the impact the programme in the long-term has can be improved in endeavouring to enhance these partnerships. Lastly NRC shows that it is an organisation that understands that feeding experiences and lessons learned back into the organisation is vital to organizational development and programmatic improvement. However, the learning environment in NRC is not as conducive as maybe desired and organisation-wide this should be taken seriously. The recent changes in paying more attention to Monitoring and Evaluation are a step in the right direction.

The **Value for Money** assessment, considered quite important by both DFID and NRC, sketches a mixed picture: NRC clearly shows understanding of the linkages between costs and the extent to which these costs influence the results set out in the Programme logframe, though in practice some shortcomings have been noted. The most important of these being: i) imperfect compliance with existing financial and logistical procedures, such as budget discipline, ii) a monitoring and reporting system that does not provide sufficient quality information to management at field level and iii) moderate awareness for and systems in place to optimize cost efficiency - e.g. no comparisons to the costs incurred by or intention to benchmark with similar agencies in countries where NRC operates. The evaluator esteems NRCs PPA funded Programme, however, reasonable Value for Money as most of these shortcomings are identified by NRC as well and steps are taken or planned to counteract these. Concentration solely on cost efficiency is, however, dangerous as cost-effectiveness need to be taken into account as well. It is assumed that NRC as a result of its strive for high quality outputs, will score higher than average in that respect.

The effectiveness of DFID PPA funds is further assessed in as far as **Additionality** of these funds could be recognized and demonstrated. Although no hard evidence is available, the evaluation team considers that there were sufficient elements available and presented to judge that the DFID PPA funds are effectively used such that their additionality is unmistakable (see also chapter 5).

Recommendations:

NRC should try to:

Programme design

1. Produce and/or update country specific logframe matrices with SMARTly formulated outcome indicators and revise the overall Programme logframe to measure and monitor more appropriately progress of planned change during and at the end of the Programme
2. Improve the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues such as gender, connectedness and environmental issues in the existing or future programme designs in paying specific attention to the various issues, specifying targets and using appropriate analysis tools

Implementation

3. Improve the relationship with IPs with long-term contracts and capacity building efforts to enhance their organizational, managerial and technical capacities
4. Strengthen coordination mechanisms with UNHCR through joint work plans
5. Engage in multi-year planning and programming increasing cost efficiency and cost-effectiveness and more durable partnerships
6. Intensify and improve training activities for beneficiaries that accompany provided agricultural, IGA and WASH related inputs to enhance the likelihood of achieving the overall Programme Outcome
7. Improve the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues such as gender, connectedness and environmental issues in the implementation of existing programmes in paying specific attention to reduce e.g. gender related vulnerability, impact of interventions on the environment and the one-off character of the interventions
8. Continue to enhance the advocacy efforts as already started, in combining country, IDMC and AID expertise and linking to other IDP / PAD advocacy initiatives to further improve effectiveness

Value for money

9. Conduct regular comparisons of unit costs of selected activities with peer programmes and monitor actual unit costs vis-à-vis budgeted unit costs
10. Explore the rationale for the differences in cost efficiency compared to other peer organisations and further explore the Value for Money of NRC's programmes in analysing their (cost-)effectiveness
11. Establish mechanisms and/or develop incentives to encourage country programmes to improve the cost-efficiency of their programmes
12. Enforce budget discipline, cost-efficiency awareness and discipline in applying financial and logistic rules and regulations
13. Enhance and streamline the reporting systems and the feeding-back of lessons-learnt into the organisation

General

14. Reduce the number of countries and sectors involved in the Programme and consider even to abandon the effecting of such an overall Programme, whenever an extension of the current Programme is foreseen; Separate and independent funding to existing country or global programmes might be more appropriate and less complicated to execute
15. Develop management and monitoring systems that are more outcome oriented / result-based instead of output-based. Combine these efforts with results-based budgeting
16. Put comparable programmes under one umbrella (logframe) programme and persuade donors to pool-fund in one 'programme' such as the shelter construction programme in Myanmar and to allow for collective financial and narrative reporting.

ANNEX 1 – Terms of Reference



INVITATION TO TENDER

Mid-Term Evaluation of DFID CHASE Support for NRC Programs

NRC seeks qualified individual(s), group(s) or company to execute an evaluation of DFID CHASE funding in selected country programs and global advocacy initiatives.

COUNTRY	:	Head Office (Oslo) with travel to field locations
DURATION	:	March – September 2012
REPORTING TO	:	Institutional Donor Adviser

1. BACKGROUND

Since April 1, 2011, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) has provided funding for Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) program activities in seven countries: Pakistan, Colombia region (including Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela), Iraq, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia. Activities supported by DFID in these countries span six inter-related core competences, which form the foundation of NRC programming. They include Shelter; Food Security; Information, Counselling, and Legal Assistance (ICLA); Education; Camp Management; and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). In addition to country programs, DFID funding supports NRC's global advocacy campaigns and the monitoring activities of the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC).

NRC receives support from DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE), which funds projects in emergency situations and fragile states through the Programme Partnership Arrangement (PPA). One of the important tools in assessing the performance of PPA funded programs is the Independent Progress Review, in which NRC will commission evaluations due at the mid-term stage (18 months into funding) and the final stage (36 months into funding).

This evaluation marks the mid-term stage and will review the progress and future potential of program activities underway since April 1, 2011 and in Colombia since May 15, 2011. In recognition of the benefits in linking reviews at the mid-term and final stages, consideration will be given to renewing this contract for the second evaluation scheduled for the end of 2013.

2. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION AND INTENDED USE

The main purpose of the mid-term evaluation is to provide an independent assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and results of DFID funded NRC activities at the global and country-specific levels. It will also verify information contained in the annual reporting process between NRC and DFID, while reviewing the quality and process of reporting in general.

The evaluation results will inform the future work of DFID-funded program activities in the countries under review, as well as similar operations in other countries where NRC is present.

Its findings and conclusions will be shared with DFID and DFID's evaluation manager Coffey International, NRC Head Office (HO) in Oslo, the Core Competency Advisers, the managers in country programs, and other interested partners.

3. SCOPE OF WORK AND LINES OF INQUIRY

Scope

The evaluation will focus on the following areas:

- Global Advocacy Campaigns on Humanitarian Access; Housing, Land and Property; and Natural Disaster Response (Head Office in Oslo)
- Internal Displacement Monitoring (IDMC in Geneva)
- Country Program Activities
 - o Colombia region - Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela (ICLA)
 - o Myanmar (Shelter)
 - o DR Congo (Food Security)

In addition to general recommendations, the evaluation will develop two to three recommendations per focus area that can be implemented within the remaining 18 months of funding.

Lines of inquiry

Each program activity at the global and country levels will be divided into a number of lines of inquiry, as outlined below. These will be finalized with the collaboration of the evaluation team and in greater detail according to the planned outcomes of each activity.

Relevance: Doing the right activities

- To what extent do NRC country programs and advocacy/displacement monitoring activities, as described in the PPA CHASE logframe, represent and respond to the needs and priorities of constituencies and target beneficiaries?
- To what degree have NRC activities balanced achieving the greatest impact while targeting the most vulnerable and marginalized?
- To what extent does DFID funding influence and impact NRC targeting strategy? (Additionality)
- Going forward, in what ways can NRC improve the design and implementation of these activities to achieve greater relevance?

Effectiveness: Doing activities in the right way

- What are the distinctive offerings of NRC in the humanitarian sector in the selected country program and advocacy/displacement monitoring activities?
- In what ways does the PPA CHASE mechanism and overall approach taken by DFID enable NRC to provide this type of distinctive expertise and service? (Additionality)
- Going forward, how can NRC leverage its strengths to improve the humanitarian effort in selected advocacy campaigns, country programs, and displacement monitoring?

Efficiency: Doing activities at the right cost (e.g. value for money)

- To what extent can NRC demonstrate cost effectiveness, including an understanding of program costs, the factors driving those costs, and linkages to performance and ability to achieve efficiency gains?
- To what extent has NRC delivered results at improved efficiency due specifically to receipt of DFID funds? (Additionality)
- Going forward, could NRC reduce costs without sacrificing quality?

Results: Doing activities that produce positive change not otherwise achievable

- To what degree are country programs and advocacy/displacement monitoring activities progressing towards their outcomes as described in the PPA CHASE logframe?
- To what extent have the *country programs* directly impacted the lives of beneficiaries, positive and negative, as described by the PPA CHASE logframe? (Additionality)
- To what extent have *advocacy and displacement monitoring* caused positive change as described by the PPA CHASE logframe? (Additionality)

Cross-cutting themes

A particular emphasis will be placed on measuring additionality, defined by DFID as “*the additional benefits that are directly attributable to the activities delivered by the project.*” The additionality of funding demonstrates how *the results arising from an intervention would not have occurred in the absence of the intervention.* Discussion of additionality should also highlight whether the PPA CHASE mechanism in particular has a multiplier effect on overall project reach, quality, and impact.

In evaluating each of the four categories of assessment, attention should also be given to highlighting cases of organizational learning, innovation, and sustainability.

- *Learning and innovation.* Examples from each country program should be provided and include learning that improves capacity (e.g. organizational development) and learning that improves contextual knowledge (e.g. learning about the situation of the target population). The degree to which these types of learning have and could improve programming, as well as the structure and use of NRC’s monitoring and evaluation system, should be described
- *Sustainability.* Assess the extent to which program activities are sustainable across each of the four criteria. This should focus on sustainability issues of particular concern to humanitarian work/emergency response and policy development and advocacy. Where applicable, it should also include an examination of strategic partnerships.

Evaluation principles

The evaluation will be guided by the following ethical considerations:

- Openness of information given, to the highest possible degree to all parties.
- Public access to the results when there are not special considerations against this
- Broad participation of interested parties
- Reliability and independence

4. METHODOLOGY

The methods to be used in the mid-term evaluation include:

- Desk study and document review: The evaluation team shall review proposals, reports and other documents associated with the development of NRC’s relationship with DFID, global advocacy campaigns, IDMC activity, and ICLA, Shelter, and Food Security programs.
- Key stakeholder interviews: The evaluation team will conduct interviews with NRC staff at Head Office and in the field, staff at IDMC, national and international NGOs, relevant UN agencies, community based organizations and inter-agency networks where applicable (e.g. UNOCHA Food Security Cluster in DR Congo).
- Beneficiary focus groups and surveys: For the assessment of country programs, the evaluation team will meet with beneficiaries and community representatives of the target population for each Core Competency under review. This can include household surveys, focus groups, and interviews.
- Field visits and other travel:
 - o Field visits will be made to each of the countries under review. Field work should be divided by the team, with the entire team visiting DR Congo to pilot the methodology, the lawyer/advocacy expert traveling to Colombia region (Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela), and the humanitarian program expert traveling to Myanmar. The expert in program finance can either do the analysis for Colombia and Myanmar remotely or visit each country for a shorter period of time while other team members are present in the field.
 - o The lawyer/advocacy expert and expert in program finance will travel to Geneva for two to three days to interview staff at IDMC and gather documentation and financial information relevant to the evaluation.
 - o The team is expected to visit HO in Oslo at least twice. First, the team will travel to HO at the start of the evaluation to meet the Evaluation Steering Committee, interview relevant country program staff, and meeting with the Advocacy and Information Department (AID). At the end of the evaluation, the team will return to present and facilitate a discussion about their findings and recommendations.

Additionality. Outcomes and additionality should be quantitatively assessed as far as possible. Qualitative methods are also encouraged and should demonstrate whether outcomes are grounded in the context of the intervention as well as providing an explanation of why and how the program affects change.

Efficiency. As there are difficulties in monetizing results required to make a complete cost benefit analysis, a mix of methods can be used to assess efficiency and the value for money of NRC activities. In the inception report, the evaluation team will recommend the type of tools and approaches to be used and provide an explanation of their reliability and appropriateness.

5. DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING DEADLINES

The evaluation team will submit three reports and offer a presentation to the NRC Head Office and relevant staff. Team members will also provide a short presentation summarizing key findings for senior management in country programs at the end of each field visit.

- Inception report (April 6): Following the desk review and prior to beginning field work, the evaluation team will produce an inception report subject to approval by the NRC Evaluation Steering Committee. This report will detail a draft work plan with a summary of the primary information needs, the methodology to be used, and a work plan/schedule. With respect to methodology, the evaluation team will provide a description of how data will be collected and a sampling framework, data sources, and drafts of suggested data collection tools such as questionnaires and interview guides.

It should highlight the strategy for addressing additionality and efficiency (value for money) analysis. This includes reviewing the type and detail of data available for analysis, the analytical approach selected, and a justification for that approach.

Given the geographic spread of ICLA activities in the Colombia region, the report should also specify which countries the team will visit (e.g. Colombia and Ecuador).

Once the report is finalized and accepted, the evaluation team must submit a request for any change in strategy or approach to the NRC Evaluation Steering Committee.

- Draft report (June 29th): A draft evaluation report will be submitted to the Evaluation Steering Committee, who will review the draft and provide feedback within two weeks of receipt of the draft report.
- Final report (August 13th): The Final Mid-Term Evaluation Report report will follow the guidelines in the UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports and cover the following areas:
 - o Executive summary (5 pages)
 - o Evaluation purpose, objective(s), and scope
 - o Evaluation methodology
 - o Findings
 - o Conclusions with recommendations and lessons for the programs going forward
 - o Appendices, including evaluation terms of reference, maps, sample framework, and bibliography

All material collected in the undertaking of the evaluation process should be lodged with the Chair of the NRC Evaluation Steering Committee prior to the termination of the contract.

- Presentation of findings (May and September):
 - o *May-June*. At the end of the field research, the evaluation team will present key findings to management in each of the country programs.
 - o *September*. After the Final Mid-Term Evaluation Report is submitted, the evaluation team will present their findings at the NRC Head Office and facilitate a discussion about the use of CHASE funds during the next phase of DFID support.

6. TIME-FRAME AND BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS

Proposals should present a budget in the number of expected working days over the entire period (e.g. 90 full time days over a period of 6 months).

Evaluation activities will be conducted during March-September 2012, with a final presentation of findings expected in September.

A final decision on the evaluation team will be taken by mid-March 2012. Desk review and initial conversations with the Evaluation Steering Committee should be planned for late March. The deadline for the Inception Report is April 6th.

Visits to Oslo and Geneva to conduct interviews with key NRC HO country program staff, the Advocacy and Information Department (AID), and the IDMC will be planned for mid to late April 2012.

Field visits to Myanmar, Colombia, and DR Congo are planned for late April through early June 2012. The entire team is expected to visit DR Congo together to pilot the evaluation tools and methods. The team will split for the other two country visits, which will be conducted at the same time.

In the event of serious problems or delays, the team leader should inform the Steering Committee immediately. Any significant changes to review timetable shall be approved by the Steering Committee in advance.

7. EVALUATION MANAGEMENT AT NRC

An Evaluation Steering Committee has been established with the following members: Institutional Donor Adviser (Thomas Qviller), Head of Technical Support Section (Austen Davis), and Evaluation Adviser (Cara Winters). The Steering Committee will oversee administration and overall coordination of the evaluation, including monitoring progress on the deliverables. The main functions of the Steering Committee include:

- establishing the terms of reference of the evaluation
- selecting external evaluation team
- reviewing and commenting on the inception report and approving the proposed evaluation strategy
- reviewing and commenting on the draft report
- establishing a dissemination and utilization strategy

The Institutional Donor Adviser, in coordination with the Steering Committee, will act as the Committee Chair and is responsible to facilitate access to information, documentation sources, travel, and field logistics. In case of any changes in positions at HO, the Steering Committee will be adjusted accordingly.

8. EVALUATION CONSULTANT TEAM

The evaluation team will be composed of three international consultants, with the potential for national consultants as needed. The team leader should be identified in the application's outline evaluation framework.

Required Expertise within the Team

- *Lawyer/Advocacy Expert*: at least 1 team member will be a lawyer by training or have over 7 years of experience leading advocacy campaigns related to humanitarian crises and international human rights law. A minimum of 3 years of experience in evaluating legal interventions and advocacy efforts are necessary. Language proficiency in Spanish is required.

- *Humanitarian Program Expert:* at least 1 team member will have a minimum of 3 years of experience in evaluating humanitarian projects and have 5 years of experience as a program manager in the humanitarian sector. Language proficiency in French is required. Specific competencies in food security and livelihoods are desirable.
- *Accountant/Program Finance Expert:* At least 1 member of the team will be an accountant by training, with a minimum of 3 years of experience in program finance in the humanitarian sector. Proven skills in cost efficiency analysis are necessary. Familiarity with program logistics and supply chains in emergency settings is desirable.

Necessary Skills

- Fluency in written English is required of all team members.
- Experience with the logical framework approach.
- Prior experience in DR Congo, Colombia region (Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela), and Myanmar is helpful.

Application Deadline: March 2nd 2012

Bids must include the following:

- Two page outline of evaluation framework
- Proposed evaluation budget
- CVs and evidence of past evaluations for each team member

Submit completed bids to Ms. Cara Winters at cara.winters@nrc.no

ANNEX 2 – People interviewed

First name	Last name	Organization	Job title
<i>Colombia</i>			
Fatima	Esparza	CCJ	Coordinator Advocacy
Viviana	Tacha	CCJ	Researcher-Consultant
Zuly	Laverde	CODHES	Coordinator Ecuador Office
Marco	Romero	CODHES	Director
Pilar	Gimeno	ICRC	Coordinator-Protection Department
Angela	Molina	NRC Colombia	Advocacy and Public Policy Field Officer
Andrea	Naletto	NRC Colombia	Program Director
Camillo	Ramirez	NRC Colombia	Program Officer Refugee Program
Mauricio	Rodriguez Pulido	NRC Colombia	Administrative and Financial Manager
Karine	Ruel	NRC Colombia	Regional Program Manager
Atle	Solberg	NRC Colombia	Country Director
Maritza Lucumi	Moreno	NRC Colombia	Regional Coordinator
Kimberly Ann	Stanton	PCS	Executive Director, Country Representative
Andres Eduardo	Celis Neira	UNHCR	Coordinator Protection Unit
Gina	Betancourt	Nat. Dept. Social Prosperity, Victims Unit	Member Working Group on Victims outside Colombia
<i>DR Congo</i>			
Badiambila	MUKENDI	Bureau Echo Goma	Gestionnaire de Programme
Aude	RIGOT	CARE / ROC Bureau Goma.	Directrice Provinciale Nord - Kivu
Feargal	O'Connell	Concern	Liaison Officer
Milambo	Augustin	FAO	Coordinator Emergencies N Kivu
Christophe	Loubaton	FAO	Coordinator Food Security
Michael	Duerst	ICRC	Coordinator ECOSEC
Faustin	Mirino	IPAPEL	Agriculture Inspection Officer
Honorine		NRC DR Congo	Project Coordinator
Alain	Burie	NRC DR Congo	Project Manager Food Security
Pietro	Galli	NRC DR Congo	Programme Director
Alain	Homsy	NRC DR Congo	DRC Country Director
Leo	Otieno	NRC DR Congo	Finance and Administration Manager
Andrea	Bianchi	NRC DR Congo	Area Manager
Karen	Kerry	OCHA North-Kivu	Coordinator
Karen	PERRIN	OCHA North-Kivu	Head of Office
Heather	Kerr	Oxfam GB	Country Director
Gérard	Kerrien	Premier Urgence	Country Director
Christophe	Beau	UNHCR	Coordinateur du Cluster Protection
PAUL MAKOMA	KANYIHATA	VSF	Admin.& Financial Officer
Liliane	NSABIMANA	VSF	Bureau Reg. Grands Lacs Logisticienne Congo
Guy	ADOUA	World Food Programme AFDI, EVDS, GAV, Gradeco, UWAKI, Ceclav, Caped	Coordinateur Adjoint du Bureau Provincial Implementing Partners
<i>Ecuador</i>			
Mª Elena	Posada	Mision Escalabriniana	Field Director, Lago Agrio
Carlos Enrique	León N.	NRC Ecuador	Country Coordinator Ecuador
Alexandra	Visser	NRC Ecuador	ICLA Program Officer
Belén	Ayala	SJMR	Monitoring officer
Maribel	Melo	SJMR	Field lawyer, Lago Agrio
Fernando	Ponce	SJMR	National Director
Maybritt	Rasmussen	UNHCR	National Programme Officer

Xavier	Creach	UNHCR	Head of Sub-Office
Reem	Alsalem	UNHCR	Senior Protection Officer
Céline	Füri	UNHCR	Protection Officer
Juan Pablo	ALBÁN ALENCASTRO	Universidad San Francisco de Quito	Director del Consultorio Jurídico Gratuito
José	Sandoval Zambrano	Ministerio de Relaciones exteriores	Director de Refugio

Myanmar

Moira	O'Lear	Actionaid	Country Director
U Khin	Maung Nyunt	BRIDGE ASIA JAPAN	Admin / Finance Officer
Rev. Saw Matthew Philippe	Aepe	Karen Development Network	Director
Hiet	Hamel	Local Resource Centre	INGO Liaison Officer
James	Myet Soe	Myanmar Red Cross	Monitoring & Evaluation Officer
Chris	Hawryluk	NRC Myanmar	Project Manager-Shelter
John	Bleers	NRC Myanmar	Country Director
Kyaw Zay Va	Prideaux-Brune	Oxfam GB	Country Director
Kelland	Maung Stevenson	PSI Save the Children	Field Office Coordination Officer Country Director
Thomas	Fisler	Swiss Agency for Development & Coop.SOC	Counsellor, Director Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid SE Asia
Atsuko	Furukawa	UNHCR	Field Officer
Maung Thann	Maung	UNHCR	Assistant Field Officer
YUMI	BAE	UNICEF	Chief Field Operations
Aung	Win	World Vision	Community Facilitator
Sally	Thompson	Thailand Burma Border Consortium	Deputy Executive Director (Myanmar/Thailand)

Norway

Marcus	Danbolt	NRC Norway	Finance & Admin. Controller Latin America & Middle
Fernando	de Medina-Rosales	NRC Norway	Adviser-Information Counselling and Legal Assistance
Irene	Gjerde	NRC Norway	Controller Finance and Administration Department
Thomas	Qviller	NRC Norway	Institutional Donor Adviser Int.Programme Department
Pål E.	Wæraas	NRC Norway	Support Service Manager Logistics, ICT, Administration
Cara J.	Winters	NRC Norway	Adviser, M&E, Strategic Management Support
Austen	Davis	NRC Norway	Head Technical Support Section
Ingrid	Macdonald	NRC Norway	Head Advocacy
Ronny	Rønning	NRC Norway	Head Strategic Management Support dept.
Pål	Wæraas	NRC Norway	Manager for Project Logistics
Andrew	Wilson	NRC Norway	Monitoring and Reporting Coordinator
		NRC Norway	Advocacy Advisers in AID
		NRC Norway	Country Controllers Columbia, DRC, Myanmar
		NRC Norway	Heads of Sections
		NRC Norway	HQ Technical Advisers

Panama

Fatima	Aguilar	CEALP	Field Lawyer
Tristan		CEALP	Project Coordinator
Liana	Bandamo	NRC Panama	ICLA Field Officer
Enrique	Torrella	NRC Panama	Country Coordinator
Rodolfo	Naranjo	ONPAR	National Deputy Director
Julio	Vargas	Red Cross-Colón	Coordinator Colón
Ana Lorena	Alfaro	SJR	National Coordinator

Eva	Camps	UNHCR	Protection Officer
<i>Switzerland</i>			
Nina M.	Birkeland	IDMC	Head of Policy and Research Department
Pascale	Guillot	IDMC	Head of Finance and Administration
Kate	Halff	IDMC	Head of IDMC
Barbara	McKalin	IDMC	HLP Head of Department
Marzia	Montemurro	IDMC	Head of Department (Africa and Americas)
Clare	Spurrell	IDMC	Head of Communications
Arnchild	Spence	NRC Switzerland	Resident Representative
Karen	Gulick	UNHCR	Head of Section
Dina ABOU	SAMRA	Office Coord. Humanitarian Affairs	Hum. Affairs Off. Protection & Displacement Policy Dev.
<i>Venezuela</i>			
Jesús	Medina	Caritas	Field lawyer, S.Antonio Táchira
Javier	Zambrano	CONARE	Director, Tachira State
Ninoska Laya	Pereira	NRC Venezuela	Country Coordinator
Laura		NRC Venezuela	ICLA Program Officer
Rafael Aaron	Diaz Ramirez	Ombudsman-S.Cristobal Tachira	State Director
Elisa	Vivas Carvajal	Ombudsman-S.Cristobal Tachira	Deputy Director
Walter	Sánchez Arit	UNHCR	Head of Field Office. San Cristobal

ANNEX 3 – Bibliography

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ANNEX 4a - Country Report DR Congo

Evaluation of DFID funded NRC programme in DR Congo, 30 April-11 May 2012

I. Introduction of the PPA programme

Brief context and position of the evaluated area within the overall (country) programme

NRC-DR Congo has been established in Eastern Congo since 2001. Total staff is almost 300 people, of which 13 expatriates, spread over 3 sub-offices (Goma, Bukavu and Beni). Its 4 core competences are: Education, Food Security (FS, with the largest budget), Shelter, and Information Counselling and Legal services (ICLA). The DFID PPA funded project under evaluation resides in its entirety under the Food Security programme of the Goma section.

Funded by a large variety of donors, with Norwegian MFA and Swedish SIDA as its most traditional and long lasting ones, NRC's overall budget in Eastern Congo in 2011 accounted for some USD 15M. Although DFID's contribution only represents 10% of the overall FS budget and 3% of the overall country budget, the DFID PPA CHASE agreement forms an important opportunity for NRC-DR Congo to elaborate longer term strategies and planning, shifting somewhat from a pure humanitarian response programme into a more transitional one, including both relief and developmental aspects and thus aiming at reaching more durable and sustainable solutions.

The DFID-sponsored project implemented by NRC in DRC is centred on the provision of agricultural inputs and income generating activities in Masisi Territory, Province of North Kivu and Mugunga 3 Refugee Camp, close to Goma, the capital of North Kivu (see map in annex 8). In total, 9 different types of activities were developed, covering agricultural production, improved stoves/tree planting, juice production, mushroom growing, small scale trading, soap making, rabbit breeding, water powered milling and food stores building/management.

II. Set-up of the country / area visit

The country visit was organised according to the Inception Report i.e. with staff discussions, peer organisation and secondary stakeholder interviews for a total of 10 days and carried out by three evaluators (Ms Pita, Ms Murillo and Mr Bosch-TL). The field visits and primary stakeholder interviews focused on two main areas: Masisi, comprised of 5 IDPs camps, including its neighbouring and host communities, and the Mugunga III camp with its surrounding local population. Due to security constraints the Masisi area could not be visited (see later).

Methodology

The specific methodology used in DRC consisted of desk studies and document reviews, key stakeholders interviews including NRC management and field staff, 7 out of in total 8 partner organisation representatives, provincial institutional counterpart (Provincial Inspection Services from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock, IPAPEL), secondary stakeholders (Concern, Première Urgence), UN agencies such as UNHCR, OCHA, WFP, FAO, and community based authorities inside and outside the camps (see annex 2, persons met). To assess NRC's position in the humanitarian environment, relevant peer organisations were also interviewed (Oxfam, ICRC, VSF), including a DFID PPA recipient (CARE).

A number of focus group discussions with primary and secondary stakeholders were undertaken inside and outside the Mugunga camp, covering a varied sample of the initiatives developed in this area. Interviews allowed verifying, counter-checking and collecting data to generate additional information necessary to complement the main conclusions derived from the desk study and document reviews.

The evaluation was guided by inquiry lines in relation to the DAC criteria relevance / appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability / connectedness (see further the Inception Report).

Appropriateness / relevance

NRC has been managing and coordinating 6 IDP camps included within the scope of the project between 2008 and October 2011, after which it decided to step out and pass these tasks to Première Urgence. Some 13.000 IDPs and hosting communities settled at these 6 camps were identified, and, acknowledging the burden and negative impact on neighbouring communities living around these camps, NRC appropriately felt the need to act also upon the protection of these host communities. The DFID PPA Chase funding represented a unique opportunity to bring in opportunities of change by facilitating some inputs and training that could help create a more sustainable livelihood to this vulnerable population in general.

Constraints

As a result of flaring up hostilities between different factions deserted from the FARDC, a wave of new IDPs arrived from the Masisi and Sake areas into the direction of Mugunga camp (Goma); the Masisi axe was cut off, rendering an evaluation mission to this area impossible. The field visits and the information gathered are therefore not representative in terms of population reached, with the Masisi area consisting of over 85% of the total number of primary beneficiaries. Agricultural interventions are also exclusively executed in this zone and hence these could not be assessed by field visits either.

Despite these limitations, visits undertaken in Mugunga have allowed the evaluation team to make a fairly clear assessment of the IGA activities (e.g. soap making, mushroom production and rabbit rearing) and of NRCs way to work with/through local partners.

III. Stakeholder's analysis (primary, secondary) and their involvement in the programme¹

Stakeholder	importance	influence
IDPs	5	1
Hosting community	4	1
Local (NGOs) implementing partners	2	1
Other partners (UNHCR/FAO/OCHA)	2	3
Governmental services (IPAPPEL)	2	2
Other INGOs working w target population	1	2
Other INGOs working in same sector	1	2
Donors	1	4
Government	3	2
NRC staff	2	5

Importance /influence matrix	Low influence	Medium influence	High influence
High importance	IDPs, Hosting community (box A), Government		
Low Importance	Local NGOs, Governmental services, Other INGOs working w target population, Other INGOs working in same sector (box B)	UN agencies (box C)	NRC staff, Donors (box D)

¹ For an explanation on assessment criteria and methodology see Ch 2: Methodology

Box A, C and D (the yellow boxes) represent the key stakeholders of the project and should therefore be of special interest to the project. Ideally stakeholders in Box A should move both one box to the right, meaning they would gain more influence to the project. However, this is at present unrealistic, given the still very fragile living circumstances of the target group and the low capacity (technical, organizational and operational) of both local communities and the government.

IV. Main findings regarding design, programmatic issues, management, partnership (role, capacity building), organizational development and learning.

Design: Previous Livelihood support projects implemented in 2009, 2010 and 2011 (North Kivu) targeting returned and local populations served as an inspiration and a source for the formulation of this programme. A comprehensive needs assessment was carried out in the targeted region and direct beneficiaries were identified and selected through a thorough and transparent process based on a participatory vulnerability assessment. The selected list of target groups was being published, shared and counter-checked on site. Still, the specific DRC programme contains in the opinion of the evaluation team some flaws in its design:

- The production of a global work plan, incorporating lessons learnt from past experiences, could have enabled NRC to develop a more strategic 3- years project, where e.g. a gender and stakeholders' analysis, a plan to mitigate project risks, objectives in terms of training and technical support and a hand over strategy are included. Despite its 3 years life span and longer term goals, the project is now more conceived as a transitory "inputs delivery" intervention.
- NRC had already past experiences with local government bodies such as the Institut Provincial pour l'Agriculture, la Pêche et l'Élevage (IPAPEL) providing technical services and their technical experience at field level could have enhanced the project design. It is well understood that dealing with governmental services is often cumbersome and their capacity limited, but their contribution would certainly have been of value and would have increased institutional and local ownership of the intervention, the more as it was so heavily geared at improving agricultural production.
- Although a needs assessment was carried out, this was not clearly reflected in the project design, nor could signs of genuine consultation or participation of key stakeholders, including the MoA be traced in the implementation plan. As an example: a wide variety of different IGAs was offered, of which beneficiaries could choose from, though it remains unclear whether these options were practical and could durably decrease the vulnerability of beneficiaries. No cost-benefit or market studies for these activities were included in the project design, and the viability of the various IGA activities is questioned (in particular the water mill and the warehouses², but also other activities such as mushroom production do not seem to be well thought through).
- IDPs and host communities were for certain IGAs organized in mixed groups by NRC, a laudable initiative to encourage peaceful coexistence between IDPs living in camps and the neighbouring communities, but certain beneficiaries of the host communities clearly were less vulnerable than the IDPs (e.g. the juice producing group).
- There are also some inconsistencies in the numbers of beneficiaries, counting households in some cases versus beneficiaries in person in others. This creates confusion and large margins of error when calculating the cost-efficiency and impact of activities. Notwithstanding the different approaches and requirements from donors, NRC should endeavour the standardization of criteria such as primary and secondary beneficiaries as an organization to enable consistency and appropriate comparison.

The global frame of the PPA programme is not showing a logic sequence in between the objectives, the outcomes and the activities (see also Ch 3.1). Output indicators have been incorrectly defined and are hardly measurable; as an example, the mere "involvement" of the target groups in agricultural production and IGAs (output indicator 1) will not necessarily result in increasing their food security.

² These two activities were later as pilot projects added to the programme as costs for agricultural inputs were born by in-kind donations from FAO.

However, an internal and more appropriate logframe was designed with country-specific outcome indicators defined and a specific "Project Purpose". Data resulting from a thorough vulnerability assessment (August-September 2011) could have been integrated into the matrix as a base from which targets and milestones could have been defined to measure and monitor the progress of project implementation. Unfortunately, the survey was very lately analysed and cannot be used as baseline data because (the situation of) the target groups has already changed. It is suggested to redo the vulnerability assessment with the targeted beneficiaries and to produce thus up-dated baseline data enabling the project to assess the progress and genuine impact on beneficiaries in subsequent years.

Programmatic Issues: The project is effectively running from October 2011, following the inception phase (setting up of eligibility criteria and methodology, contract with partners, procurement plan and plan of activities, etc.), but should have started three months earlier as agreed in the MoU with DFID (in retroactive effect to April, 1st). Some staff salaries, however, have covered the full 12 months. Start-up delays shortened the implementation phase under evaluation to less than 6 months, also due to additional gaps between the training period and the delivery of inputs to primary beneficiaries.

NRC included in its activities many training opportunities for beneficiaries. These are highly important as they constitute sometimes the main asset for target groups and are essential when it comes to adopting new (agricultural) techniques or income generating activities. However, the quality, duration and the total amount of training provided seem to be insufficient to produce sustainable impact.³ Especially in the case of agricultural and livestock production long-term commitment and assistance of the provider is prescribed. IPAPEL's training services should in that respect perhaps be reconsidered (or firstly trained on training techniques) and other training sources (VSF, FAO...) could be an alternative option. Technical and operational support for Implementing Partners (IPs) could also be further strengthened at field level (see below).

The evaluation considers also the appropriateness, viability, equitability and cost benefit of some of the activities (water powered mills, food stores, mushroom production) questionable. Commercial businesses should at least be accompanied by proper business analysis and models and consistent (management/marketing) training. A high diversity of food and income generating activities, coupled with lack of suitable technical expertise (ex. rabbit breeding), of benefit of scale (ex. Mushroom production), and of capacities (water powered mills and food store management) will also reduce their effectiveness and cost-efficiency and hence make them less likely to be sustainable.

Project management is very hands-on and skilled, but its tight control and close supervision of IPs risk falling into micro-management (overly verifying, purchase of all items, etc.) resulting in being little efficient in the end. A detailed time-frame of activities constitutes the main project management tool. Local implementing partners have to systematically report upon tasks requested nearly on a weekly basis. Technical field expertise and creativity of IPs are thus under-utilized and a gradual hand-over to partners could make the role of NRC less prominent and paternalistic. Overall the management is quite output oriented, and a monitoring system measuring progress against outcome targets with a focus towards the achievement of the project purpose, could be highly beneficial in terms of increasing effectiveness and long-term impact.

NRC is represented in all relevant humanitarian coordination fora (e.g. Food Security/protection clusters, UNHCR coordination meetings in Masisi) and holds particularly good relationships with UN agencies (FAO, WFP). Coordination and exchange of information between the various humanitarian actors (International and local NGOs, UN agencies) is, however, not optimal, both at Goma, but also at field level. Technical articulation/exchange between IPAPEL, IPs, other Humanitarian actors (e.g. Concern) and NRC are of particular importance at field level and so is active participation and information sharing at the various clusters.

³ A total of 12 training sessions were conducted to 35 staff from IPs by 4 trainers on agricultural production (vegetables and grains) and livestock (rabbit rearing) after which these staff trained beneficiaries.

Partnership: NRC is generally perceived by its international peers and donors (FAO, WFP, ECHO) as a very reliable and professional actor. Its work is particularly appreciated in the camp management and the coordination of humanitarian assistance in the camps, where NRC has performed outstandingly. When it comes, however, to field coordination and activities at more horizontal level, NRC is considered as an organization that works rather in isolation, not inclined to promote partnerships or alliances with other humanitarian actors working on the same targeted areas and/or similar target groups. This approach might jeopardize opportunities to complement humanitarian activities and to find synergies with similar field interventions which in the end could increase project's impact perspectives.

As far as local partnership is concerned, NRC's rightful choice to work with Congolese partners is particularly challenging, considering their limited technical competences and the high levels of fraud/corruption. NRC should be given credit for such a decision. IPs appreciate NRC's approach to build their technical capacities. Respect and good interaction exist at field level and the project has rendered these organizations more visible. On average, their services to the project represent some 30% of their total annual budget. Conversely, they resent the lack of involvement in the project design and an equal relationship as partners. They unanimously have expressed their wish to the evaluation team to be more actively involved in projects future direction. To date, the 8 local organizations selected as local implementers carry out a fixed and established set of field activities. Under the training of trainers modality, 12 ToT training sessions have been conducted by the technical services of IPAPEL (MoA) on agricultural production (vegetables and grains) and livestock (rabbit rearing). Their current contractual engagement implies no specific responsibilities vis-à-vis the outcomes of the project.

Connectedness and other Cross Cutting issues (gender, protection, environment)

Connectedness: Working with institutional authorities (e.g. IPAPEL) is an important asset of the project, considering their limited physical, organizational and technical capacities. Training provided by the IPAPEL services and engaging with the extension services at field level contribute to local capacity building as well as to enhancing the state responsibility for its citizens. However, the project is not yet firmly embedded in the local structures for several reasons: i) time limitations and organizational background – NRC coming from a relief and humanitarian background; ii) very limited involvement of the Ministry of Agriculture in project design and project implementation. Like the project IPs, the staff of MoA fulfils a mere technical, sub-contractor role as service providers; iii) absence of governmental services at field level in combination with weak capacities and capabilities of the MoA and their technical staff. Regular involvement of e.g. the extension services into project implementation and decision-making and connecting the private sector with community leaders on potentially profitable operations could favour durable solutions and increase the sense of local ownership of project's activities.

Gender: Vulnerability has been the overarching differentiating criterion on this project at large (heads of households, people with disabilities, elderly people, etc.). Consequently, women constitute a larger part of the targeted population (some 60%) with the exception of the youngsters (only 25%). The project is giving women, as a particularly disadvantaged group, a sound opportunity to enter and participate into areas, traditionally occupied by men (e.g. presidency/secretariat posts at the savings groups - "Mutuelles de Solidarities"), clearly encouraging the incorporation of gender considerations in a male dominated society. Having said this, women are still under-represented at decision-making levels of the project management and implementation, (both within NRC staff and particularly the IPs).

Generally speaking, the project is particularly trying to ensure that women benefit equally to men. Although gender aspects have been included in the project and gender equality promoted in the project rationale, no gender analysis or the consequences of certain interventions on gender equality or the role of women in society could be traced. Gender awareness is, however, part of the project objectives and NRC-DRC demonstrates clearly its commitment in this respect

Protection: Together with vulnerability, protection cuts across all the stages of the project. Special considerations have been made to sensitive issues such as SGBV cases, women and minors subject to physical abuse, by providing e.g. energy saving stoves and tree plantation at households to specially protect women and minors against the high risk of violations (rape, kidnapping) from collecting wood at the forest. Protection activities have been additionally applied through advocacy actions, such as the publication of a study about the actual situation and future of IDPs living in the Masisi and Mugunga camps (produced by IDMC and the NRC-DRC PAA), to alert international organizations and donors to continue humanitarian assistance in these camps.

Environment: The programme has adopted a "do no harm policy" has been adopted by the project rather than mainstreaming environmental good practices in general. Some environmentally friendly practises are, however, applied such as the promotion of natural herbicides, reforestation initiatives and the provision of energy saving stoves. However, considering that agriculture production benefits over 75% of the total number of beneficiaries, some training on agro-ecological practises (production of organic manure, soil conservation, agro fertilisation) and/or agriculture conservation could have been incorporated.

Additionality: The transition for NRC from camp management and mere humanitarian assistance to IDPs into a more transitional and long lasting development approach represents an element of additionality for the organization. The project brings the targeted population the means to step out from food dependency and opens a door for them to acquire sustainable livelihoods and a more dignified position in society. The unrestricted nature of the funds has also allowed NRC to try out pilots and more innovative initiatives. Indeed, testing new IGAs that do not fall within the traditional NRC programmes is positive in itself, although efforts to appropriately justify and document its choices (ex-ante feasibility studies, business plans, etc.) should be undertaken.

V. Financial issues

According to financial information provided, total actual costs as of March 2012 are \$390,552 out of which direct costs represent a 34% and indirect 66% of total costs. An amount of some \$ 83,000 or 19% of the available budget was left unspent.

Activities representing major budget drivers are shown in the following table:

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Percentage of Direct Costs</i>
Rabbit Breeding	30%
Water Powered Mill	22%
Agricultural Production ⁴	14%
Food Storage Construction	9%

a. Financial and procurement systems

The financial data is consolidated once a month upon receiving financial information from field offices. Staff from the Financial Administrative and Management Office reviews and upload information from excel worksheets into AGRESSO (NRC's financial system), The Financial and Administrative Manager validates and certifies financial information and data are sent to NRC Oslo to register Head Quarters' costs, after which a final financial report is produced and send to NRC-DRC. The custodian of all accounting records is the FAM; project financial information is sent to Project Coordinators and Mission Management for their analysis and it is used as a tool to facilitate Management decisions regarding financial and funding needs.

⁴ It should be noted that this amount is not correctly representing the proportion agricultural production accounts for within the total project activities, as the in-kind contributions from FAO (worth some 80,000 USD) are not included in the accounting system.

Technical and financial reviews take place once every three months. Although the FAM sends financial reports to Project Coordinators only a few comments are received back on the financial data and no comments on the status of technical and financial conciliation.

The role of the FAM in the selection and approval processes of implementing partners (IP) is mostly very limited, which increases the risk that IPs do not have the needed procedures in place to guarantee proper accountability and also disregards NRC's guidance to have a pre-award assessment of IPs. The FAM has also no role in the monitoring process, which limits FAM's contribution to controlling that project implementation is according to budget, policies and procedures, and also reduces the opportunity to strengthen IPs' financial and management capacities.

There is no specific Procurement Plan for NRC – DRC in place. Although the Logistic Office is trying to implement it, this is still work in progress.

b. Cost-Efficiency: Variance analysis (see annex 4e)

c. Cost-efficiency: Comparison with peer organisations

This analysis was performed for two activities of which the investment represented more than 10% of the total project activity costs and for which financial information from other implementers was available. Based on these criteria, Rabbit Breeding and Food Store Construction were selected and the "peer" organizations that provided financial information for the Rabbit Breed activity were Cooperation International (COOPI) an international NGO, DIOBASS-FAO a local NGO and for the Food Store Construction a local NGO, UWAKI, provided financial information.

Results from financial comparison with "peer" organizations demonstrated that NRC investment per unit costs is considerable higher than the "peer" organizations; for example, in the Rabbit Breed activity NRC invested 50% more than COOPI and over 100% more than DIOBASS-FAO; further financial analysis demonstrate that direct costs for COOPI are higher than NRC's direct costs and DIOBASS-FAO has a slightly lower direct cost; however the major cost driver representing the largest difference between NRC and the "peer" organizations are the indirect costs. Food Store Construction comparison shows a similar pattern, as revealed in the "peer" organizations comparison analysis tables below:

Rabbit distribution "peer" comparison

<i>Organization</i>	<i># Beneficiaries</i>	<i>Direct Costs</i>	<i>Indirect Costs</i>	<i>Total Costs</i>	<i>Investment / beneficiary</i>
COOPI	4200	\$54,400	\$40,000	\$94,400	\$22
DIOBASS-FAO	9000	\$80,000	\$60,000	\$140,000	\$16
NRC	3600	\$39,540	\$77,500	\$117,040	\$33

Food Store Construction "peer" comparison

<i>Organization</i>	<i># Beneficiaries</i>	<i>Direct Costs</i>	<i>Indirect Costs</i>	<i>Total Costs</i>	<i>Investment/ Beneficiary</i>
UWAKI	250	\$8,500.00	\$5,000.00	\$13,500.00	\$54.00
NRC	120	\$12,500.00	\$24,500.00	\$37,000.00	\$308.00

It should be noted, however, that the number of persons that are supposed to benefit from Uwaki's food stores is double the number of NRC beneficiaries, though the size and set-up of the food stores are comparable. Also, the number of persons benefiting from rabbit distribution is not completely comparable either, as in the different programmes different entities were used (e.g. households in one project, whereas NRC counted a certain number of community members representing a group as beneficiaries), and NRC provided as well some training in addition to the rabbit distribution.

These peer organisation comparisons are a valuable instrument to keep organisations 'sharp' with respect to economy and (cost-)efficiency. However the third parameter to assess Value for Money of an intervention, *effectiveness*, dealing much more with the quality of output delivery, is not assessed here and thus conclusions drawn from these peer organisation comparisons as such should be put in that perspective..

VI. Conclusion and Recommendations

NRC-Congo is widely recognized by donors, partners and the humanitarian environment as a committed and reliable actor in the protection and promotion of IDP rights. With a longstanding and recognized background in humanitarian assistance, NRC's efforts in the implementation of transitional and more developmental activities are of particular value. Efforts to increase interaction and to promote synergies at field level and further invest on capacity building its IPs are considered (by the evaluators) of particular importance to project effectiveness and sustainability perspectives.

Although the evaluators have been critical on many programme activities, in particular the programme design, they consider the programme still quite valuable and trust it can and will improve effectiveness and efficiency. The following recommendations might help in this respect. NRC-DRC should try to:

1. establish genuine and more equal partnerships with its local IPs, increasing gradually their responsibility and documenting/exchanging good practices stemming from their field experience;
2. more actively involve IPs and target groups into the decision-making process concerning project orientation and implementation;
3. reduce the number of IGA activities and/or the direct involvement of NRC in it; eliminate the – probably- non-viable activities (e.g. mushroom production) and promote those that are financially sustainable (e.g. rabbit breeding, provided technical and managerial capacities are up to standards) and/or have positive, wider market perspectives by for instance linking the initiatives to value chains / the private sector (e.g. soap making, agricultural production);
4. intensify and improve trainings (the only asset IDPs are always able to carry with them);
5. apply cost benefit and other (e.g. gender-, power-, feasibility-) analyses prior to engaging in innovative initiatives (e.g. water-powered mills, food stores / warehouses);
6. concentrate more on country specific project outcomes and result based monitoring systems and promote these as well towards the IPs;
7. put more emphasis on cost efficiency (e.g. unit-cost comparison, procurement plans, involving the FAM more in planning and budgeting) and document major programmatic and budget deviating decisions.

ANNEX 4b - Country Report Colombia

Evaluation of DFID funded NRC programme in Panamá, Venezuela, Ecuador, 28th May-7th June 2012

I. Introduction of the PPA programme

Brief context of NRC Colombia and its DFID funded Refugee Programme

NRC Colombia was established in the region in 1991 and has been operating as a partner in a coalition of international and national NGOs, called Project Counselling Services (PCS) until 2005. Approximately 70 people are employed - 3 expatriates, and some 25 persons are involved in the Refugee Programme. NRC has several field offices in Colombia: Cucuta and Ocaña (Norte de Santander), Pasto and Tumaco (Nariño), Santa Marta (Magdalena) and Bogotá. Activities focus on assistance and protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Colombia. Its core competences are Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA), Education, Advocacy and Public Policy (Colombia specific).

NRC Colombia also implements a Regional Refugee Programme in three countries neighbouring Colombia, with field offices in Ciudad de Panamá (Panama), Quito and Tulcan (Ecuador), and San Cristobal (Venezuela). This Programme was developed in partnership with local organisations. Implementation of activities is conducted by one reliable local partner per country and concentrates on a rights-based Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) programme, promoting fair Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedures. The programme seeks to ensure access for refugees to public and legal services and justice, and promotes the education of refugees' children and youth of vulnerable host community (formal education and non-formal skills training programmes).

NRC is funded by a variety of donors in Colombia, with important contributions from Norway (MFA), Sweden (SIDA), and Canada (CIDA and GPSF). Its overall budget in 2011 was 8.2 million USD and 9.5 million USD for 2012, with the DFID contribution representing 6,6% of its total budget. DFID's financial contribution is relatively small, representing some 30% of the total budget for the Regional Refugee programme. However, the DFID PPA CHASE funding in Colombia is considered very important mainly for the following reasons: i) it has enabled NRC Colombia to scale up its work in two out of the three neighbouring countries (Ecuador and Panama) and to start offering the same services to Colombians in Venezuela; ii) it has allowed NRC to implement the Regional Refugee Programme more structurally.

II. Set-up of the country /the regional dimension / areas visited

The country-region visit was organised according to the Inception Report and consisted of staff and beneficiary interviews and discussions, reviews of relevant documents and interviews with peer organisations and other stakeholders. The evaluation was conducted by three evaluators (Ms Pita, Ms Murillo, Mr Reed) and the participation of Mr Bosch-TL during the debriefing session lasting all in all 10 days. The field visits and primary stakeholder interviews focused on three main areas: (1) international protection concerns and the needs of Colombian refugees and PNIPs in the three neighbouring countries; (2) legal and practical impediments of long-term solutions for Colombian refugees; and (3) the humanitarian situation in Colombia, the state of the armed conflict and the effectiveness of national protection mechanisms. Field visits included Quito and Lago Agrio in Sucumbíos Department (Ecuador); San Antonio and San Cristobal in the State of Táchira (Venezuela) and interviews with IPs in Panama (conducted through teleconferencing).

Methodology

The specific methodology used in Colombia consisted of a desk study and document review phase, key stakeholders' interviews (and direct beneficiaries in Venezuela), including NRC management and field staff in Colombia (Bogotá) and regional field offices (Ecuador, Panamá and Venezuela). The evaluation team conducted 44 interviews with IPs, counterparts and key stakeholders (see Annex 2,

list of interviewees). Relevant peer organisations were also interviewed (including ICRC and PCS in Colombia and the Panamanian Red Cross in Panamá) in order to assess NRC's position and reputation within the humanitarian environment

Interviews allowed verifying, counter-checking and collecting data to generate additional information necessary to complement the main conclusions derived from the desk study and document review. The evaluation has been guided by inquiry lines in relation to the DAC criteria relevance / appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability / connectedness (see further the Inception Report).

Appropriateness / relevance

As a result of the precarious situation of Colombians in need of international protection in neighbouring countries, NRC has enhanced its presence in these countries, particularly responding to legal protection needs through the DFID PPA Chase funding. NRC's regional presence is unique and its concentration on refugee-matters is also novel (equalled only to UNHCR), considering the estimated 500,000 people in need of international protection. The Regional Refugee programme is conducted within the framework of the Mexico Plan of Action which is an instrument for regional strategic cooperation to strengthen international protection of refugees in Latin America¹.

Constraints

Constraints to this evaluation have been the large and scattered intervention area, which rendered field visits very time consuming; the difficulty in reaching a representative number of beneficiaries (as refugees are not grouped together, but dispersed and often hidden) and the fact that some senior financial staff was only limited available. Notwithstanding these constraints, the openness of the project staff and the many interviews undertaken have allowed the evaluation team to make a substantiated assessment of the progress and strengths and weaknesses of the programme to date.

III. Stakeholder's analysis (primary, secondary) and their involvement in the programme

The following stakeholders were identified and their influence on and importance to the programme assessed:²

Stakeholder	Importance	influence
Colombian refugees and PNIP	5	1
Other Local NGOs	2	1
Main IPs (CEALP/SJMR/Caritas)	3	2
In-line authorities (Police, Ombudsman)	2	2
Other IGOs working w target population	3	2
Other partners (UNHCR)	3	3
Governmental refugee agencies (ONPAR, CONARE, Refugee Directorate)	4	3
Donors	1	4
NRC staff	2	5

¹ The Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action (Mexico, 16/11/2004) is one of the important legal frameworks currently existing on the international protection of refugees in Latin America. Its five strategic lines of action (communication and advocacy; institutional strengthening; research and monitoring; protection and education) guide NRC's regional programme.

² For an explanation on assessment criteria and methodology see Ch 2: Methodology

Importance /influence matrix	Low influence	Medium influence	High influence
High importance	Colombian refugees and PNIP	UNHCR Governmental refugee agencies	
Medium importance	Other IGOs working with target population, main IPs		
Low Importance	Local NGOs,		NRC staff, Donors

The stakeholders in the yellow boxes are considered the key stakeholders of the programme. Whilst it is understandable that the stakeholder analysis reveals low levels of influence in the programme of Colombian refugees/PNIP themselves, they are considered as “highly important” to the programme and efforts should be undertaken to increase their influence.

As primary duty bearers, governmental refugee agencies have both a high importance and should have a high influence in the project. NRC-Colombia, however, still needs to encourage them to exercise this influence e.g. in applying and respecting the protection rights of PNIPs concerned. In this respect, the inclusion of Colombians forced to flee their country under the Law 1448/2011³ and the approval of Law 81 in Panama⁴, represent major steps in humanitarian and refugee law and NRC has contributed to these achievements. In addition, the evaluation team is of the opinion that a specific advocacy component in the Programme, containing desired country-specific changes in the correct application of the Law and respect of acquired international commitments, would further contribute to this process.

The cooperation framework with UNHCR is strategic and based on solid grounds (global, regional and country-specific MoUs have been signed and coordination mechanisms established). UNHCR and NRC mostly work with the same IPs (e.g. CEALP in Panama; the Jesuit Migrants and Refugees Service (SJMR) and the San Francisco University in Ecuador; Caritas in Venezuela). Still, the evaluators consider that UNHCR’s influence in the programme could be enhanced by establishing more and more concrete joint operational plans. These would make the partnership even more effective in attaining international protection standards.

IV. Main findings

Design: The project is undoubtedly addressing a highly relevant and largely invisible issue: the international protection of Colombians displaced across neighbouring countries. NRC designed the project, providing legal services to protect the rights of People in Need of International Protection (PNIP) and training activities through well-respected national counterparts in the three host countries. With implementing partners in Panama, Ecuador and Venezuela since 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively, only the partner in Panama was consulted during the design process. Low level of involvement at this stage negatively affects ownership and probably as well impact during the implementation phase and sustainability perspectives. Alongside these partnerships with local NGOs, NRC and UNHCR have regional and country-specific alliances. The project is coherent and based on a straightforward logic between activities and outputs. The implementation of the foreseen activities in itself is rightful, though substantive strategic advocacy actions (to resolve the high percentage of

³ The Victims and Land Restitution Law (Law 1448/2011) was signed by President Santos of Colombia on June 10th 2011. With this Law, the State recognizes the existence of an armed conflict in Colombia for the first time and the Government affords protection rights to the population under international humanitarian law.

⁴ The Law 81/2011 creates a legal mechanism of permanent residency for persons under Temporary Humanitarian Protection

pending cases, arbitrary interpretation and application of the Law) should have been included in the design, to yield more tangible outcomes of the project.

As it currently stands, project design is, however, somewhat generic and it lacks accurate problem identification and analysis per host country. NRC has a wealth of information regarding particularities of each country (legal regime, political and social dynamics) and the approximate characterizations of the beneficiary population that can provide the analytical base to produce **country-specific** logical frameworks/operational plans and outcome indicators.⁵ This information led, for example, not to include the growing presence of non-Colombians in need of international protection in Panama in the project design⁶, though the practice of the IPs is such that they do not turn away non-Colombians. The design of the project put *return* as a general option of durable solutions rather than looking at other more realistic and specific options for the PNIP (e.g. local integration, resettlement in a third country). During the revision of the Programme indicators this is now -rightfully- modified.

These flaws in the project design generated difficulties in identifying an adequate theory of change (identified and documented change attributable to the project) and in establishing measurable country-specific outcomes. The absence of a concrete definition of the planned change contributes to the fact that the programme is perceived as rather target-oriented (e.g. training reflected as an end in and of itself) instead of more country-specific outcome-oriented (e.g. training as a means to reach an explicitly defined end).

While the vindication of rights and reparation mechanisms before the judicial power is largely justified as a protection mechanism, and the evaluator understands the particular vulnerable state in which sexually abused victims live, it is considered unnecessary to restrict indicator #4 to only SGBV cases. NRC's request to modify this indicator and to omit the "sexual" connotation of the crime is supported by the evaluator.

Programmatic Issues: The current project has been implemented for less than a year and is under the coordination of a Regional Project Manager since September 2011. The programme has benefitted from a regional approach and management, demonstrated by a shared focus in all three countries; a gradual standardization of forms/documents; internal regional monitoring; increased information exchange and sharing of experiences amongst teams and counterparts from the host countries.

The relevance of providing Colombians in neighbouring countries with technical information on the application of Law 1448 of 2011 (Victims and Land Restitution Law) is unquestionable. People are in need of this information. Given the early stages of implementation, the lack of a clear definition on how this population, inside and outside Colombia, is going to be attended to and the on-going conflict in areas of origin, the information provided is rightfully sensible and realistic to the current state of affairs/circumstances.

Given that the Regional Refugee Programme is rather new to NRC-Colombia, adjustments still need to be made progressively to ensure that the regional office adequately responds to the refugee-centred logic of the project (differing from the former, predominant IDP logic), and to the context and realities of the three neighbouring countries. As an example, in the recently initiated legal service provided in Venezuela (October 2011), gaps in accessing education, health and labour were identified by the target groups during the interviews. Although ICLA assistance focuses on legal identity and document rights in this region, ICLA could perhaps provide information on how to access these rights

⁵ The terms **output** and **outcome** refer to the outputs and outcomes of the main Programme Logical Framework. Wherever the terms **country-specific outcome** is used this refers to the evaluator's recommendation to consider the main Programme LF as a meta - cascaded LF and to develop country-specific LFs where meta LF outputs would become country-specific outcomes.

⁶ Although these non-Colombians refugees are still limited in numbers, the humanitarian nature of the intervention and basic protection principles would advise the formal inclusion of these other PNIP in the DFID funded programme as well.

and establish referral mechanisms to relevant institutions and service providers. These gaps could then also be used to identify priority needs to be addressed in subsequent programme phases.

Management: The management structure of the Regional Refugee programme is somewhat unusual within NRC. The Colombia Country Director, as the overall authority, deals specifically with political and institutional aspects, staff and advocacy matters and holds monthly on-line meetings with the respective country representatives to discuss these affairs. When it comes to programming and implementation on technical and budgetary issues, the Programme is headed by a Regional Programme Manager (RPM) also based at NRC's office in Bogota, Colombia. She is assisted by a specific FAM and a programme officer, oversees the three Country Programmes and has a permanent communication flow with and regularly visits the country representatives and ICLA (and Education) officers in the three countries concerned. In general, these different lines of authority do not seem to be affecting NRC's performance, although it has created misunderstandings in some cases.⁷ Attention should be paid as to respect systematic channels of communication with the IPs and other stakeholders and to have a clear line-management for the RPM, to prevent affecting programme's effectiveness.

The regional programme is planned in yearly overall Strategy maps and Plans of Action. Since 2012, the regional approach has facilitated the elaboration of a regional strategy document. Estimated costs per main activity are included, and, in some cases (ex: Venezuela), a plan of activities constitutes the basic management tools used at country level.

ICLA field staff is highly committed to their job, but they seem to be in general overcharged. Understanding the sensitive nature of the consultations (people fear for their own protection in the host countries) lawyers could perhaps gain in efficiency by better structuring their work, e.g. providing basic rights information (education, health, employment, etc.) by means other than exclusively bilateral interviews (e.g. by distributing leaflets or cautiously using public media,...). NRC's organizational capacities and expertise could certainly help IPs in this respect.

DFID funds articulate well with SIDA funds, oriented at Education activities in Panamá and Ecuador, in particular. This complementarity enhances NRC's position and its response to assist PNIP. Country offices regularly link project activities with similar social initiatives carried out by local actors such as the "Mision Scalabriniana", the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and others, to address needs beyond the ICLA component and to assist persons who do not fit completely in the beneficiary profile (e.g. migrants, people in need of psychological support).

Partnership (role, capacity building): NRC is highly esteemed by all of those interviewed and perceived as a competent and reliable actor in the defence and protection of the rights of PNIPs. Together with UNHCR, the organization is recognized in Colombia and the neighbouring countries as the lead on matters related to forced migration. However, its contribution as an advocate within the working groups (on protection, durable solutions, etc.) is considered somewhat less noticeable.

UNHCR highly values NRC's presence. Their partnership on refugee-related issues is crucial and of particular benefit to the targeted population. Still, the alliances with UNHCR do not always translate into concrete joint plans of action oriented at producing shared goals and quality levels at national and local levels (ex: Lago Agrio, Ecuador), particularly important when both organizations work with the same local IPs. As an example, in Venezuela, the weak quality of ICLA services provided by a Caritas lawyer financed by UNHCR might negatively affect NRC's good reputation and thereby the programme.

NRC has made a clear and rightful choice of using local capacities by picking well-established and respected NGOs as implementing partners in the three neighbouring countries: CEALP in Panamá,

⁷ In Panama, confusion was manifested by some interviewees in relation to the role played by the Colombia office in decision-making processes involving the implementation of activities and programmatic agreements

the Jesuit Refugees and Migrants Service (SJMR) and the San Francisco University in Ecuador and Caritas in Venezuela. CEALP and SJMR are chosen for their perceived expertise in the provision of legal services, although they do not perform equally (see later). Caritas (Venezuela), with limited experience in relation to refugee legal aid, was rightly chosen by the large presence developed over decades in the country. Its extensive social network has permitted to out-reach activities through a mobile legal service, supporting a considerable number of PNIP. Its technical weakness is counter-balanced through a closer technical support and follow-up provided by NRC's ICLA officer. Although NRC clearly attempts to make use of and collaborates with its partners to the largest extent, there are some partnership issues that need attention:

- CEALP (Panamá) appreciated the financial support provided, shared goals in relation to international protection of Colombians and international backing in policy discussions with relevant authorities. Besides the contract in the framework of the DFID-financed project, CEALP holds two other agreements with NRC. The complexity of and time needed to report under different reporting mechanics and timing is, however, negatively affecting CEALP's efficiency. NRC's efforts to raise CEALP's reporting standards should also continue.
- In Ecuador, the lack of a common approach by NRC-UNHCR and the SJMR (an IP of both NRC and UNHCR) in relation to the proposed legal assistance to the target groups needs to be resolved. SJMR is not genuinely protecting asylum seekers in encouraging them to apply for a migratory ("visa de amparo") rather than for a refugee status. Additionally, it was noted that the coordination, the legal support and monitoring provided by SJMR to its field staff are fairly weak. Field lawyers, already located in remote and difficult areas, are disconnected from headquarters and sometimes overwhelmed with work (e.g. Lago Agrio). High staff turnover requiring permanent recruiting and training efforts is a concern and needs to be addressed, in coordination with UNHCR.
- The MoU agreement signed with the San Francisco University (legal assistance and legal representation to SGBV cases) needs to be updated and further developed. The two SGBV cases are on hold, but an anti-constitutional case with a high potential impact for asylum seekers is about to be brought to Court and should therefore be made public by the project. To further support vindication of rights and access to justice with a more practical approach, the prosecution of perpetrators involving gender-based violence cases that could be resolved within the timeframe of the programme and are carried out by young lawyers of the free legal clinics could be encouraged.

Operational relations with local authorities involved in refugee protection are positive in all regional contexts, though the relation with the central authorities varies from country to country. Relations are best developed in Panamá and Ecuador with the *Oficina Nacional para la Atención de Refugiados* (ONPAR) and the Refugee Directorate, respectively. In the case of Venezuela, while relationships with the national *Comisión Nacional de Refugio* (CONARE) are on hold at national level, the relation with the authority at provincial level is at present very good; this institution highly appreciates the quality of NRC's legal service.

The creation of a Regional Programme Manager position based in Bogotá has undoubtedly favoured a more regular communication within NRC staff (in between neighbouring countries and within Colombia) and a better coordination with its implementing partners (e.g. consultative meeting held with all IPs at the end of 2011, regular regional field visits, etc.).

Organizational development and learning: The actual documentation and reporting system are not sufficiently facilitating lessons learned or wider dissemination of results. Organizational development and learning could be enhanced by conducting country-specific analyses and by producing country-focused strategies that evaluate the impact of the various types of initiatives currently in place (i.e. training, institutional strengthening and provision of legal services and registration campaigns). A practical approximation of "what works" to achieve change could be very conducive in overcoming some of the political obstacles in the respective governments to fully adhere to international legal

standards. The recent creation of a Regional Programme Manager position should aid in this regard as well.

LRRD / connectedness and other CC issues (gender, protection, environment, additionality)

Connectedness: The regional approach and the extension of legal services to remote isolated areas have certainly strengthened the response of local IPs to Colombians in need of international protection. Locally offered legal services have increased national capacities through the hiring of local lawyers. NRC has not yet taken steps to provide these lawyers with guidance, to establish clear priorities and, thus, to generate a reflexive legal practice that allows tackling complex legal problems with solutions grounded in international law and good protection practices. The programme still faces important challenges in raising awareness of the plight towards the refugees, considered to be an invisible population. The rates of refugee status recognition in Venezuela and Panamá are extremely low and many asylum-seekers have remained illegal immigrants or have sought a solution in being registered as migrants over the years. Although Ecuador showed a different tendency, extending refugee status under the amplified definition of the Cartagena Declaration⁸, it is now also showing signs of pulling away from this trend. Its recently modified legislation on Refugee Status Determination (May 2012), restricts access and excludes so-called refugees under the Cartagena-inspired definition. To address these challenges, the programme has undertaken positive advocacy initiatives (e.g. a publication followed by a presentation before the Colombian authorities on the impacts and limitations to the application of the Victims Law vis-à-vis PNIP). However, these initiatives will be more effective when they address country specific needs. Notwithstanding the abovementioned comments, the co-organization (with UNHCR) in Venezuela of a six-month course on International Refugee Human Rights Law,⁹ orientated at representatives of line authorities (*Ombudsman*, crime scene investigators, local police, juvenile protection body, CONARE), was highly appreciated by these institutions. Apart from raising awareness and providing specific tools to these institutions dealing with asylum seekers, it constitutes a good example of how the programme tries to connect with local authorities and more long-term stakeholders.

Gender: the gender focus of the project is limited to some actions targeting women such as ensuring the presence of female lawyers to advice female beneficiaries in some cases (Panamá); or, providing attention to cases of sexual violence (Ecuador), incorporated in the project design. In the absence of a gender analysis prior to project design or as part of a stakeholders' needs assessment specific steps could be taken (e.g. undertake open discussions with UNHCR and IPs to better understand culture, gender differences and inequalities; set-up a playground for children during consultations of single headed-households) to ensure adequate addressing of gender issues. This would also have implications on the design of plans of action and defining indicators (apart from merely counting the number of female beneficiaries). Being aware of NRC's limitations, the organization of a general gender workshop for the Programme and its IPs was considered an important step in the right direction.

Environment: With regards to the environment in a broader sense, meaning the safeguarding of an environment where human beings enjoy sustainable development and protection, the regional programme is at the core of those principles, including the rights of PNIP to security and to access services recognized by international and national human and refugee Laws. The suppression of information constitutes in this respect a human rights violation. NRCs programme safeguards the environment (against discrimination, stigmatization) and the public interest by raising awareness before the ombudsman, the crime scene investigators, the juvenile protection body and the local

⁸ The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (22 November 1984) adopted by the Colloquium on the International protection of refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, broadened the refugee definition used in Latin America offering a new and wider approach to refugee protection and solutions in the region.

⁹ Diploma on International Refugee Human Rights Law, 156h, 40 participants of which 15 financed by NRC via DFID

police forces and municipalities, etc. through training and proper information. Other, more direct environmental issues are less relevant in this programme and are not further assessed.

Protection: The project design and implementation are clearly based on a rights-based approach and human protection is at the heart of the whole Programme. Initiatives and actions to further protect fundamental human rights of the targeted population are undertaken by NRC Colombia from Bogota through consultation/coordination with NRC's AID services in Oslo towards the Colombian authorities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Victims Restitution Unit, created to attend the victims of the armed conflict). However, protection concerns are raised by the restrictive nature of national Refugee Status Determination (RSD), e.g. Panamá has a screening/admission valid for only one year, accepting only 13 per cent of all applicants, and admission rates in Venezuela are comparably low. Other issues such as the high percentage of pending and arbitrarily rejected cases, wide-spread bribery, harassment by police officers, etc., as reported by field lawyers and whilst understanding their political sensitiveness, deserve in the opinion of the evaluators additional capacity building, documentation of best practices and applied advocacy efforts.

Additionality: DFID funding allowed NRC the flexibility to set-up activities wherever deemed necessary in host countries. Notably, the decision to establish an institutional presence in remote areas previously lacking this type of legal service, such as Colón (Panamá), Lago Agrio (Ecuador) and San Antonio de Táchira (Venezuela, first one in the country) has filled an important void. The decision was recognized as ground-breaking by local counterparts and has been complemented by actions oriented at ensuring the presence of other humanitarian organisations in that locality. For example in Colón, Panamá, NRC's presence has attracted other service providers to the area, making the situation of refugees and PNIP more visible. The regional approach to the refugee issue is also novel and can potentially assist in defining strategies to enhance the protection response to the tens of thousands of persons in need of international protection. Finally, the provision of specific information relating to the Colombian "Victims' Law" -- not provided by any other institution -- adequately responds to the interests and needs of beneficiaries.

In the case of Panamá, NRC is also regarded as central for coordination of RSD/PAD response (by authorities and INGOs) and described as a catalyst in bringing parties together.

IV Financial issues

NRC Colombia received in total US\$1,760,000 for the period from April 1st 2011 to March 31st 2012 for the Regional Refugee Programme in Colombia. This funding came from three sources: NMFA \$997,000 (57%), DFID \$545,000 (31%) and SIDA, from 1/1/2012 with the amount of \$218,000 (12%).

Actual costs from April 1st 2011 to March 31st 2012 spent on DFID funds:

<i>DFID Funds</i>	<i>Indirect costs</i>	<i>Programme implementation costs (mainly by IPs)</i>	<i>Available funds as of March 31st 2012</i>
\$545,000	54%	35%	11%

a. Financial systems and procurement:

NRC Colombia applies and follows the rules and regulations of NRC worldwide as described in its Financial Handbook. Working predominantly with Implementing Partners (IPs), NRC Colombia advances funds to IPs for programme implementation, defined in the agreements, and IPs submit financial reports along with technical reports. NRC Colombia developed and uses Global IP tools and IP follow-up sheets and over the years NRC Colombia demonstrated to have very few losses or ineligible costs.

However, there are also a number of issues that needs NRCs attention:

- Financial report review of IPs could be enhanced by using a standard evaluation format; the same applies to internal IP audit reports; observations in this regard were also supported by NRC – HO’s Controller visit reports, as well as by external auditors.
- A pre-award evaluation of IPs should be standardized and better documented to ensure IPs have administrative, accounting and internal control in place and to demonstrate NRC’s adherence to transparency.
- Also the financial selection criteria for IPs could be better documented and standardized, though it is well understood that certain partners are just the only ones available for the specific tasks and that competition on financial or qualitative grounds in this respect is just not realistic.

NRC – Colombia has taken steps to further improve the monitoring of IPs financial reporting, e.g. by hiring a specific financial officer for the Refugee Programme. A specific memorandum, stating technical monitoring to be performed along with financial monitoring and stamping supporting documents from financial reports submitted by IPs is also a step forward. All in all NRC needs to continue to carefully monitor its IPs and document all irregularities and lessons learned to even further demonstrate its intention to be as cost-efficient and cost-effective as possible.

b. Cost variance analysis (see annex 4e)

c. Cost Efficiency compared to Peer Projects

Since NRC Colombia uses nearly exclusively IPs to implement programme activities, it was somewhat difficult to find activities directly implemented by NRC Colombia, which could be used to compare with “peer” organizations of NRC as such. Also, the Refugee Programme is quite unique and there is no other programme being implemented with the regional approach and scope of this programme. It was eventually possible to identify some workshop costs and to compare these with the workshop costs of selected “peer” organizations. The evaluator is, however, very much aware of the limitations of choosing such a minor element of the work NRC is doing and would advise in subsequent evaluations to spend more time in preparing together with NRC itself in defining proper cost efficiency peer comparisons.

Two organizations provided information about their workshop costs (i) Project Counselling Services (PCS), which organized a regional workshop in Quito, Ecuador, and (ii) Plan International, which carried out a regional workshop in Panama. These costs were compared with a Gender Workshop held by NRC – Colombia in the three countries. The cost efficiency analysis of the unit costs for the workshops showed that NRCs costs are median compared to “peer” organizations.

Table: comparison of the unit costs per participant in various workshops:

<i>NRC - Colombia</i>	<i>Costs per country</i>	<i># Participants</i>	<i># Days</i>	<i>Total Costs per Participant per Day</i>
NRC’s workshop in Venezuela	\$4,272.00	15	2	\$176
NRC’s Workshop in Panama	\$1,266.00	15	2	\$76
NRC’s Workshop in Ecuador	\$7,344.00	23	2	\$181
NRC’s average unit costs				\$144
PSC’s Regional workshop in Quito – Ecuador	\$12,800.00	35	4	\$91
Plan International’s workshop in Panama	\$18,850.00	20	5	\$188

VI. Conclusion and recommendations

The relevance of the Regional Refugee Programme is unquestionable and NRC’s regional presence and structure largely justified and unique in the humanitarian world. Together with UNHCR, NRC has become a reference and a key actor in making the situation of Colombian refugees and PNIP more

visible. Its decision to support – via competent and reliable local partners - the establishment of ICLA services in remote and “forgotten” areas has filled an important void.

The following recommendations are based on the above mentioned findings and were presented and discussed at the end of the mission with the NRC Colombia team (Country Director, Regional Programme Manager and Programme officer, FAM) during a debriefing session.

General recommendations

a) Programming and planning:

- As from the next planning period, problems and priorities should be identified and defined per country in order to better tackle specific impediments and consequently better achieve planned change;
- Produce and implement a bottom-up, evidence-based advocacy plan (documented cases produced by the lawyers at field level), in order to ensure country specific advocacy initiatives, in cooperation with the Advocacy Section in Oslo.

b) Management and implementation:

- Make the Regional Refugee Programme a genuine Programme with pool-funding of the various donors, to ensure greater coherence and to better illustrate coordination and synergies with for instance other NRC’s services and programmes (e.g. AID Department, Education). The production of country specific management tools (logframe matrices, calendar of activities rather than plans of activities per donor) might facilitate monitoring efforts and consistency of the overall programme
- Monitor more on qualitative / country-specific outcome indicators with specific milestones to measure progress of planned change at the end of the project, in addition to indicators agreed in the PPA log frame.
- Continue to develop strong operational and strategic coordination mechanisms with UNHCR at country and local levels, including specific joint plans of action (such as the one adopted in Venezuela).
- Strengthen the capacity building component by developing structured and country specific capacity building plans that include key stakeholders such as relevant government, IPs and NRC staff. Conducting technical working sessions with the IPs to address legal and priority issues, problems and case management techniques would likely increase the quality of legal services provided, particularly in Ecuador.

c) Finances:

- NRC-Colombia should put more weight on cost efficiency and proper budgeting in general, and to continue to pursue partner’s adherence to financial and administrative standards.

Specific recommendations

Ecuador

- Develop a specific plan of activities, with a strategic outlook, in close collaboration with San Francisco University and UNHCR.
- Clarify SJRM’s position as to legal protection, advice, priorities and mechanisms applied to asylum seekers, in close coordination with UNHCR.
- Encourage and support SJRM to establish a monitoring and coordination internal unit. Field visits of ICLA officer could be a good opportunity to technically assist field lawyers.

Venezuela

- Streamline activities and services provided by Caritas’ lawyers, in close coordination with UNHCR. Continue to use NRC’s experience and expertise to contribute to the standardization of case management techniques and the documentation of best legal practises.

ANNEX 4c - Country Report Myanmar

Report of the Evaluation Mission to NRC Myanmar, 11-20 June 2012

I. Introduction of the PPA programme

Brief context and position of the evaluated area within the overall (country) programme

In Myanmar NRC is working in two parts of the country, providing protection and assistance to conflict affected IDPs in the Southeast, specifically the Tanintharyi Region and the States of Mon and Kayin. NRC started its operations in October 2008 in the aftermath of the devastating cyclone Nargis leaving 140,000 persons dead or missing. From May 2010 NRC shifted its work more to the conflict affected areas in East and South-east of Myanmar, under the umbrella agreement of UNHCR, but most recently an agreement via the Office of the Chief Minister of Kayin State has also been obtained (as one of the few INGOs operational in Myanmar).

NRC Myanmar receives funding from various sources with Norwegian MFA and Swedish SIDA as its most important and long lasting ones. NRC's overall budget in Myanmar in 2011 accounted for some GBP 2,8M. Although DFID's contribution represents only 10% of the overall country budget, the DFID PPA CHASE agreement forms an important opportunity for NRC to elaborate longer term strategies and planning, shifting somewhat from a pure humanitarian response programme into a more transitional one, including both relief and developmental aspects and thus aiming at reaching more durable solutions. NRC Myanmar employs in total 40 staff of which 3 are expatriates.¹

The DFID-sponsored project implemented by NRC Myanmar is designed to provide much needed shelter for vulnerable members of the communities in the conflict areas of south east Myanmar in the Thanintharyi Division. The construction of the shelters is organized through Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in order to mobilize the local communities, create ownership of the process, and build their capacity. The costs of providing the building materials comprise 58% of the expenditures, making it the main cost driver for this project. Timber is provided by bulk purchase by NRC in order to ensure price and quality, while local materials and tools are handled by the CBO's.

II. Set-up of the country / area visit

The country visit was organised according to the Inception Report e.g. with staff discussions, peer organisation and secondary stakeholder interviews for a total of 8 days with one evaluator (Mr Bosch-TL). The field visits focused on the Tanintharya Region (S-E Myanmar) with project staff and primary and some secondary stakeholder (World Vision, Bridge Asia Japan, Myanmar Red Cross) interviews, whereas the interviews in Yangon were only with peer organisations (Save the Children, Swiss Development Cooperation, ActionAid, Oxfam, INGO Forum, Unicef, KDN and TBBC – none of them direct DFID PPA recipients), partners (UNHCR) and NRC management staff. NRCs Shelter Programme is executed in cooperation with Community Based Organisations as implementing partners of which one could be interviewed during the field visit. Other - governmental- partners such as the NATALA (Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs) were not available, as the evaluation team did not receive in time a Travel Authorisation (see later).

Methodology

A number of focus groups discussions with primary and secondary stakeholders were undertaken in the project area, though they covered only a small sample of the initiatives developed in this area (see constraints). The limited number of interviews still allowed for some verifying, counter-checking and

¹ <http://www.nrc.no>, accessed at 19/08/2012

collecting of data, generating additional information necessary to complement and substantiate the conclusions derived from the desk study and document reviews.

The evaluation has been guided by inquiry lines in relation to the DAC criteria relevance / appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability / connectedness (see further the Inception Report).

Constraints

The authorities in Myanmar were very reluctant to provide the necessary travel authorisations to visit the programme area in South-east Myanmar, so in the end only a small programme area - four villages² with some 280 households, of which 16 vulnerable households received new housing - could be visited. The activities reviewed were also limited to assessing the construction of housing and provision of NFIs, as the intended set-up site for a forestation project was also in an area not accessible at the time.

Despite these limitations, the evaluator considers the visits and interviews carried out informative enough to fairly assess the programme activities and their impact on the targeted population.

III. Stakeholder's analysis (primary, secondary) and their involvement in the programme

The following stakeholders were identified and their influence on and importance to the programme assessed:³

Stakeholder	importance	influence
IDPs / IDP returnees	5	1
Hosting community	4	1
Local NGOs/CBOs	2	2
Governmental services	2	2
Other INGOs working w target population	1	2
UNHCR	2	3
Donors	1	4
Government (NATALA)	3	3
NRC staff	2	5

Importance /influence matrix	Low influence	Medium influence	High influence
High importance	IDPs, Hosting community (box A)		
Medium importance		Government , UNHCR (box B)	
Low Importance	Local NGOs, Governmental services, Other INGOs working w target population, (box C)		NRC staff, Donors (box D)

² The same villages received previously assistance from BAJ of in total 30 shelters, making a comparison in quality and appreciation feasible between NRC and BAJ provided assistance.

³ For an explanation on assessment criteria and methodology see Ch 2: Methodology

The stakeholders in the yellow boxes can be considered as key stakeholders and especially those with low or medium influence should be paid more attention to, to increase their influence. Ideally stakeholders in Box A should move both one box to the right, meaning they would gain influence to the project, but at present this is unrealistic given the still very fragile circumstances and low capacity of local communities.

UNHCR has a special position in this stakeholder analysis as it is a direct partner, but as well often a donor (though not in the Thanintharyi area) and NRC is dependent for its access to most of the areas on the relation with UNHCR.

IV. Main findings:

Design and Programmatic issues: The programme was already designed by UNHCR after a very extensive vulnerability assessment and later on adopted by NRC. Authorities were quite involved in the inception phase of the programme, as they had to provide permission of access the area, though the design itself was mainly done by UNHCR/NRC with virtually no consultation or participation of beneficiaries themselves. Though governmental services were involved it is the impression that this did not induce institutional or local ownership as NRC was more perceived as a service provider than as a development organisation.

NRC identified and selected the beneficiaries through a thorough and fairly transparent process based on the previous vulnerability assessment by UNHCR. The selected list of target groups was being published, shared and counter-checked on site. Although some of the IDPs were already residing over 10 years in the community, it was still one of the criteria for vulnerability, excluding some of the host households that were maybe even worse off. This factor, combined with the fact than in some villages over 25% of the households received new housing might negatively affect social cohesion in the community⁴. No signs of these effects were noted thus far, as the visit was too short and superficial to detect these, though it is something the programme should be aware of and could maybe take alleviating measures against.

The design of the programme was adapted as more funds became available due to cost-savings in the shelter-construction materials. Without a proper needs assessment additional Non-Food-Items (NFI) (bed nets, solar lamp, waterfilter) were provided, only to the recipients of new housing. The distribution of bed-nets conflicted sometimes with the programmes of other humanitarian actors (WorldVision, PSI) as these actors provided the bed-nets in a social marketing programme and the need for waterfilters was not evidenced. NRC offered also some Watsan training, carried out by the Myanmar Red Cross. The bulk of the savings is, however, intended to be spent in a new forestation programme to compensate to some extent for the environmental impairment that is likely to occur as a result of the timber use for the shelters. Although laudable in itself, these modifications of the programme design need to be well-founded and documented and based on proper needs assessments. Especially the restricted distribution of NFIs to recipients of new housing could easily add to the perception of unequal treatment of community members. This is the more likely as it was noted that communities expressed in the vulnerability assessment many other and more pressing - communal- needs than the needs for housing. As this is and certainly was a very sensitive area for the Myanmar government, it is, however, also understood that NRC was not as "free" to provide community assistance as it would be in other circumstances or areas.

Although NRC exceeded its target of building 158 durable shelters by 2%, it should be noted that at the same time, due to a more accurate counting of the actual family members per household, the number of beneficiaries compared to the estimated numbers in the proposal dropped from 950 to 788. This is a reduction of 17%, increasing the intervention cost per beneficiary, although the same number

⁴ As a matter of fact a minimum number of vulnerable households should be eligible for the programme in a village to receive shelters, to effectively set-up and instruct the coordination committee

of households as originally targeted were reached. In view of the above and considering substantial cost saving in the shelter construction (average cost for one house fell from some \$ 1500 to \$ 1000), it would have been advisable to have used the freed-up funds for more communal-benefitting activities such as water and sanitation or communal infrastructure projects.

The global frame of the PPA programme stipulates that, as a result of providing shelter to PADs these persons will “live in secure and durable shelters, providing a platform for promoting livelihoods”. Especially the latter part of the country level outcome for Myanmar is doubted in the present design of the programme. It is therefore suggested that NRC should enlarge its involvement with PAD communities to not only providing shelter, but also to ensure that the vulnerability of PADs in other ways and more durably will be diminished.

An internal, more appropriate and applicable logframe with specific outcome and output indicators for the DFID programme was not defined other than the quantitative targets of the number of shelters to be delivered in the overall Programme logframe.⁵ In some cases, vulnerability as defined in the UNHCR/NRC survey was maybe not the most appropriate criterion in selecting beneficiaries, as the IDP status itself lead to a high vulnerability score. Some, clearly better-off IDPs were therefor selected for new housing while others -residents-, at first sight equally or even more vulnerable, did not benefit from the programme.

Project management: appears to be very skilful, adequate and effective, even though no workplans derived from a logframe were followed. This adds to the impression that NRC-Myanmar is a very professional service provider but less so when it comes to a more participative, inclusive developmental approach. Illustrative for this is the way the community was involved: CBOs existing or newly formed were “delegated” with most of the coordination of the shelter construction, including organising local labour, whereas NRC provided the bulk of the material and some training to the CBO management on bookkeeping. Once, however, the houses were built the ‘train’ would move on and the CBOs left behind with whatever was left-over of the funds provided by NRC.⁶ In itself an effective way of project management, though not very community-minded nor with a longer-term perspective in mind.

The project is effectively running from October 2011, following the inception phase (eligibility criteria and methodology, contacts with CBOs, procurement plan and plan of activities, etc.) and the rainy season. It is a clear demonstration of NRCs strong competencies and capacity to even exceed in such a short implementation period (effectively 6 months) the intended number of shelters. The previous comments should also be seen in that light: it was in the short period of time quite unlikely to have accomplished this number of shelters with a more development-like approach.

Partnership (role, capacity building): As mentioned, NRC is using ad-hoc village committees, politely called CBOs, as implementing partners for the construction of the shelters, latrines and the distribution of NFIs. The relation built up is clearly one-off and though NRC provides some training to the bookkeeper and the chief, no factual capacity building is provided other than hands-on training in construction methods to carpenters and carpenter groups. The committees are in a subcontractor role and are not furthermore assisted to effectively spend any left-overs of the shelter funds. This is a missed opportunity for NRC, as they might need these committees in the near future as facilitators of likely needed assistance and mediation when refugees from the Thai border camps would return.⁷

⁵ The DFID shelter programme was, however, put under the ‘umbrella’ of a simultaneously run, Norwegian MFA funded programme logframe.

⁶ Under the partnership agreement with UNHCR, UNHCR is to continue other activities with the CBOs in cases where NRC (or for that matter other UNHCR partners such as BAJ or MRCS) complete activities, but no signs of this continuity could be found.

⁷ Following the peace / cease fire negotiations optimism has been growing that the country faces a better opportunity for peace and reform than in decades. The April meetings, for example by KNU delegates with President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi could become historical land-marks “It is clear, however, that there are more steps to the peace process than a signed

UNHCR forms a special partner for NRC-Myanmar, different from the partnerships in other countries. NRC is directly dependant for most of its operations in Myanmar on UNHCR and plays therefore a dependant role. However, UNHCR could not execute the shelter Programme in Tanintharyi Region as no donor was available / willing to provide funds for interventions in such a delicate and volatile environment. NRC was, however, able to step in, due to its unrestricted DFID PPA funds (and those from others such as SIDA and NMFA) and 'assisted' UNHCR in the shelter intervention, working at the same time under its umbrella. This relation caused initially some friction as the lead and the responsibility for the intervention remained unclear for some time. NRC should become as quickly as possible 'independent' again by striving for a similar agreement in Tanintharyi Region as was obtained from the Office of the Chief Minister of Kayin State.⁸

Coordination and exchange of information between the various humanitarian actors (Int and local NGOs, UN agencies) is existing, predominantly in Yangon, and to a lesser extent at field level. NRC is, however, perceived as a humanitarian actor, operating rather in isolation, decreasing thereby the scope of possible partnerships in e.g. advocacy efforts. However, quite recently a consortium is formed together with ActionAid (a renowned community development humanitarian actor) and the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), a mixed donor/implementer of infrastructure in Myanmar. This kind of partnerships could nicely compensate and supplement the capacities NRC is lacking, stemming from an emergency relief background.

Organizational development and learning: NRC demonstrates in entering in this kind of consortia as well its openness and willingness to develop itself organisationally. Structural learning from experiences is, however, less visible, the more like (hardly) no documentation could be traced on e.g. managerial decisions to deviate from or adopt additional activities such as the forestation project and the extra distribution of NFIs. It is the impression that this has more to do with the organisational culture (in emergencies lengthy and documented discussions are unusual) than with personal unwillingness.

NRC has also clearly applied its experience and lessons learned from previous shelter programmes, notably in the Delta area, in adjusting the design and preferences of shelters to the cultural sensitivity and environmental demands. This certainly had its positive effects on (cost-)efficiency as staff was experienced at the start of the programme and knew already the hitches of shelter construction.

The set-up of an internal shelter survey, including beneficiary appreciation of the products received is a good initiative, but not in place thus far. This survey should provide, if properly carried out - meaning not only interviewing direct beneficiaries, but also neighbouring community members - a significant opportunity to learn if and when this information is fed-back into new projects (design).

LRRD / connectedness and other CC issues (gender, protection, environment)

Connectedness: In the precarious situation where the Programme is only allowed to build shelters it is hard to connect the intervention to more longer-term development efforts. The programme is clearly also set-up to provide (rehabilitation) services to a deprived population and nothing more. Yet the programme could have been designed and implemented in such a way that partners, the village CBOs, were more involved and invested in (see previously). In addition to the hardware services provided, some **advocacy** in cooperation with AID-Oslo efforts were traced (e.g. to better secure land rights for beneficiaries) and the intention was mentioned that the Programme would soon benefit from

ceasefire arrangement with the government" Naw Zipporah Sein, KNU Secretary-General. *From: Burma Policy Briefing nr 8, June 2012*

⁸ It should be mentioned that obtaining this agreement is regarded unique in the Myanmar NGO community (INGO-forum spokesman) and a clear demonstration of NRCs diplomatic way of operating and dealing with government officials. The launch of national registration cards (another, well received, -ICLA- programme) and of course Norway's involvement in the peace-talks itself are other highlights that strengthen NRC's position in Myanmar.

assistance provided by an NRC HLP advisor. This should not only support IDPs but as well members of the hosting community.

Gender equality within NRC's own organisation is quite balanced, at management positions (2 out of 5 senior managers are women) and to a lesser extent at field level (though at least one female engineer is employed). This is quite uncommon in the given context and should be given credit for, though the target of 40% female staff (Myanmar strategy 2012-2014) is by far not reached. As female members of households tend to be more vulnerable than male, they comprise a larger part of the beneficiary population. This, however, does not demonstrate NRCs gender equality intentions per se and no specific signs of these could be noticed in project design nor in project implementation either (apart from selecting mostly women as bookkeepers in the CBOs for their accuracy). A gender analysis of the intervention or research of the consequences of the interventions on gender equality or the role of women in society could neither be traced. On average, there seems to be a certain degree of gender awareness, but there is still a long way to go to make the programme genuinely gender sensitive.

Environment: The programme is well aware that the shelter provision intervention has its impact on the environment. On average every house needs some 1,75 cubic meter of timber for the construction, apart from bamboo and other small material, and it is the good intention of the programme to replenish this timber. An accompanying forestation project is therefore designed, though, as it could not yet be assessed, it is not possible to value this project. It was noticed as well that, in construction of the houses mostly natural material was used (including the roofing), not only for cost-reducing purposes but also to use readily available material from the villages, limiting thus environmental damage of transport and application of 'foreign' materials.

Additionality: As mentioned before, the programme could probably only have been financed with unrestricted longer-term funding. The DFID PPA funding fitted very well this purpose and these funds could even be used to 'bridge' and complement other more or less unrestricted funds. In addition, the availability of these funds contributed quite likely in convincing authorities (and UNHCR) to allow NRC as a fairly unknown and new humanitarian actor to enter this precarious area. Furthermore NRCs previous experience and shelter-expertise worldwide will certainly have generated added value to this intervention as well. Lastly, the multi-annual funding allowed NRC-Myanmar as well to 'pre-finance' building material and to benefit as such from economies of scale.

V. Financial issues:

a. Procurement and Financial systems

The financial systems follow NRCs global ones, including annual independent audits. No particular reason evolved from the evaluation to further investigate these issues, apart from the fact that it was somewhat difficult to obtain an accurate and up to date budget and budget versus actuals overview. Procurement -mainly timber as biggest cost-driver- is, after careful supplier selection, centrally done, with regular quality check at the supplier site. This bulk purchase has certainly in terms of economies of scale its positive effect on programme's cost-efficiency and was one of the reasons the unit price of a shelter decreased significantly (see further).

b. Cost-Efficiency: Variance analysis (see annex 4e)

c. Cost-efficiency: Comparison with peer organisations

This analysis was performed for the shelter activities, the main cost driver of the programme, and for which financial information from other implementers was available. Peer organizations that provided financial information were Bridge Asia Japan (BAJ), an international NGO previously subcontracted by UNHCR providing very comparable housing in the same area and UN Habitat that provided shelter in the Delta area after cyclone Nargis. Unfortunately the data of the latter organisation were incomplete and therefore not comparable.

Results from financial comparison with “peer” organizations demonstrated that NRCs investment per unit costs is considerably higher than the “peer” organization;⁹ BAJ delivered, however, shelters of inferior quality (acknowledged by various sources and observed in the field), and did not provide extra’s such as NFIs and WASH training; however it should be noted that the largest difference between NRC and the “peer” organization constitute the indirect costs. NRC provides quality products in a constant and reliable manner, however at a certain cost!

COSTS COMPARISON WITH "PEER" ORGANIZATIONS								
Shelter construction								
ORGANIZATION	# Shelters	DIRECT COSTS	Direct Cost per shelter	INDIRECT COSTS	TOTAL COSTS	Total Cost per Shelter	INVESTMENT PER BENEFICIARY	Comments
BAJ	253	\$ 177.100	\$ 700	\$ 100.000	\$ 277.100	\$ 1.095	\$ 219	no assessments done
Habitat					\$ -			
NRC	161	\$ 167.000	\$ 1.037	\$ 162.835	\$ 329.835	\$ 2.049	\$ 410	different quality, more community participation, NFIs (bednet, waterfilter, solarlamp) distributed. Figures differ from presented actuals as expenditures were made in advance (50.000 \$) and on forestry (30.000 \$)

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

NRC is a very well respected organisation with a solid reputation for its high quality work and competent staff. NRC Myanmar is well managed, delivers high quality outputs and is able in the short period of its existence in Myanmar to position itself as an important humanitarian player and respected partner for UN agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF). The Programme design has some flaws, but these are not significantly hampering an effective continuation of the implementation, provided the management will take up and address the most pressing issues mentioned below.

Given the limited time and the restricted intervention area to be visited, the evaluator realizes he has only been able to assess the DFID funded NRC shelter programme in Myanmar to a limited extent. Yet it is considered that the following recommendations are sufficiently well-founded and appropriate to share. NRC-Myanmar should try to:

1. Build long(er)-term and genuine partnership-relations with CBOs / LNGOs;
2. Reconsider addressing only the needs of the most vulnerable/IDPs, e.g. more community work like water points / latrines / schools etc. and provide NFIs also to other community members;
3. Use procurement plans and well-defined budgets to demonstrate even more clearly the intention to aim for highest cost-efficiency;
4. Document management decisions and work according to standardized workplans;
5. Use needs assessments as baseline data and monitor also country specific outcomes (e.g. reduction in vulnerability) against these;
6. Use cost-effectiveness analysis to reconsider the number of beneficiaries (total investment per beneficiary - direct plus indirect costs - considered still fairly high);
7. Intensify and improve trainings for CBOs, especially on community mobilization / increasing social cohesion and self-reliance;
8. Continue to make the programme more gender sensitive;
9. Include wherever possible other NRC core competencies (AID-HLP, ICLA, Educ. FS/IGAs) in the shelter programme.

⁹ These figures contain the direct costs per shelter **after** NRC Myanmar realized its huge cost-savings of some 35% by changing its policy to work with / through CBOs instead of using contractors.

ANNEX 4d - Country Report IDMC

Report of the Evaluation Mission to NRC IDMC, 21-22 May 2012

I. Introduction of the PPA programme

Brief context

As part of the Norwegian Refugee Council and on the request of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (IASC), IDMC was created in 1998 to set up a global database of IDP worldwide, at a moment in history where massive conflict induced internal displacement was taking place and coordination and pronouncement by the humanitarian actors were virtually non-existent. Since then its leading position and its partnership with the United Nations system (UNHCR and OCHA), has given IDMC - and NRC - a privileged and prominent position compared to other NGOs. Its regular monitoring on conflict induced internal displacement worldwide and the combination of its research expertise and comparative ground analysis gives IDMC additional credit and a solid reputation in relation to other specialized organizations.

DFID has supported IDMC financially without interruption since its inception with several longer-term grants. The funding trend over the years shows that DFID's proportional share diminished, though in absolute terms it remained more or less stable. (around 300,000 GBP/yr).

Position of the evaluated area within the overall (country) programme

DFID's PPA funds to IDMC represents 1 % of the overall PPA Chase funding. The Project is a continuation of IDMC's stand-alone regular programme (with different priorities and targeted countries compared to the NRC global and country programmes) rather than an integrated component within the overall PPA programme. This somewhat 'isolated position' within the PPA programmes is considered a weakness in the programme design (see later). A joint advocacy plan together with countries involved and the Advocacy Section of AID in areas like protection and HLP, where IDMC is well positioned and has a good reputation, would probably have strengthened the chances to better influence the agenda on durable solutions for PADs of the countries targeted under the PPA programme.

II. Set-up of the country / area visit

The assessment of IDMC programme within the PPA focussed on visiting the IDMC office and interviewing its staff in Geneva and two of its direct partners, UNHCR and UNOCHA, both residing in Geneva as well.

Methodology

The relatively modest and untargeted amount of funding allocated to IDMC¹, its broad working area (55 countries worldwide), and the stability of DFID aid to its regular programme for 14 consecutive years were some of the considerations when planning the specific time dedicated to the Centre. Together with the desk study and the document review, the specific methodology applied in IDMC's assessment constituted of bilateral interviews with i) IDMC's management staff, i.e. NRC's representative and IDMC Directorate; Heads of the Africa and Americas, Policy and Research, Communication and Finances and Administrative Departments; ii) technical staff; iii) secondary stakeholders, such as OCHA and UNHCR. Because of the relationship and inter linkages within the overall programme, the Head of the Advocacy Section in Oslo and other AID staff were also interviewed in the course of the IDMC assessment and to assess the linkages between AID and IDMC.

¹ In 2011 only 10% of the DFID PPA allocated funds to IDMC were used, as previous DFID grants were still sufficient to cover the 14% DFID contribution of the IDMC 2011 expenses (in total some 4 mill USD).

Constraints

Considering the large scope of the IDMC programme, the untargeted allocation of the funds, the absence of primary beneficiaries, actual peer organisations, bilateral exchanges with other entities and/or groups to cross-check information, this assessment has been rather limited in scope and elaboration, making the conclusions of this assessment relatively modest and restricted. A contributing factor to this feeling of inability to 'grasp' IDMCs work in this tight framework was the absence of any external evaluation of the institute thus far.

III. Stakeholder's analysis (primary, secondary) and their involvement in the programme.

The following stakeholders were identified, and their influence and importance to IDMC and its work assessed:²

Stakeholder	importance	influence
IDPs	5	1
Humanitarian NGOs, media, portals	2	1
Governments / authorities	3	2
Other institutions working in advocacy	4	2
Other institutions working in IDP sector (UNHCR, OCHA)	5	2
Donors	1	4
NRC-Oslo	2	3
NRC / IDMC staff	2	5

Importance /influence matrix	Low influence	Medium influence	High influence
High importance	IDPs;	Other institutions working in advocacy; Other institutions working in IDP sector	
Medium importance	Humanitarian NGOs, media, portals;	Governments / authorities	NRC-Oslo
Low Importance			IDMC staff, (D) Donors

The stakeholders in the yellow boxes can be considered as key stakeholders. Although difficult to achieve, the low influence of IDPs (the ultimate beneficiaries of IDMCs work) themselves is something to notice and it is advised to IDMC to see how their influence can be increased by e.g. seeking closer contact with IDP representative bodies. As described in their Strategy 2012-2014, IDMC is well aware of its position within and influence on stakeholders, though less apprehensive on the influence of stakeholders on IDMC itself.

² For an explanation of the assessment criteria and methodology see Ch 2: Methodology

IV. Main findings:

Design: As mentioned before, PPA Chase funding contributes to IDMC's regular programme and mandate to inform, influence and support responses to situations of internal displacement. Other than the quantitative general output indicators with minimal logic sequence to related outcomes, no specific indicators have been designed for the use of these funds. However, the stability and diversity of funds received by IDMC since its creation³, independently from NRC, and the large and ever increasing number of visitors to its website are good proxy indicators of the appropriateness and appreciation of its products and the relevance of the programme to IDMC's main beneficiaries (donors and humanitarian organisations in particular).

A joint advocacy strategy within the general logframe with AID and the targeted country programmes (output 1 and 2) towards the programme outcome (increase access to protection, quality assistance and durable solutions) could not be traced and constitutes an inconsistency and weakness of the overall programme design. This is in line with the specific focus on more short term humanitarian interventions of NRC versus more long-term perspectives searched by IDMC. It might be a good opportunity for IDMC/NRC to investigate these internal coordination disparities and the under-utilization of its human resources (analytical and advocacy potential capacities).

Programmatic issues: IDMC can be considered as a professional, active and successful service provider. Its monitoring and data base, as well as its reporting and training programme constitute a reference and useful source of information for many. IDMC's work is consulted by the UN system and the humanitarian world and, to a certain extent, by national governments and local organisations. Its credit and added value on the situation of internal displacement stem from a combination of in-depth analytical capacity and comparative ground based analysis, both through working with local governments and organizations, and by its firm link to NRC 's country programmes. The unrestricted nature of its funding has provided IDMC the flexibility to be pro-active and responsive in an ad-hoc manner and at the same time to develop its strong research capacity. Its country analysts, in collaboration with country programmes where NRC is present, identify the gaps to feed in policy and research. Nevertheless, IDMC's analytical capacities do not seem to be systematically used by NRC's AID and ICLA advisors in return. Good examples, however, of combining IDMC's world-wide research expertise with the expertise of NRC's ICLA advisors and the Advocacy section (part of the AID Department) are the recent training on Housing, Land and Property (HLP), jointly conducted in Goma (DR Congo) and Geneva, the collective drafting of an IDMC-NRC Climate Change strategy and the Report on the IDP camps in the Masisi area (DRC) in coordination with the country programme.

As an advocacy actor, IDMC is directly involved in the IASC and an active member of the Global Protection Cluster and some of its sub-working groups. While this role places the organization in a good position to push forward policies and influence decisions, underutilized by HQ in Oslo, its strategic partnership with UNHCR, OCHA and the Special UN Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs might bring as well some questions about IDMC's independency as (part of) an INGO. Particularly this latter characteristic might jeopardize IDMC's future, as financial and organisational independency might be the key for IDMC future existence. Though the mutual benefit of being part of NRC is still clearly prevalent and understood as vital for both parties, it might be that a future as a self-governing research institute would secure IDMC's independence and future existence more permanently.

Project management: The fact that the organization has not been made explicitly accountable or evaluated for the use and deliverables of external funds so far, might be one of the reasons of a rather output oriented management system. Until quite recently the institute was mainly functioning in an ad-hoc, reactive manner, rather than being more result-based oriented. With the actual restructuring of the organisation more logically into departments and the adaptation of work plans and targets, the

³ This good Humanitarian Donorship resulted in a 2012 budget of over 4 mill USD.

organisation is now more able to properly monitor its progress towards pre-defined goals and its organisational processes.

Partnership (role, capacity building): IDMC has been recognized as a reliable and highly appreciated partner by both OCHA and UNHCR, not only as a services provider but also in its advocating role. Both organisations acknowledge IDMCs leading role in providing internal displacement figures and in keeping IDPs visible at the political agenda. Its high standards of country and thematic analysis, its contribution to policy development through direct collaboration with governments and dissemination practises, its anticipation to bring forward identified needs and gaps are all significant characteristics of IDMCs unique work. Collaborative partnerships with other humanitarian actors such as IFRC, ICRC, IOM and other major NGO humanitarian actors are, however, less visible and add to the impression of IDMC working in relative isolation.

Organizational development and learning: As a result of a self-assessment process, IDMC has changed its organizational structure and will apply a more project-oriented approach in its work plans, including logical frameworks and well-defined indicators and targets (see previously).⁴ This certainly is a big and necessary step forward in IDMCs organizational development, and the forecasts for organizational improvement are positive, though it is too early to assess whether these changes will yield the anticipated increase in (cost-)efficiency and effectiveness.

Connectedness and other Cross-cutting issues (gender, protection, environment)

IDMC is by closely cooperating with local governments, building their knowledge and capacities on issues of protection (guiding principles) and durable solutions to IDPs certainly connected to the development of IDPs, its ultimate beneficiaries. By disseminating policies of specific concern to conflict induced displacement, it contributes as well to a long-term perspective in raising awareness for IDPs and in pointing at responsibilities of states and civil societies.

By focusing on protracted crises and by having long term perspectives, IDMC is bringing out the debate between the humanitarian character of the assistance and the need to integrate IDPs into more transitional and developmental solutions. Protection is therefor considered mainstreamed at all levels of the project.

Gender within IDMC's own organisation is highly unbalanced (over 85% of staff is female), both at management positions and at research level, with certain sections occupied in their entirety by women. This is of course not discrediting IDMCs work but is as undesirable from a gender bias perspective as it would be if the organisation would have been dominated by male. However, IDMCs publications and reports demonstrate that gender awareness as such is present, evidenced e.g. by a number of studies on SGBV, women's access to land and also on topics more related to the specific challenges of men and boys.⁵ In principle the IDP monitoring data are disaggregated by sex and age as well.

V. Financial issues:

a. Procurement

IDMC's procurement system is not different from NRC's general procurement systems and, as IDMC in comparison with country programs has minimal procurements, this issue was not further assessed.

⁴ As IDMC is formally residing under the NRC AID department in Oslo, its organizational restructuring is part of the wider restructuring of AID itself (see annex 4f: Organigram of AID / IDMC)

⁵ See <http://www.internal-displacement.org/> e.g. National outrage: Violence against internally displaced women and girls in eastern Chad (November 2010); Still at risk: Internally displaced children's rights in north-west Pakistan (June 2010); IDMC, Gender Aspects of Internal Displacement, 2006

b. Financial systems

The financial systems follow as well NRCs global ones, including annual independent audits. No particular reason evolved to further investigate this issue either.

c. Efficiency + variance analysis

IDMC dedicates a large proportion of its funds to staff (some 70% of its annual budget). This is quite understandable as staff are the main asset of the institute, though at the same time they are the main cost-driver. Although IDMC does not exceed and is even at the low side of the salary scale for comparable staff in the research-sector (see table 6.2 in main report) it is the impression that this cost-driver is not consistently kept at its lowest level (e.g. see the substantial increase in average gross salary per employee in below table). The evaluation with the average gross salary per employee at NRC Head Office in Oslo is not completely comparable as staff capacity levels and costs of living are different, though it provides at least some insight in the staff-cost as percentage of operational volume.

Average Cost per IDMC/NRC Employee, 2010-2012

	2010	2011	2012 (budget)
IDMC number of employees (full-time equivalent)	26.5	27.0	28,5
IDMC average gross salary per employee (USD '000)	95	103	132
IDMC Annual turn-over (USD '000)	3,718	4,156	5,090
IDMC staff costs as % of annual turn-over	68	68	76
NRC HO Number of employees (FTE)		93	111
NRC HO av gross salary per empl (USD '000)		96	97
NRC HO Annual turn-over (USD '000)		13,120	13,392
NRC HO Staff costs as % of annual turn-over		68	72

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

IDMC is a very well respected organisation with a solid reputation for its high quality work and competent researchers. It is well managed, delivers needs-based outputs and is able to continuously and increasingly attract funds from a wide variety of donors. However, the humanitarian scene is changing and it is to be questioned whether IDMC will be able to continue to interest donors for its activities at this level. The evaluation team considers it therefore very wise that the management has taken steps to make the institute more result based oriented and to further the organisational development. Given the limited time, the proportion of the DFID PPA funds to the overall IDMC budget and conversely the enormous scope of IDMC, the evaluation team realizes it has only been able to assess the IDMC to an incomplete extent. Yet it considers the following recommendations sufficiently well-founded and appropriate to share. IDMC should,

1. Focus annual planning on strategic and specific goals by geographically concentrating resources, advocacy efforts and means of influence;
2. Develop consistent management tools with specific outcome indicators and milestones;
3. Endeavour to have an all-encompassing external evaluation of the institute to assist in further developing IDMCs organizational and programmatic strategy;
4. In close coordination with country programmes and HQ, explore new strategic alliances with e.g. CSOs to better influence policy and governments on the situation of PAD in protracted conflicts;
5. Keep staff costs as low as possible and regularly compare not only with peer-NGO-organisations in Geneva, but also with NRC HQ staff and the staff costs as proportion of total costs;
6. Try to establish more overt linkages with individual humanitarian NGOs and organisations⁶ other than NRC and the UN family, to widen the public and to discover potential future (research) clients, but at the same time avoiding to become too diverse in scope.

⁶ Apart from the existing cooperation with ICVA (a global network of NGOs).

ANNEX 4e – Results of Country Variance Analyses

For each of the three individual country programmes, we have analysed the differences (or “variances”) between budgeted and actual costs for the period 31 March 2011 – 30 April 2012.¹ The variance analysis was limited to costs that were: (i) financed by DFID, and (ii) administered by the programmes themselves (as opposed to costs incurred by NRC’s headquarters, which mainly consist of expatriate salaries and insurance costs). It focuses on budget items that, taken together, account for over 80% of total observed variance; variance analysis was not conducted for budget items with actual costs that varied less than 10% from budgeted costs.

1. Variance analysis of the Colombia ICLA programme

The budgeted DFID-funded portion of the 2011/12 budget for this programme was GBP 378,000², of which about 86% (or GBP 326,000) was administered by the programme itself, and the remainder by NRC’s headquarters in Oslo (Table A1.1).³ Most of the budget was allocated to the purchase of local and (sub-) contractor services for undertaking baseline surveys and providing legal services. The services were necessary for delivering the planned outputs for 2011/12 (assisting 1,300 persons in need of legal protection, training of 500 public servants, assisting 500 Colombians on return to their home country, and documenting two emblematic SGBV cases). During the reporting period, actual costs (administered by the programme itself) were approximately 15% (or GBP 49,000) lower than budgeted, the main reasons being:

- the programme spent less than half of its GBP 41,000 budget on seminars and teaching, primarily because of delays in programme implementation (which did not start in April 2011, but in August 2011 in Colombia and in early 2012 in Venezuela and Ecuador); in addition, unit costs were somewhat lower than anticipated, and
- the programme spent GBP 35,000 less on (sub-)contractor services, because of delays in programme implementation and because of the decision to use secondary data for the establishment of a baseline in Ecuador (instead of undertaking separate baseline surveys).

In spite of delays in implementation, the programme spent about 30% (or GBP 8,000) more on travel than was budgeted. According to the programme, this was because the remote location of beneficiary communities in Venezuela and Ecuador (Lago Agrio) resulted in higher-than-expected travel costs. In addition, the programme also spent GBP 6,000 more on external services, because the cost of an additional external financial audit of DFID funds was not included in the original budget.

Table A1.1: Results of Variance Analysis of the Colombia ICLA Programme (GBP ‘000)*

Budget Item	Budgeted Cost (B)	Actual Cost (A)	Variance (=B-/A)	Explanation for Variance
Administered by programme				
Local services	123	120	3	(no significant variance)
Seminars and teaching	41	20	21	Lower than expected volume (due to late start), lower than expected unit cost
(Sub-) contractor services	91	56	35	Delays in implementation, savings on baseline surveys by using secondary data
Travel	26	34	(8)	Higher than expected cost to access remote locations
External services**	4	9	(6)	Audit cost was not budgeted

¹ A variance analysis of the IDMC budget was not deemed appropriate as this would include the budget vs. actuals of IDMC’s entire funding. See Chapter 6 for an indicative analysis of IDMC staffing costs as a proxy indicator for overall cost-efficiency.

² The original budget allocation was GBP 381,472. Because of exchange rate differences, this was reduced to GBP 378,000

³ The amount administered by NRC HO includes on top of the 7% administration costs, the salaries for programme related expatriate and PAA staff

Other costs	41	37	4	(no significant variance)
SUBTOTAL	326	277	49	

Administered by NRC headquarters

Field programme support	28	32	(5)	(not covered by the analysis)
Salary expatriate staff	-	11	(11)	
Administrative charge	25	9	15	
TOTAL***	378	329	49	

Source: Consultant, based on programme accounts

* 31 March 2011 – 30 April 2012 (DFID-financed costs only)

** After correction for incorrect classification of consultant cost of US\$32,000 (or about GBP 20,500), which was allocated to the budget item "(sub-)contractor services".

*** The original budget allocation was GBP 381,472. Because of exchange rate differences, this was reduced to GBP 378,000.

2. Variance analysis of the Myanmar shelter programme

The budgeted DFID-funded portion of the 2011/12 budget for this programme was GBP 272,000, of which about 85% (or GBP 236,000) was administered by the programme itself, and the remainder by NRC's headquarters in Oslo (Table A1.2).⁴ Most of the programme-administered budget was allocated to the purchase of building materials for the construction of 158 units of durable shelter, the planned output for 2011/12. Actual costs for these houses were considerably (minus 35%) lower than budgeted, mostly due to cost savings (e.g. bulk purchase of timber, involvement of community labour and coordination instead of using contractors), and partly due to generous budgeting. During the reporting period, actual costs were approximately 3% (or GBP 8,000) lower than budgeted and budget variance limited, the main reasons being:

- a budget revision was carried out in July 2011, adjusting the actual costs more to reality,
- internal costs were lower than expected as less support staff from HQ could visit the project area than foreseen,
- the programme spent lower-than-expected amounts on the purchase and rental of equipment, which accounted for most of the positive variance of GBP 7,000 of other costs.

The programme spent also less on local staff salaries, mainly because the programme decided to involve CBOs residing in the target villages more heavily in the execution of the shelter construction. The actual cost allocated to the budget item "building materials" was nonetheless higher than the budgeted amount because the programme decided to allocate the cost savings on shelter construction as a reservation for an intended reforestation programme and to pre-finance building material for the subsequent budget period.

Table A1.2: Results of Variance Analysis of Myanmar Shelter Programme (GBP '000)*

Budget Item	Budgeted Cost (B)**	Actual Cost (A)	Variance (=B-/A)	Explanation for Variance
Administered by programme				
Building materials	161	114	47	Lower than expected unit cost of shelters
- of which reserved for reforestation and pre-financing	-	30	(55)	Proposed to absorb savings from shelter unit costs
Salary local staff	19	18	1	Less than expected field staff needed
Travel	9	9	-	
Internal costs	20	12	8	Less HQ support staff
Other costs	27	20	7	Lower than expected cost of equipment due to subcontracting
SUBTOTAL	236	228	8	
Administered by NRC headquarters				

⁴ The original budget allocation was GBP 279,746. Because of exchange rate differences, this was reduced to GBP 271,739.

Field programme support	3	NA	NA	(not covered by the analysis)
Salary expatriate staff	15	NA	NA	
Administrative charge	18	NA	NA	
TOTAL	272	NA	NA	

Source: Consultant, based on programme accounts

* 31 March 2011 – 30 April 2012 (DFID-financed costs only)

** Budget revision per July 2011

3. Variance analysis of DR Congo food security programme

The budgeted DFID-funded portion of the 2011/12 budget for this programme was GBP 330,609, of which nearly 80% (or GBP 263,000) was administered by the programme itself, and the remainder by NRC's headquarters in Oslo (Table A1.3). Most of the budget was allocated to the purchase of emergency articles and local services to help move 2,600 IDPs out of camps and provide assistance to neighbouring residents, the planned output for 2011/12. During the reporting period, total actual costs were substantially lower than the budget. In addition, there was significant variance between actual and budgeted costs for several individual budget items, the most important of which can be summarized as follows:

- the programme spent GBP 5,000 less on emergency articles though the construction of the water powered mill and the warehouses (under construction) were still not accounted for.
- the savings from reduced spending on agricultural inputs (provided by FAO) were almost completely spent on innovative outputs (warehouses and water powered mill).
- the programme spent GBP 17,000 less on local staff, primarily because more local implementing partners were engaged.
- the programme spent about GBP 6,000 less on training, as only one MUSO (Mutuelles de Solidarite) was trained instead of five.
- transportation costs and travel expenses were substantially lower than expected, accounting for savings of GBP 19,000, as security constraints hampered many field visits.
- the programme spent more-than-expected amounts on premises, of which elevated renting fees accounted for most of the negative variance of GBP 5,000.

Table A1.3: Results of Variance Analysis of DRC Food Security Programme (GBP '000)*

Budget Item	Budgeted Cost (B)	Actual Cost (A)	Variance (=B-/A)	Explanation for Variance
Administered by programme				
Emergency materials	88	82	6	Lower price for material than budgeted.
Salary local staff	78	61	17	Less local staff needed
Seminar and teaching	12	6	6	Less MUSO's trained than planned
Equipment purchases	6	-	6	Less need as FAO provided agricultural tools
Premises, communication	24	29	(5)	Renting fees were higher
Travel & Transportation	39	20	19	Less travelling and transportation due to security and involving local IPs
Other costs	16	12	4	
SUBTOTAL	263	210	53	
Administered by NRC headquarters				
Field programme support	-	-	-	(not covered by the analysis)
Salary expatriate staff	46	44	2	
Administrative charge	22	18	4	
TOTAL	331	271	60	

Source: Consultant, based on programme accounts

* 31 March 2011 – 30 April 2012 (DFID-financed costs only)

ANNEX 5 - Inception report NRC MT evaluation DFID CHASE program

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 - F. Summary of documents available for desk review

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1. INTRODUCTION

As part of the Independent Progress Review, mandatory for all DFID's PPA partners, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) launched mid-February 2012 a Tender for a Mid-Term Evaluation of the DFID CHASE Support for NRC Programs. This evaluation marks the mid-term stage and will review the progress and future potential of program activities underway since April 1, 2011 and in Colombia since May 15, 2011. As a result of this Evaluation tender TFM Consult, a Dutch consultancy firm, has been contracted to undertake this evaluation in presenting a well-experienced, multidisciplinary and multicultural evaluation team. The underlying Inception Report is the first deliverable of this evaluation team.

The evaluation team will evaluate and analyse the following five NRC-implemented programs as part of NRC's worldwide DFID CHASE funded PPA program:

- global advocacy campaigns on humanitarian access, housing, land and property, and natural disaster response, undertaken in NRC's head office in Oslo (AID),
- internal displacement monitoring centre (IDMC), undertaken by the IDMC program in Geneva,
- an information, counselling, and legal assistance (ICLA) program in the Colombia region (Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela),
- a shelter program in Myanmar, and
- a food security and Income generating program in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In the terminology used in the NRC Evaluation Policy, the first two programs are "cross-cutting or other thematic issues" and the three country programs are "individual projects".

2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The main purpose of the mid-term evaluation is to provide an independent assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and results of DFID funded NRC activities at the global and country-specific levels. The evaluation will also verify information contained in the annual reporting process between NRC and DFID, while reviewing the quality and process of reporting in general.

The evaluation results will inform the future work of DFID-funded program activities in the countries under review, as well as similar operations in other countries where NRC is present.

Scope

The evaluation will focus on the following areas:

- Global Advocacy Campaigns on Humanitarian Access; Housing, Land and Property; and Natural Disaster Response (AID, Head Office in Oslo)
- Internal Displacement Monitoring (IDMC in Geneva)
- Country Program Activities
 - Colombia region - Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela (ICLA)
 - Myanmar (Shelter)
 - DR Congo (Food Security)

Comments of the evaluation team

Given the wide intended dissemination of the evaluation results, the evaluation team assumes, unless misunderstood, that not only *DFID-funded* program activities in the countries under review, as well as *similar operations* in other countries where NRC is present will be informed and could benefit, but also the wider humanitarian assistance public and other related donors. More specifically, the evaluation team considers assessing such a world-wide and broad humanitarian assistance program an excellent opportunity to feed the present discussions in the humanitarian world. Suggestion would then be to include also platforms like ALNAP in the sharing of the evaluation results.

Regarding the scope and the areas of the Program chosen to assess, the evaluation team regrets not to have been involved in the selection process, though it assumes there were good reasons for doing so (see also 5. Assumptions). In particular not being able to visit Iraq will hamper assessing Output 4. of the Program: *Contribution to access to appropriate assistance and durable solutions for PAD in urban settings*. It is suggested therefor to NRC to make also the program data of Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia available to the evaluation team and to allow it to contact and, if considered appropriate and necessary, to interview at distant program staff and other stakeholders.

In the ToR no reference is made to NRC's partners in implementing its Program, though it is clear that partners can contribute or hamper the success of a program significantly. The evaluation team considered it therefor instrumental to pay also attention to NRC's partners, partner policy and how it is monitoring its implementing partners (see further annex A, table 2).

There are some inconsistencies in the Information to DFID Business Case paper¹ and the Program logical framework (LF)²: (Southern) Sudan is mentioned as a benefitting country for advocacy and policy interventions and dialogue, but not in the LF; Global Advocacy Campaigns will focus on Humanitarian Access; Housing, Land and Property; and Natural Disaster Response, while the LF refers to promoting responses to disaster-induced displacement only, on page 6, the objectives of the DRC program are wider than those mentioned in the LF, etc. This confusion could have been avoided if the evaluation team would have received the authentic DFID proposal, including the financial chapters. In general it is felt that the information provision hitherto has been suboptimal for the evaluation team to fully understand and get acquainted with the DFID funded PPA program, what has its consequences as well for the robustness of this Inception Report.

¹ NRC Information to DFID Business Case (PPA 416) Feb 2011

² NRC 153361 PPA internal logframe

3. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

The methods that will be used in the mid-term evaluation include:

Desk study and document review: The evaluation team will review proposals, reports and other documents associated with the development of NRC's relationship with DFID, global advocacy campaigns, IDMC activity, and ICLA, Shelter, and Food Security programs. In Annex F an overview is given of documents available at the time of drafting the inception report and those deemed necessary for further review.

Key stakeholder interviews³: The evaluation team will conduct interviews with NRC staff at Head Office and in the field, staff at IDMC, national and international NGOs (including other DFID PPA recipients), national authorities/representatives, relevant UN agencies, community based organizations and inter-agency networks where applicable (e.g. UNOCHA Food Security Cluster in DR Congo).

Visiting Country programs and meeting beneficiary focus groups and secondary beneficiaries: For the assessment of country programs, the evaluation team will meet with direct beneficiaries (primary stakeholders) and indirect beneficiaries such as community representatives, police officers etc. (secondary stakeholders) of the target population for each Core Competency under review. This will include focus group discussions, individual and communal interviews, a stakeholder analysis and developing representative case-studies. The main objective of the country visits is to obtain and analyse data and information that can validate and enrich the desk review and to generate new information that will confirm or refute the conclusions of the desk study and document review. For more details about the sources of data, data collection methods and selection methods of respondents see annex A, Table 1.

The evaluation will be guided by inquiry lines in relation to the DAC criteria Relevance / Appropriateness, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Results (also sometimes referred to as Impact⁴) and in relation to some specifically mentioned cross cutting themes (see later). The inquiry lines mentioned in the ToR are supplemented with questions from the evaluation team and are presented in table 1 (annex A), including the evaluation team's methodological approach to answer these questions. Table 2 provides specific and more detailed questions that apply only to some of the locations / programs and/or the cross-cutting themes. In the annexes also some questionnaires / guiding questions for the interviews with various stakeholders are presented as well as Sphere standard checklists for Food Security and Shelter Humanitarian Assistance⁵ and data capture sheets for financial information.

The ToR of the evaluation mentions some specific – additionality⁶, Value for Money and Learning and Innovation - and some more general cross-cutting themes such as sustainability. In addition to sustainability or the more appropriate term *connectedness*⁷, often used in Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance (HA), the evaluation team proposes to include as well the in HA evaluations commonly used cross cutting themes *gender, protection and environment*.

Stakeholder analyses will be conducted at an early stage of preparation for the country visit. The analyses will be refined during the process in order to obtain a range of perspectives and ensure that all key people and groups participate/are heard.

³ We use the following definitions of stakeholders:

Key stakeholders are those who can significantly influence or are important to the success of an activity.

Primary stakeholders are those individuals and groups who are ultimately affected by an activity, either as beneficiaries (positively impacted) or disbeneficiaries (adversely impacted). In a rural roads activity, primary stakeholders might include both the petty traders and small farmers whose livelihoods are positively affected by the new roads, and those households who are adversely affected, such as by having to relocate because of road widening.

Secondary stakeholders are all other individuals or institutions with a stake, interest or intermediary role in the activity. In a primary health care scenario, secondary stakeholders might include the host community, the local health workers, health department officials, the Ministry of Health, NGOs, donors, private doctors and so on.

⁴ DAC/OECD (2002) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management

⁵ Sphere Handbook 2011

⁶ DFID: the additional benefits that are directly attributable to the activities delivered by the project." The additionality of funding demonstrates how the results arising from an intervention would not have occurred in the absence of the intervention.

⁷ Refers to the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account (ALNAP 2006).

Sampling: The stakeholder analyses, for national level and the selected projects, will form the basis for planning initial meetings and contacts in country. At the project level we will take account of key elements of diversity, for example locations, components and types of beneficiaries (e.g. according to vulnerability). Sampling will then be planned within these strata taking account of the resources available. An indicative objective is to conduct interviews with at least 50 individual beneficiaries per program. Work with beneficiaries will include meetings with particular focus groups on whom the project may have had a differential impact and/or whose interests are a priority for NRC. Female headed households (de jure or de facto) and other groups of women will be included in all studies; other possible groups are richer vs. poorer households; distinct ethnic or socially differentiated groups; elderly vs. younger groups; livelihood systems may be an important conditioning factor in some cases. Interviews with individuals and/or representatives of households will be conducted in parallel.

Following are some notes on the specific cross cutting themes of the ToR, in particular on the Value for Money theme, as these are considered of special interest to NRC and DFID.


Value for Money (VfM)

i. Introduction

The evaluation team will adopt the definition of VfM that was developed by the National Audit Office (NAO) of the United Kingdom, and is currently in use by DFID. According to the NAO, “Good value for money is the optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcome”. VfM consists of three elements: economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Figure 1). To assess VfM, we propose to measure and analyse:

- **cost-efficiency**, a measure of outputs in relation to costs, and
- **Cost-effectiveness**⁸, a measure of quantifiable outcomes in relation to costs (this is a measure similar to VfM, but not identical as VfM also incorporates qualitative outcomes).

Figure 1: Defining Value for Money



Source: ITAD (2011)

ii. Evaluation of Cost-Efficiency

Overview. To assess cost-efficiency of the five NRC programs under review, we propose the following three-step method:

1. measure planned and actual cost-efficiency,
2. analyse differences between planned and actual cost-efficiency, and
3. analyse differences between actual cost-efficiency of each of the five NRC-implemented programs, and two “peer” programs.

The results of these analyses will allow us to form an opinion on the cost-efficiency of a program against: (i) planned cost-efficiency levels of the program itself, and (ii) cost-efficiency levels of comparable programs. We recognize that a comparison between an NRC-implemented program and other programs is methodologically complex (if only because no two programs are implemented in precisely the same context). However, without

⁸ Others (e.g. WB) define Cost-effectiveness as the extent to which the program has achieved or is expected to achieve its results at a lower cost compared with alternatives.

comparing alternative approaches, it will be difficult to answer the question of cost efficiency in a humanitarian environment: to what extent are NRC-managed projects implemented more efficiently than other Humanitarian projects?

Step 1: Measure planned and actual cost-efficiency. This requires the collection of budgeted and actual expenditures at the latest date for which data on actual spending were available. For example, if a program intends to train teachers, cost-efficiency may be estimated by estimating the average cost per trainer teacher (see Table 1 below for an example). In view of time and resource constraints, the evaluators will only analyse components of which the budgeted cost would account for more than 10% of the total program cost (with a maximum of four components per program). Management cost and cost of head office support (if any) would be allocated to individual components in proportion to their total share in the program cost.

Table 1: Cost Efficiency Analysis (example)

	Planned (until Jan 201X)	Actual (until Jan 201X)
Total cost of teacher training	US\$100,000	US\$60,000
Number of teachers trained	200	100
Average cost per trained teacher	500	600

Step 2: Analyse differences between planned and actual cost-efficiency. In accounting, this type of analysis is better known as “variance analysis”. The purpose of a variance analysis is to identify the factors that have caused differences between planned inputs and outputs vis-à-vis actual inputs and outputs. For example, the higher-than-expected average cost per trained teacher may have been caused by a higher-than-expected dropout rate (Table 2). Another possible reason for differences in planned and actual cost-efficiency indicators is a difference in unit costs (which is called (the relation between costs and inputs or “economy” in Figure 1).

Table 2: Variance Analysis (example)

	Planned (until Jan 201X)	Actual (until Jan 201X)
Total cost of teacher training	US\$100,000	US\$60,000
Number of teachers enrolled in training	200	200
Dropout rate	0% (not included in plan)	50%
Number of teachers trained	200	100
Average cost per trained teacher	500	600
Average cost per enrolled teacher	500	300

Step 3: Analyse differences between actual cost-efficiency of NRC-implemented programs, and two “peer” programs. This step requires the following:

- for each NRC-implemented program under evaluation, two recently completed programs will be identified that are broadly comparable, were not implemented by NRC, and for which sufficient data is available (preferably in the form of publicly available evaluation reports);
- selection of cost-efficiency indicators⁹, which are relevant and can be calculated for the NRC program and the two peer programs (such as the average cost per trained teachers, assuming that all three programs have a teacher training component),
- estimation of cost-efficiency indicators for the peer programs, and to correct these for differences in exchange rates, cost levels, and price inflation in intervening years, so that they are comparable to efficiency indicators calculated for the NRC-implemented program.

⁹ Indicators in VFM assessment play a significant role since they provide ‘a measure of productivity’ (efficiency) and ‘qualitative and quantitative measures of increase or decrease in outcomes’ (effectiveness). Clearly, then, the quality of these indicators and the accessibility of data to support measurement of progress against them have important implications for VFM (ITAD: Measuring the Impact and Value for Money of Governance & Conflict Programmes).

We recognize that it is difficult (the AID program) and even not possible to identify a credible peer program (the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) in Geneva, which is the only centre of its kind and for the AID program). For this reason, we propose other cost analysis approaches for these programs in addition to Step 1 and Step 2 when analysing the cost-efficiency of these programs (see annex E)

iii. Evaluation of Cost-Effectiveness

Summary: The outcome of the cost-efficiency analysis is a series of cost-efficiency indicators for selected components of each of the five NRC programs under review, and comparable components in two “peer programs” (except for the IDMC and AID programs, for which it is not possible to identify peer programs). For each of these components, we will estimate cost-effectiveness indicators by relating the cost of implementing the component (which was already estimated when evaluating cost-efficiency) to outcomes (see Table 3 for an example). The effectiveness indicators will, in turn, be compared to effectiveness indicators of the same two peer programs or of alternatives.

Table 3: Cost Effectiveness Analysis (example)

	Planned (until Jan 201X)	Actual (until Jan 201X)
Total cost of teacher training	US\$100,000	US\$60,000
Number of teachers trained	200	100
Average cost per trained teacher	500	600
Number of trainer teachers employed by public school within one year	50	40
Average cost per trainer teacher employed by public school within one year	US\$2,000	US\$1,500

Learning and Innovation

This will be assessed in the following manner:

- Thematic innovation: Does the program introduce new thematic components to the organisation’s existing program, or does it introduce a new dimension within an existing theme?
- Improvements in the intervention strategy used (increasing program effectiveness): Does the program have a greater impact, compared to previous programs, due to, for instance, synergy effects with other programs, complementary activities (the 1+1>2 principle) or new intervention techniques? Have there been/will there be any unplanned positive impacts on the planned target groups or other non-targeted communities arising from the intervention?
- Efficiency gains in program implementation: Does the program achieve the same impact as previous programs using fewer funds, as a result of, for instance, lower procurement costs, more rational use of resources, or more efficient use of time?

In addition attention will be paid to *Organizational development* and *Contextual knowledge development*.

Additionality

The term has different meanings and connotations, but we use the DFID definition (see previously). In endeavouring to assess NRC’s additionality one should be able to evaluate the situation without NRC’s intervention (counterfactual) with the actual situation. This is only possible in comparing analogous “control groups” with the targeted groups that benefitted from NRC’s intervention and only for those interventions that produce hard evidence of benefits of NRC’s intervention. After carefully examining the various components of the NRC program we concluded that only the Food Security/ IGA and the Shelter program could eventually fit in these ‘evaluability’ criteria. Hence we will explore other evaluation techniques such as contribution analysis that will enable us to comment on the additionality of the other programs. In addition, the evaluation team will review in how far NRC itself has been able to analyse DFID’s contribution to the effectiveness and replicability of its Program. Both qualitative and quantitative methods will be used to assess the issue of *additionality*.

Gender

The evaluation team will assess NRC’s gender-equality policies, and in how far they are followed. Evaluators will also evaluate the extent to which interventions promote gender equality. In relation to this, the data in the evaluation report will be disaggregated by sex, where possible (see further annex A, Table 2).

Protection

Evaluating whether protection needs have been met is a key element in the assessment of effectiveness. Evaluators will investigate whether those who needed protection in the widest sense and are specifically targeted by NRC have received it. Even where protection issues do not form a major part of the intervention, evaluators will still assess whether protection issues were for instance integrated into design of the program and planning. Particular attention will be paid to the effectuated level of protection and the articulation/coordination between the provision of ICLA services and other programs such as shelter and food security.

The environment

The evaluation team will also assess whether NRC's interventions have supported environmental sustainability, or whether the Program has been / is harmful for the environment in design or implementation, i.e. existence of proper environmental practises to the surrounding space/set-up; capacities existing to deal with critical risks, etc.

Connectedness

Connectedness / Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) needs to be viewed from macro and micro perspectives, from the level of national institutions to that of local livelihoods. The evaluation team will examine the key area of timing, noting that few agencies make a strategic review at the crucial point when turning from relief to recovery. It will analyse also the quality of partnership between international and local NGOs and other major actors, the key role that good partnerships and local capacity plays in successful interventions, and whether and to what extent NRC decided to work with expatriate or local staff.

At a general level, the evaluation will assess the institutional and political context and in how far NRC's support is more likely to be replicated rather than it is replacing governmental tasks. Building local capacity is another important aspect of connectedness and the evaluation will include as well a detailed analysis of NRC's support to rehabilitation and rebuilding livelihoods.

Note on evaluator's ethical and professional standards

The evaluation team will carry out its work in accordance with international standards of good practice in approach and method. All conclusions will be as much as possible substantiated with adequate and documented data.

In the conduct of their work the evaluators will use a multi-method approach and triangulate¹⁰ between different sources and data gathering of information. These information sources will include i.e. non-beneficiaries, primary stakeholders (specifically humanitarian beneficiaries, members of the host communities), local government (or equivalent such as group/tribal leaders), international agency staff, partners (both expatriate and local employees of partners), NRC staff and experts, main actors, EU and other donors and humanitarian agencies, etc.

In order to substantiate evaluation findings the numbers, sex, ethnicity etc. of primary stakeholders will be noted, as well as ways in which confidentiality and dignity have been assured in the interview process. In this consultation, the evaluation team will use as much as possible participatory and non-discriminatory techniques.

In carrying out their work, the evaluators will be vigilant as well as to any non-respect of international humanitarian law and principles, standards and conventions, UN protocols, Red Cross codes, and declarations, such as the Madrid Privacy declaration.

Before starting their work all evaluators have signed and have committed themselves to NRC's Code of Conduct.

¹⁰ Different types of triangulation (e.g. data -, discipline -, and methodological triangulation) will contribute to validate findings of the evaluation as much as possible.

4. WORK PLAN

The following work plan is drafted, based on the information obtained thus far (15th of April 2012):

Inception phase (2 -22 April):

Desk study/review of documents, drafting of the inception report, contacting of the various programs, coordination and set-up of field visit schedules.

Field research and analysis phase (23 April – 24 of June):

Visiting various program locations, interviewing key, primary and secondary stakeholders, including stakeholder analysis, observations and focus group discussions (see further 3. Methodology).

The country visits will focus on key stakeholder meetings, briefing for the national team and beneficiary meetings. Preliminary schedule will be reviewed to identify and rectify any problems or gaps in both process and information. Key tasks are:

- Meetings with Project Management team and other key stakeholders:
- Conduct briefing/ orientation workshop with in-country team
- Field visits to project locations and testing of planned methods and approaches
- Review workshop with in-country team and analysis of field data
- Follow up/ feedback meetings with key stakeholders
- Wrap up meetings presenting and discussing preliminary findings with key NRC staff

Reporting and Dissemination Phase (25 June – begin of Sept 2012):

Draft report (due 29th of June but dependant on timing of the Myanmar field visit), Final report (due 13th of August) and the Presentation of the evaluation results beginning of September at NRC Headquarters in Oslo.

The evaluation team is composed of a core team (Ms Pita, Ms Murillo and M Bosch – TL), complemented with a local consultant for the Colombia Region Program and a Program Finance Expert for financial analysis backstopping. The evaluation core team will do most of the field work, unless otherwise specified.

For practical reasons the team that will visit the IDMC program in Geneva is composed of the TL and Ms Pita, instead of Ms Murillo and Ms Pita. In line with the ToR, the Myanmar program will be visited only by M Bosch and the Colombia Region Program by Ms Pita, Ms Murillo (partially) and the local consultant M Reed Hurtado, whereas the DRC program, the relevant NRC Headquarter staff and the AID program in Oslo will be visited by the entire core team.

The evaluation of the Value for Money aspects of NRC's program will be undertaken by Ms Murillo as an Accountant (AC) and M Oosterman, a program finance expert (PFE), as follows:

Cost-efficiency analysis

- identify relevant peer programs (PFE in consultation with TL)
- analyse selected peer programs (PFE)
- measure planned and actual cost-efficiency of NRC-implemented programs (AC)
- analyse differences between planned and actual cost-efficiency of NRC-implemented programs (AC)
- analyse differences between actual cost-efficiency of NRC-implemented programs and the selected "peer" programs (PFE)

Cost-effectiveness analysis

- identify quantifiable outcomes related to program components for which cost-efficiency analysis was undertaken (AC)
- calculate cost-effectiveness indicators (PFE)
- analyse differences between actual cost-efficiency of NRC-implemented programs and the selected "peer" programs (PFE)

Timeline:



5. ASSUMPTIONS

The evaluation will assess three country program activities and two global programs in order to provide an as objective and impartial mid-term evaluation of the NRC Program Supported by the DFID CHASE PPA no 416 as possible. In doing so, the following assumptions have been made:

- All relevant information, not only for the country programs under review, but also for the other programs belonging to the abovementioned Program, will be provided by NRC in time and at first request of the evaluation TL, unless NRC has good reasons not to do so. These will then be communicated in writing to the evaluation team.
- Security and political situation will allow the evaluation team to visit all locations / program sites under review and to interview the persons / institutions deemed necessary during the time of field visits. If this is not possible, NRC will again explain the reasoning therefor in writing to the evaluation team.
- Although it is noted that not all programs started at the same time and at the beginning of the PPA round 2011-2014, it is assumed that enough progress has been made to assess all programs effectively, while the difference in running period will of course be taken into account when assessing the actual progress made.
- The choice of scope for this evaluation and the focus of areas mentioned in the ToR were made outside the influence of the evaluation team. It is assumed, however, that these choices were made for feasibility reasons and from a practical stand and represent the Program in its totality as good as possible. The time the evaluation team will spent in the various countries is, however, disproportional to the impact weighing, (based on an estimation of the number of beneficiaries served ?) of the respective Program outputs as stated in Program's log frame.
- As far as the terms used in the ToR and in the various documents give rise to misinterpretation or confusion, we assume that these terms are mistakenly used (e.g. cost-effectiveness whereas cost-efficiency is probably meant). We refer as much as possible to the definitions used by DFID in the Evaluation Manager PPA and GPAF of Feb 2012 and will mention in all reporting whenever the evaluation team will deviate from these definitions.
- In the scope of the evaluation the evaluation team will also verify the information contained in the annual reporting process between NRC and DFID, while reviewing the quality and process of reporting in general. It is assumed that this annual reporting will occur on time to be assessed by the evaluation team.
- In the event that any of the intended programs cannot be visited (in time), e.g. the Myanmar program, it is assumed that another, comparable program will be visited.

ANNEXES

ANNEX A: Evaluation criteria

Table 1:

Evaluation criteria and questions	Method of data collection	Sources of data	Selection method of respondents	Comments
Relevance				
1. To what extent does the NRC PPA CHASE program represent and respond to the needs and priorities of constituencies and target beneficiaries?	Focus Group Discussions ; Desk study/ documents review ;	(Quarterly) project progress reports; (Partner) senior management	Purposive sampling of projects ; Random sampling of beneficiaries	What are NRC's constituencies?
2. To what degree have NRC activities balanced achieving the greatest impact while targeting the most vulnerable and marginalized?	semi-structured interviews;	Information from DFID Business Case PPA 416 and its Intervention Appraisal		Was it NRC's objective to target the most vulnerable and marginalized? If so, what selection criteria are being used?
3. Going forward, in what ways can NRC improve the design and implementation of these activities to achieve greater relevance?		NRC PPA proposal to DFID log frames various secondary stakeholders / implementing partners		Has there been any adaptation already?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true and coherent? - Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders? - Has a handover strategy been considered and understood by the partners? - Is the range of activities realistic with regard to the stakeholders' capacities? - Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account? - Is the program appropriate in the humanitarian context? 		Individual and focus groups of beneficiaries		How was the design process carried out? Context analysis?

Evaluation criteria and questions	Method of data collection	Sources of data	Selection method of respondents	Comments
Efficiency				
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To what extent can NRC demonstrate cost effectiveness, including an understanding of program costs, the factors driving those costs, and linkages to performance and ability to achieve efficiency gains? 2. To what extent has NRC delivered results at improved efficiency due specifically to receipt of DFID funds? (Additionality) 3. Going forward, could NRC reduce costs without sacrificing quality? 	<p>Financial data collection and analysis</p> <p>Semi-structured Interviews</p> <p>Desk study / document review</p>	<p>Internal monitoring reports , evaluations</p> <p>Reports from implementing partners</p> <p>Financial audits</p> <p>NRC field staff</p> <p>implementing partners</p> <p>other key actors in the intervention area</p>	<p>Purposive sampling of other key actors, implementing partners and NRC field staff</p>	<p>Cost effectiveness <-> cost efficiency: See the paragraph on Value for money and definition of cost-effectiveness</p> <p>How is quality defined and monitored</p> <p>Benchmarking?</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How well is the availability/usage of means/inputs managed? - How well is the implementation of activities managed? - What is the quality of NRC's internal monitoring, procurement and reporting system? - Have eventual recommendations done by auditors been taken into consideration? - How does the intervention articulate with other NRC projects? <p>How does the project coordinate with other similar interventions?</p>				

Evaluation criteria and questions	Method of data collection	Sources of data	Selection method of respondents	Comments
Effectiveness				
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the distinctive offerings of NRC in the humanitarian sector in the selected country program and advocacy/displacement monitoring activities? 2. In what ways does the PPA CHASE mechanism and overall approach taken by DFID enable NRC to provide this type of distinctive expertise and service? (Additionality) 3. Going forward, how can NRC leverage its strengths to improve the humanitarian effort in selected advocacy campaigns, country programs, and displacement monitoring 	<p>Quantitative and qualitative data analysis of monitoring data ;</p> <p>Focus groups discussions with stratified beneficiaries</p> <p>Semi-structured Interviews</p> <p>Desk study / document review</p>	<p>Internal monitoring reports , evaluations, CAD reports</p> <p>Reports from implementing partners</p> <p>NRC field staff implementing partners</p> <p>other key actors in the intervention area</p>	<p>Purposive sampling of partners and key informants</p> <p>Random sampling of beneficiaries</p>	<p>Instead of offerings we would rather assess NRC's direct effects of its PPA CHASE program / intervention</p> <p>PPA CHASE mechanism and overall approach taken by DFID is insufficiently known to the evaluation team</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As presently implemented what is the likelihood of the Outputs to be achieved? - Are the targets for the Outputs still appropriate and are they regularly been reported against? - In how far are external factors influencing the achievement of the Outputs? - How does the intervention complement/create a distinction with initiatives implemented by other humanitarian actors? 				

Evaluation criteria and questions	Method of data collection	Sources of data	Selection method of respondents	Comments
Results				
1. How well is the project achieving its intended outcomes?	Quantitative and qualitative data analysis of monitoring data ; Focus groups discussions with stratified beneficiaries	Partner interviews ; Local authorities Evaluations, Annual reports, IDMC country profiles, cluster reports	Purposive sampling of partners and key informants Random sampling of beneficiaries	This mid-term evaluation may be too early to properly assess achievement of outcomes
2. What impact has the NRC PPA CHASE program on the lives of beneficiaries through: - country programs - AID program - IDMC program	Sample survey of project beneficiaries Semi-structured Interviews Desk study / document review	NRC field staff other key actors in the intervention area		
- Have there been any positive or negative unplanned effects on the target groups arising from the projects? - How are unplanned negative effects on the target groups or other non-targeted communities being mitigated? - What is the likelihood of a multiplier effect (additionality)?				

Table 2

"X" indicates that the evaluation question is applicable to an individual project / country program

Specific-evaluation questions per country / program	IDMC	AID	DRC (food security)	Colombia (ICLA)	Myanmar (shelter)
Relevance					
1. Does the program still respond to the priority needs of the target groups?			x	X	x
2. Do the services (ICLA/advocacy) proposed respond to the priorities of the target groups within the existing current context?		X		X	
3. What are the selection criteria (and/or early warning) for the introduction of new situations/close-up of files	X	X		X	
4. How appropriate was the choice of building shelters on collective sites, as opposed to on individual plots? What is expected to happen to these sites (vis-à-vis longer-term development), and will it be possible to prevent the creation of permanent settlements?					X
5. Did program design and partner implementation adequately incorporate concerns about the environment and gender?			X	X	X
6. Will the shelter program contribute to or impede long-term shelter solutions?					X
7. After years of intervention using this methodology, what have been the major accomplishments? What are the lessons learned? What mistakes have been made?	X	X	X	X	
8.					
9. What does this project contribute in relation to NRC's overall mandate?	X	X	X	X	X
10. Have specific milestones and targets/country for the countries surrounding Colombia been considered? If so, are they appropriate?				X	
11. How are durable solutions be conceived in the intervention area?			X	X	X
12. What does the program expect of national authorities and key stakeholders in the relevant countries?	X		X	X	X

"X" indicates that the evaluation question is applicable to an individual project / country program

Specific-evaluation questions per country / program	IDMC	AID	DRC (food security)	Colombia (ICLA)	Myanmar (shelter)
13. Is there any legal partnership framework between the program and national/local in-line authorities?	X	X		X	
Efficiency / cost-effectiveness					
14. What were the costs per project, and how did these compare with other humanitarian projects? Was there any correlation between project cost and project quality (in terms of design, implementation and results)?			X	X	X
15. How does NRC relate to its counterparts and national authorities in the intervention countries?			X	X	X
16. What are the coordination mechanisms used with partners and key stakeholders?	X		X	X	X
17. At what moment do monitoring activities of program conclude (when refugees become IDPs/return to original place/lead a safe and protected life)?	X	X	X	X	X
18.					
19. Do SGBV victims use the offered service to access justice?				X	
20. In how far is protection provided and how do ICLA services articulate/coordinate with other protective programs?	X	X	X	X	X
Effectiveness					
21. What challenges delayed the start of the programs? Did other organizations face similar challenges? How did delays impact the program, in term of effectiveness, relevance or results?			X	X	X
22. What were the different ways that each program dealt with and mitigated the possible effects of land tenure issues? Were any of the approaches more effective than others?			X		X

"X" indicates that the evaluation question is applicable to an individual project / country program

Specific-evaluation questions per country / program	IDMC	AID	DRC (food security)	Colombia (ICLA)	Myanmar (shelter)
23. What is the flexibility/capacity of the program to adapt to changing external conditions?			X	X	X
24. How does the program track effective returns/successful stories?	X	X		X	
25. If the unstable situation in Colombia continues (as is expected), what steps is the program taking to ensure refugees and PNIP have access to solutions in the country of current residence?				X	
26. When would PAD be considered successful returnees falling off the program/database?	X			X	
Results					
27. Did the program achieve its objective of supporting vulnerable conflict-affected families living in inadequate shelter with transitional shelter intended to bridge the gap between relief and reconstruction?					X
28. What are the most successful projects? What are the reasons for the least successful interventions? Are there any generalizable lessons?	X	X	X	X	X
29. Did any environmental issues emerge during implementation? Were the issues addressed in program design? How were they managed, and what were the consequences?			X		X
30. What are the rolling up/scaling up prospects of the program (additionality)?	X	X	X	X	
31. What is the specific added value of the program as against the gaps identified with key mandated organisations and key stakeholders in the relevant countries?	X	X	X	X	X

"X" indicates that the evaluation question is applicable to an individual project / country program

Specific-evaluation questions per country / program	IDMC	AID	DRC (food security)	Colombia (ICLA)	Myanmar (shelter)
Gender					
32. Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the project strategy?	X	X	X	X	X
33. considering the following aspects of gender mainstreaming: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has the project been planned on the basis of a gender-differentiated beneficiaries' analysis? • To what extent will / could the gender sensitive approach lead to an improved impact of the project? • What is the likelihood of increased gender equality beyond project end? • According to the OECD Gender Policy Marker how would you classify this project? 		X	X	X	X
Connectedness					
34. How far is the project is embedded in local structures?			X	X	X
35. To what extent have target groups and possibly other relevant interest groups / stakeholders been involved in the planning / implementation process?			X	X	X
36. What support has been provided from the relevant national, sectoral and budgetary policies?	X		X	X	X
37. Is any public and private sector policy support likely to continue after the project has finished?			X	X	X
38. Are project partners being properly developed (technically, financially and managerially) for continuing to deliver the project's benefits/services?			X	X	X

"X" indicates that the evaluation question is applicable to an individual project / country program

Specific-evaluation questions per country / program	IDMC	AID	DRC (food security)	Colombia (ICLA)	Myanmar (shelter)
Beneficiary selection					
39. Were there any established criteria for beneficiary selection and to what extent were they followed? Did selection criteria evolve over time? If so, why, and what has been the impact of this change both on the program and on the targeted population?			X	X	X
40. Were beneficiary selection criteria consistent among all programs? Were there any inequities in beneficiary selection between the programs?			X	X	X
NRC Partnership management					
41. Was the partner selection process transparent, equitable, well-managed and did it result in the selection of the highest-quality partners from among the candidates? Were the needs assessments submitted with the partner proposals adequate? How could it be improved?			X	X	X
42. How effective was NRC oversight of the partner projects? Were the internal structure and processes used by NRC for Partnership Management effective and well understood by all parties (NRC HQ staff, NRC field staff, Partner HQ staff, and Partner field staff)? What could be improved?			X	X	X
43. How effective are NRC monitoring and evaluation systems of the partner projects? How could these be improved? In particular, what steps could NRC take to assure that partner M&E responsibilities are adapted to partner capacity and capabilities?			X	X	X
44. How effective are partner monitoring and evaluation systems?			X	X	X
Lessons for future programs					
45. How can NRC assure that designs for future programs are appropriate and meet beneficiary needs and expectations?	X	X	X	X	X
46. Should NRC prioritize any one of the approaches used (shelter, IDP monitoring, FS with IGA, advocacy, ICLA) for future responses? If not, for future programming, what specific conditions would need to be fulfilled in order to choose the most appropriate from among all possible approaches?	X	X	X	X	X

Annex B: Sphere standard checklists¹¹

Food security:

- How has the disaster affected the different sources of food and income for each of the livelihood groups identified?
- How has it affected the usual seasonal patterns of food security for the different groups?
- How has it affected access to markets, market availability and prices of essential goods?
- For different livelihood groups, what are the different coping strategies and what proportion of people are engaged in them?
- How has this changed as compared with the pre-disaster situation?
- Which group or population is most affected?
- What are the short- and medium-term effects of coping strategies on people's financial and other assets?
- For all livelihood groups, and all vulnerable people, what are the effects of coping strategies on their health, general well-being and dignity? Are there risks associated with coping strategies?

Shelter:

- What are the particular risks for vulnerable people, including women, children, unaccompanied minors, persons with disabilities or chronic illnesses, due to the lack of adequate shelter and why?
- What is the impact on any host populations of the presence of displaced populations?
- What are the potential risks for conflict or discrimination among or between groups within the affected population?
- What are the material, financial and human resources of the affected populations to meet some or all of their urgent shelter needs?
- What are the issues regarding land availability, ownership and usage to meet urgent shelter needs, including temporary communal settlements where required?
- What are the issues facing potential host populations in accommodating displaced populations within their own dwellings or on adjacent land?
- What are the opportunities and constraints of utilising existing, available and unaffected buildings or structures to accommodate displaced populations temporarily?
- What is the topographical and local environmental suitability of using accessible vacant land to accommodate temporary settlements?
- What are the requirements and constraints of local authority regulations in developing shelter solutions?
- What household and livelihood support activities typically take place in or adjacent to the shelters of the affected population and how does the resulting space provision and design reflect these activities?
- What legal and environmentally sustainable livelihood support opportunities can be provided through the sourcing of materials and the construction of shelter and settlement solutions?
- What is the current availability of water for drinking and personal hygiene and
- What are the possibilities and constraints in meeting the anticipated sanitation needs?
- What is the current provision of social facilities (health clinics, schools, places of worship, etc.) and what are the constraints and opportunities of accessing these facilities?
- If communal buildings, particularly schools, are being used for shelter by displaced populations, what are the process and timeline for returning them to the intended use?
- What are the issues of concern for the host community?
- What are the organizational and physical planning issues of accommodating the displaced populations within the host community or within temporary settlements?
- What are the local environmental concerns regarding the local sourcing of construction materials?
- What are the local environmental concerns regarding the needs of the displaced population for fuel, sanitation, waste disposal, grazing for animals, if appropriate, etc.?

¹¹ Derived from Sphere Handbook 2011, p 214-216 and 278-283

Annex C: interview questionnaires / guidelines

Structures for interviews with stakeholders and actors involved in NRC PPA CHASE program

Objective: to gather information on

1. Relevance and effect of the program for the beneficiary (socio-economic, cultural etc.), differentiated by vulnerability, gender etc.
2. involvement with program formulation, implementation

a. primary stakeholders

Status, age, sex etc. of interviewee / focus group (number, composition, status)

- Benefits from NRC program (direct/indirect)
- Perception of the (quality of) NRC as HA provider
- Involvement in project (problem definition, implementation etc.)
- Side-effects of the NRC program?
- Unsolved issues?
- Project implementation involvement?

b. secondary beneficiaries (village chiefs, business men, school teachers, relevant civil servants , police officers, attorneys/ prosecutors etc.)

Status, age, sex etc.

- Benefits from NRC program (direct/indirect)
- Perception of the (quality of) NRC as HA organisation
- Involved in problem definition?
- Side-effects of the NRC program?
- Unsolved issues? Other expectations from NRC?
- Project implementation decision making / adjusting of the program?
- Quality of the intervention? Selection of beneficiaries? Political / corruptive implications?

Peer Organisations

Objective: to gather information on

1. relevance and effect of the program on other programs and whether peer programs had their effect on NRC
2. quality of program and organisation perceived and on cooperation and complementarity

Name of organisation, person interviewed, position

- Contacts with NRC? Time, intensity
- In the field where and in what context
- Complementarity between peer organisation's work and NRC's?
- Areas of added value to NRC's work?
- Areas of overlap? Consequences and/or solutions?
- Reputation of NRC's projects? At mngmnt. Level? At field level?
- Lessons learned, areas to improve

Field Officers

Objectives: to gather information on

1. Relevance and effect of the program for the beneficiary (socio-economic, cultural etc.), differentiated by vulnerability, gender etc.
2. involvement with program formulation, implementation, M&E
3. organisational place and responsibilities, capacity and capabilities in specific to the applicable humanitarian approach (ICLA, AID, FS/IGA, shelter, IDMC)

Areas to be covered: visits: frequency, who to meet, what to undertake, relative proportion of time undertaking various elements of work – project design, reporting, in-the-field M&E, working with expat, linkage with other FO's, peer organisations, other areas

Role within the organisation?

- (projects to follow? responsibilities? reporting undertaken / required? understanding of the overall strategy? contribution to this strategy?)

Project definition

- defining projects? Problem analysis, feasibility, desirability, acceptability / balancing, vulnerability perspective?

Effect of the program

- achievements toward overall goal? Beneficiaries reached? Short-term / long-term effects, side-effects

Capacity and capabilities

- Background, gaps between organisational expectations and skills? Constraints (time, otherwise)
- understanding of humanitarian issues? Best ways to support/develop people's livelihood/coping mechanisms? Covered by projects? Possible gaps – where and why?

Senior Management

Objectives: to gather information on

1. Relevance and effect of the program for the beneficiary (socio-economic, cultural etc.), differentiated by vulnerability, gender etc.
2. involvement with program formulation, implementation, M&E
3. organisational place and responsibilities, capacity and capabilities in specific to the applicable humanitarian approach (ICLA, AID, FS/IGA, shelter, IDMC)
4. lessons learned

Project definition

- defining projects? Problem analysis, feasibility, desirability, acceptability / balancing, vulnerability perspective? Reformulation

Overall strategy?

- contribution to this strategy?
- strategy translation into the project planning and the actual projects on-going? Other projects you feel would 'fit'/ should be developed to meet the strategic goals?

How is M&E set up / reporting? In terms of measuring process? Outcomes? Impact? Of the projects you are responsible/involved with?

Specific humanitarian approach? Integration with other assistance programs?

Effect of the program

- achievements toward overall goal? Beneficiaries reached? Short-term / long-term effects, side-effects
- Lessons learned?

Annex D: List of persons/institutions to be interviewed per country/global program

Department/function	name
<i>NRC Headquarters</i>	
Head of the Strategic Management Support department.	Ronny Rønning,
Heads of Sections	Adam Combs for Asia (Myanmar), Marit Backe for Central and West Africa (DRC), and Gry Ballestad for Latin America, Middle East and Caucasus (Colombia).
Manager for Project Logistics	Pål Wæraas
Monitoring and Reporting Coordinator	Andrew Wilson.
HQ Technical Advisers for the program sectors	Fernando de Medina Rosales for ICLA Selvi Vikran for food security Martin Suvatne and Jake Zarins for shelter.
Evaluation Steering Committee	Cara Winters, Thomas Qviller, Austen Davis
Financial Department	Irene Gjerde and Nicoline Nørgaard
Country Controllers for Columbia, DRC and Myanmar	DRC: Marianne Irion (PA) and the country coordinator Hanne Fjeldstad Myanmar: Kristian Boysen Colombia: Berit Faye-Peterson
<i>AID program</i>	
Advocacy Advisers in AID	Kirstie Farmer and Marit Glad,
<i>IDMC</i>	
Head of IDMC, Head of Finance and Administration Department	Kate Halff Pascale Guillot
<i>Colombia</i>	
Country Director, Atle Solberg Programme Director, Colombia Programme Adviser at head office,	Atle Solberg Andrea Naletto Berit Faye-Pedersen
UNHCR,	
<i>DRC</i>	
DRC Country Director, Programme Director Project Manager, , Logistics Manager, Finance & Administration Manager,	Alain Homsy, Pietro Galli Alain Burie Hassane Djibrine Leo Otieno
Peer INGOs, FAO, WFP, Pole Institute, MoAgr, camp management etc.	
<i>Myanmar</i>	
Country Director Project Manager	Christopher Bleers, Rafael Abis
UNHCR, peer INGOs, relevant ministries, etc.	

Annex E: Proposal for cost analysis per program

Program	Actual Output indicator	Proposed output indicator	Outcome	Proposed outcome indicator
Food Security /IGA	# of IDPs involved in Agricultural Production + IGA	# of trainings provided / hh # of tools distributed / hh	Camp population + neighbouring community have increased FS and IGA	Cost Comparison of : - (increase of) # of IDP households able to have two meals per day - (decrease of) # of IDP households that have to revert to negative coping mechanisms (e.g. begging, prostitution) with peer organization interventions
Shelter	# of durable shelters constructed and used appropriately	- Ibid - # of trainings	Conflict induced PADs live in secure and durable shelters which provide a platform for promoting livelihoods	Cost Comparison of : - appreciation score of shelters on security and durability by beneficiaries - Livelihood score with peer organization interventions
ICLA	# persons in need of international protection who are informed, counselled and assisted legally; # of public servants (m/f) trained on applicable international and national legal framework on refugee protection; # Colombians (m/f) in need of international protection who have been informed # of emblematic cases of SGBV documented	- ibid - ibid - ibid - ibid	Protection needs have been addressed through legal services for Colombian refugees in Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama	Cost comparison of - successful cases - awareness level of beneficiaries with peer organization interventions (?) or alternatively: - internal comparison of the yield of alternatives towards a given level of utility for the lowest cost (or the highest level of utility at a given cost)
AID	# and description of advocacy / policy initiatives towards UN, IASC or donors that fill an information/ analysis gap on durable solutions, in particular HLP or aim at influencing improved access, assistance and protection of PAD.	ibid	Attribution to provision of timely assistance and protection to PAD in new and ongoing emergencies with a focus on conflict and to empowerment of PAD to achieve durable solutions in post-conflict and protracted crises.	Cost comparison of - advocacy campaigns (?) - awareness level of beneficiaries with peer organization interventions or alternatively: - internal comparison of the yield of alternatives towards a given level of utility for the lowest cost (or the highest level of utility at a given cost)
IDMC	# of situations of conflict-induced displacement Situations monitored by	Ibid	Provision of information, analysis and training to improve	- internal comparison of the yield of alternatives towards a given level of utility for the lowest cost (or the highest level of utility at a

	IDMC # and description of in-country training workshops # and description of advocacy initiatives promoting response to disaster-induced displacement - Annual estimated # of displaced by rapid onset natural disaster available.	Ibid Ibid	responses to specific situations of displacement	given cost) or alternatively: - Picture the use alternative implementing agencies as control group and estimate the savings.
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Annex F: Documents for Desk study/review


Title	Location	obtained
evaluation manager PPA and GPAF -Coffey international Development	Oslo	x
annex 10 meta-log frame paper	Oslo	x
annexes 1-9 and 11-12	Oslo	x
food Security Policy_old	Oslo	x
ICLA Handbook	Oslo	x
ICLA policy_old	Oslo	x
NRC Evaluation Policy	Oslo	x
NRC 148719 IDMC Information to Business Case	Oslo	x
NRC 153361 PPA internal log frame	Oslo	x
NRC 154142 Annex to Log frame	Oslo	x
NRC 185574 Programme Policy version 2	Oslo	x
NRC 186228 PPA Business Case and Summary	Oslo	x
Shelter Handbook	Oslo	x
Shelter Policy_old	Oslo	x
NRC's Global Advocacy Strategy (2010-2012) and Increased Access Advocacy Work Plan	Oslo	
NRC's Humanitarian Strategy Towards the UN	Oslo	
Advocacy plan with policy and practice recommendations for strengthening the housing, land and property rights	Oslo	
Framework for Durable solutions	Oslo	
KPMG Due Diligence Check of PPA applicants	Oslo	
MoU PPA DFID-NRC + Original PPA Program proposal	Oslo	
Audit Account 2011	Oslo	
Baseline survey reports on the Results Framework	Oslo	
PM reports March 2012	Myanmar	x
CAD reports	Myanmar	x
Quarterly reports	Myanmar	x
Myanmar Annual report 2009, 2010	Myanmar	x
Myanmar Country strategy and work plan 2012	Myanmar	x
Shelter Evaluation report	Myanmar	
IDMC contribution and Expenses 2011	IDMC	x
2011 IDMC accounts auditors report	IDMC	x
Handbook 2006	IDMC	x
HR guidance IDMC March 2012	IDMC	x
New country categories July 2011	IDMC	x
Activity report 2011	IDMC	x
Qu-2011-1 to 4	IDMC	x
Appeal 2011	IDMC	x
Strategy 2012-2014 and Plan of Action 2012	IDMC	x
Activity report 2011	AID	
Qu-2011-1 to 4	AID	
Appeal 2011	AID	
Strategy 2012-2014 and Plan of Action 2012	AID	
June 2010: assessment on durable solutions in the camp of Mugunga 3	DRC	
CAD reports	DRC	
Quarterly reports	DRC	

Title	Location	obtained
DRC Annual report 2009, 2010	DRC	
DRC Country strategy and work plan 2012	DRC	
DRC Country Programme Evaluation	DRC	x
Colombia Evaluation 2011	Colombia	x
DFID NRC Colombia Project Overall budget	Colombia	x
DFID Proposal Summary NRC Colombia	Colombia	x
CAD reports	Colombia	
Quarterly reports	Colombia	
Colombia Annual report 2009, 2010	Colombia	
Colombia Country strategy and workplan 2012	Colombia	


ANNEX 6: DFID PPA funding allocated to the various countries/programs

Budget overview of the first year (april 2011-march 2012) breakdown to the various projects				
		Project	2011-12	%
Dfid PPA (GBP)			£ 279.746	11%
IDMC			£ 152.589	6%
**AID/IPD				
Part of salary for Protection & Advocacy Advisers in DRC, Iraq and South Sudan			£ 70.191	
	HLP	NOFY1111	£ 70.191	
	ACC	NOFY1112	£ 12.207	
Colombia		COFL1113	£ 381.472	15%
DRC		CDFK1108	£ 330.609	13%
Iraq		IQFK1101	£ 356.040	14%
Kenya/ Somalia		SOFS1109	£ 330.609	13%
Myanmar		MMFS1104	£ 279.746	11%
OPT		ILFS1104	£ 101.726	4%
Pakistan		PKFS1104	£ 330.609	13%
TOTAL			£2.543.145	100%

ANNEX 7 – Organigram AID/IDMC




New Structure



ANNEX 8: Programme area's in countries evaluated

Myanmar



Colombia Region¹



¹ <http://www.unhcr.org/4fc880c0b.html>

Annex 9: Presentation of Interviewee data

<i>Interviewee characteristic</i>	<i>Method of interview</i>	<i># of people / organis. interviewed</i>	<i>Man/women</i>	<i>location</i>
MYANMAR				
1. Peer organisations	Semi-structured, face to face	4	3/1	Tanintharya Region
		6	4/2	Yangon
	Semi-structured, phone	2	2	Yangon, Bangkok
2. Primary beneficiaries	Household interviews, semi-structured	8 hh	+/- 15/10	Tanintharya Region
3. CBOs	Group discussion, semi-structured	1 group	2/1	Tanintharya Region
4. NRC staff	Group and individual discussions, semi-structured interviews	10	7/3	Yangon
DRC				
1. Peer organisations /partners organizations	Semi-structured, group discussion (FAO) / face to face /phone (Concern)	11 / 8	8 / 3	Goma
2. Primary beneficiaries	Household interviews, semi-structured (rabbit breeding / MUSO)	35hh	10 / 25	Mugunga neighbouring area and Camp (Goma)
	Group discussion, semi-structured (soap/maracuja juice/ mushroom/ MUSO)	53 / 5	17 / 36	
3. Secondary stakeholders (donors, local authorities, UN Coordinating body – OCHA)	Semi-structured, face to face	8 / 5	6 / 2	Goma / Mugunga area and Camp
4. NRC staff	Group and individual discussions, semi-structured interviews	9	7 / 2	Goma / Mugunga camp

<i>Interviewee characteristic</i>	<i>Method of interview</i>	<i># of people / organis. interviewed</i>	<i>Man/women</i>	<i>location</i>
5. Implementing partners	Group discussion, semi-structured	14 / 7	12 / 2	Goma / Mugunga camp
Colombia Region				
1. Peer organisations (ICRC / PCS) partners (CODHES, CCJ, UNHCR, "Mision Escalabriniana")	Semi-structured, face to face Semi-structured, group discussion/face to face	2 / 2 14 / 4	0 / 2 4 / 10	Bogota Bogota (Colombia), Quito/Lago Agrio (Ecuador), S.Cristobal Tachira (Venezuela)
3. Primary beneficiaries	Group discussion, semi-structured	3 persons	0 / 3	S. Antonio Tachira (Venezuela)
5. Secondary stakeholders (national/local authorities)	Face to face / phone discussion, semi-structured	9 / 6	6 / 3	Bogota (Colombia), Quito/Lago Agrio (Ecuador), S.Cristobal Tachira (Venezuela), Panama city
6. NRC staff	Group and individual discussions, semi-structured interviews	13	6 / 7	Bogota and Cucuta (Colombia), Quito/Lago Agrio (Ecuador), S.Cristobal Tachira (Venezuela), Panama city
7. Implementing partners	Group and individual discussions/ face to face/ phone, semi-structured interviews	10 / 6	5 / 5	Bogota (Colombia), Quito/Lago Agrio (Ecuador), S.Cristobal Tachira (Venezuela), Panama city
IDMC / AID				
2. Staff	Semi-structured face to face discussions, phone	8	0 / 8	Geneva / Oslo
4. Partners (UNHCR /OCHA)	Face to face, semi-structured	2	0 / 2	Geneva

Aggregation of evaluation matrix		
	score	weight
Relevance / programme design		2
Efficiency		2
Effectiveness		2
Results / Impact		2
Cross cutting issues		2
Connectedness		1
Partnership management		1
Additionality		2
Lessons learned / learning environment		1

overall score

Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation Question	assessment criteria/ fields of observation/ indicators/data elements/ Indicators	Sources of information ¹						Rating ²					
		observ	pri SH interv	peer interv	IPs interv	NRC staff	desk study	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(n)
Relevance / programme design													
1. To what extent does the NRC PPA CHASE program represent and respond to the needs	- (quality of) needs assessments,	x	x		x	x	x						

¹ Observations, primary stakeholder interviews, peer interviews, implementing partner interviews, NRC staff interviews/discussions, desk study and document review

² (a) = very good; (b) = good; (c) = adequate but some problems; (d) = inadequate; (e) = serious problems; (n) = not relevant

Evaluation Question	assessment criteria/ fields of observation/ indicators/data elements/ Indicators	Sources of information ¹						Rating ²					
		observ	pri SH interv	peer interv	IPs interv	NRC staff	desk study	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(n)
and priorities of constituencies and target beneficiaries?	timeliness, priorities defined, definition and selection of target beneficiaries - involvement of beneficiaries in project design/implementation - level of adequacy of planned inputs/activities (vs needs, constraints)												
2. To what degree have NRC activities balanced achieving the greatest impact while targeting the most vulnerable and marginalized?	- definition of marginalized / vulnerability, selection criteria of beneficiaries - extent of coverage of most vulnerable categories vs overall impact in project design	x	x		x	x	x						
3. Going forward, in what ways can NRC improve the design and implementation of these activities to achieve greater relevance?	- adequacy of proper reporting, int + ext evaluation, documentation of best practices, learning environment , evolving beneficiary selection criteria - openness to alternative approaches	x			x	x	x						
4. As presently designed, is the intervention logic holding true and coherent?	- level of quality / coherence of log frame, theory of change - quality of formulation of OVIs, OO, PP - achievability of PP, formulation of risks and assumptions				x	x	x						
5. Is the current design sufficiently supported by all stakeholders?	- level of involvement /influence of various SH (especially prim SH) in design - level and adequacy of institutional strengthening and local ownership	x	x		x	x	x						
6. Has a handover strategy been considered and understood by the partners?	- existence and adequacy of exit strategy in relation to sustainability/ connectedness		x		x	x	x						

Evaluation Question	assessment criteria/ fields of observation/ indicators/data elements/ Indicators	Sources of information ¹						Rating ²					
		observ	pri SH interv	peer interv	IPs interv	NRC staff	desk study	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(n)
7. Is the range of activities realistic with regard to the stakeholders' capacities?	- existence and appropriateness of timescale - level of familiarity of SH with and appropriateness of proposed activities - adequacy of stakeholders' capacity assessment	x	x		x	x	x						
8. Is the current design sufficiently taking cross-cutting issues into account? (see separate section)	- level of attention paid to environment, gender, human rights, protection etc.	x	x		x	x	x						
9. Is the program appropriate in the humanitarian context?	- complementarity to other hum. actors / donors, existence of synergies - appreciation by other Hum actors		x	x	x	x	x						
Efficiency													
10. To what extent can NRC demonstrate cost efficiency, including an understanding of program costs, the factors driving those costs, and linkages to performance and ability to achieve efficiency gains?	- management assessment , cost efficiency and variance analysis - identification of cost drivers and their management, cost-awareness - adequacy of and adherence to financial / log. procedures and handbooks - level of adequacy and quality of fin. systems (Agresso)	x		x	x	x	x						
11. Going forward, could NRC reduce costs without sacrificing quality	- cost-efficiency analysis, analysis of differences in quality between NRC and peer organisations - Analysis of direct/indirect costs and comparisons with peer organisations - existence/ intention to multi-year planning/pool-funding	x		x	x	x	x						

Evaluation Question	assessment criteria/ fields of observation/ indicators/data elements/ Indicators	Sources of information ¹						Rating ²						
		observ	pri SH interv	peer interv	IPs interv	NRC staff	desk study	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(n)	
12. What were the costs per project, and how did these compare with other humanitarian projects? Was there any correlation between project cost and project quality (in terms of design, implementation and results)?	- unit cost analysis and peer program comparison, - analysis of differences in quality between NRC and peer organisations and beneficiary appreciation	x		x	x	x	x							
13. How well is the programme managed?	- availability/usage of means/inputs, timeliness and adequacy of implementation of activities, use of workplans, adequacy of organisational structure	x			x	x	x							
	- quality of NRC's internal monitoring (CAD), procurement and reporting system - (previous) recommendations been taken into consideration?	x				x	x							
14. How does the intervention articulate / coordinates with other NRC projects and similar interventions	- programme design, planning, level of integration with other CCs of NRC - level of active presence in sectoral / HA meetings	x		x		x	x							
Effectiveness														
15. What are the distinctive offerings of NRC in the humanitarian sector in the selected country program and advocacy/displacement monitoring activities?	- Quality of inputs and delivered services, - level of technical expertise and capacities, field presence - degree of reaching HA standards (Sphere, INEE etc.) - quality of relationship with in line authorities/replicability prospects	x	x	x	x	x	x							
16. Going forward, how can NRC leverage its strengths to improve the humanitarian effort in	- Presence and role in HA meetings	x		x	x	x	x							

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selected advocacy campaigns, country programs, and displacement monitoring	- adequate training of staff and IPs - Reference and/or articles in humanitarian literature and media/Content and nature of partnerships												
17. As presently implemented what is the likelihood of the Outputs to be achieved? What are the factors for improvement?	- Level of progress made compared to baseline data and output indicators in LF matrix - existence of / awareness of NRC staff for alternative approaches	x	x		x	x	x						
18. Are the targets for the Outputs still appropriate and are they regularly been reported against?	- level of detail / quality of formulation of the targets in relation to Outputs - timeliness and quality of monitoring and reporting	x			x	x	x						
19. In how far are external factors influencing the achievement of the Outputs?	- LF matrix assumptions - quality and level of appropriateness of risk mitigation measures / plans	x	x		x	x	x						
20. How does the intervention complement/create a distinction with initiatives implemented by other humanitarian actors?	- satisfaction survey of beneficiaries, compared to other HA initiatives; - Existence of complementary activities with other HA actors	x	x	x	x	x	x						
Results / Impact													
21. How well is the project achieving its intended outcomes?	- Level of progress made towards outcome indicators in LF matrix - satisfaction survey of beneficiaries	x	x			x	x						
22. What impact has the NRC PPA CHASE	- level of satisfaction and ownership of	x	x	x	x	x	x						

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program on the lives of beneficiaries through: - country programs - AID program - IDMC program	primary beneficiaries, - level of appreciation / credit given by peer organisations / sec. beneficiaries - existence of multiplier effects												
23. Have there been any positive or negative unplanned effects on the target groups arising from the projects?	- effects on e.g. social coherence and functioning, socio-economic dynamics, environment, - existence of long-term impact analyses, beneficiary feed-back	x	x		x	x	x						
24. How are unplanned negative effects on the target groups or other non-targeted communities being mitigated?	- existence, extent and quality/veracity of risks and mitigation plans - level of awareness of project staff / application of 'Do no harm principles'	x	x		x	x	x						
Cross cutting issues													
25. Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the project design/strategy?	- existence of gender-differentiated beneficiaries' analysis, beneficiary selection criteria and implementation - Existence of gender mainstreaming indicators in the LF matrix	x	x		x	x	x						
26. considering the following aspects of gender mainstreaming: • To what extent will / could the gender sensitive approach lead to an improved impact of the project? • What is the likeliness of increased gender equality beyond project end?	- disaggregation of data by sex - hierarchical position of women - level of adequate and systematic identification and support to gender related problems/vulnerability - classification of the programme according to the OECD Gender Policy Marker	x	x		x	x	x						
27. Did any environmental issues emerge during	- existence of proper environmental	x	x		x	x	x						

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implementation? Were the issues addressed in program design? How were they managed, and what were the consequences?	practices, capacity to deal with critical risks - level of awareness of project staff - level of inclusion in project design - level of adherence to the 'Do no Harm' approach												
28. Did those who needed protection and are specifically targeted by NRC have received sufficient level of protection?	- design of programme, planning - level of coordination between provision of legal and advocacy services and effectuated level of protection - level of satisfaction of beneficiaries - types and adequacy of protection modes provided (denunciation, persuasion, mobilization, capacity building, substitution)	x	x		x	x	x						
Connectedness													
29. To what extent are program activities sustainable / connected (linking emergency response to rehab/development, policy development, advocacy)?	- level of embedding in local structures, of involvement of prim beneficiaries, national/local authorities + policies - connection with public/private sector - quality and adequacy of training of primary beneficiaries	x	x		x	x	x						
30. In how far is the program developing partners / institutions capacity to take over project activities?	- existence/quality and level of technical, managerial and financial cap. Building efforts, level of delegation - existence of exit strategies in project plans /design	x			x	x	x						

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Partnership management													
31. How appropriate are NRCs partners and partnership and how was the selection done? What is the added value of NRCs partners	- existence and quality of partner selection protocols, terms and processes - quality of training delivered to IP - evaluation of IPs performance	x			x	x	x						
32. How effective was NRC's oversight of partners' projects	- NRC's M&E systems of partner's projects, internal structure - partners own M&E system, compliance, audits	x			x	x	x						
33. How equitable / dependant is the relation with NRC's partners	- level of delegation and exchange, existence and level of other partnerships, longevity and nature of contracts	x			x	x	x						
Additionality													
34. To what extent does DFID funding influence and impact NRC targeting strategy?	- level of awareness/consciousness of nature of DFID funding of NRC staff - existence of new attributable programmes and strategies	x		x		x	x						
35. In what ways does the PPA CHASE mechanism and overall approach taken by DFID enable NRC to provide this type of distinctive expertise and service?	- leverage of additional, comparable funding - attributable influence on peer organisations and partners	x		x	x	x	x						
36. To what extent has NRC delivered results at improved efficiency specifically due to receipt of DFID funds?	- existence of traceable and attributable multiplier effects - level of attributable Value for Money - attributable organisational development	x		x		x	x						

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37. To what extent have the <i>country programs</i> directly impacted the lives of beneficiaries, positive and negative, as described by the PPA CHASE logframe?	- survey of beneficiaries - level of appreciation / credit given by peer organisations / sec. beneficiaries	x	x	x	x	x	x						
38. To what extent have <i>advocacy and displacement monitoring</i> caused positive change as described by the PPA CHASE logframe?	- level of satisfaction of beneficiaries - Reference and/or articles in humanitarian literature and media - level of appreciation / credit given by peer organisations / sec. beneficiaries	x	x	x	x	x	x						
Lessons learned / learning environment													
39. How can NRC assure that designs for future programs are appropriate and meet beneficiary needs and expectations?	- existence and use of int and ext evaluations / monitoring reports - existence/quality and use of institutional memory / internal documentation / lessons learned	x				x	x						
40. In how far does NRC's M&E and documentation system contributes to a healthy and productive learning environment	-quality/soundness and usability of the M&E system, - Existence/quality of project (management) documentation	x				x	x						