



## **Final Report**

Evaluation of NRC's 2012-13 protection  
and advocacy work in the DRC

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## Glossary of terms

DMG	Do More Good (network)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
GAA	Global Access Advisor
GPC	Global Protection Cluster
ICLA	Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (programme)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MONUSCO	UN Stabilization Mission in DRC
NGOs	Non-government organisations
PAA	Protection Advocacy Advisor
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
RRMP	Rapid Response to Movement of Population
SFCG	Search for a Common Ground
SRP	Strategic Response Plan (UN)
ToC	Theory of Change
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

## Executive Summary

This report is an evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council's (NRC) 2012-13 advocacy and protection initiative in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The aim of the evaluation was to assess outcome level results and feed into developing strategy, tactics and monitoring mechanisms for future activities. Methods used included an onsite visit to the DRC (Goma and Kinshasa) and semi-structured interviews and group discussions with 59 persons (16 NRC staff and 43 external).

*Background:* NRC initiated a project in early 2012 to look at humanitarian access and non-military approaches to protection. A key foundation for this initiative was the commissioning of a research study on non-military protection strategies in DRC by an external protection specialist, Liam Mahony of Fieldview Solutions, which resulted in both an internal and external report. These reports were the basis for a range of advocacy activities launched by NRC in 2013, including presentations and briefings in DRC and concerned capitals with operational staff and policy-makers of governments, non-government organisations (NGOs), international organisations and United Nations (UN) agencies.

### Findings

Overall, this evaluation found that the NRC advocacy created visibility for the issue of non-military protection in DRC provoking further reflection, which in some cases, led to changes in policies and practices, most notably within NRC and other humanitarian actors in North Kivu. More intangible aspects such as the impact on influencing approaches and provoking reflection about protection were more difficult to measure – but it is thought that the advocacy did have an impact in this regard.

**Outcomes:** Progress found is listed by the three objectives of NRC's advocacy:

1) *Strengthen NRC's own protection on the ground (in North Kivu):* in emergency response, NRC has introduced a protection element into its multi-sectorial assessments. NRC is also planning a new protection approach for first entries into conflict areas, with a pilot underway. NRC has reviewed its 2014 strategy and strengthened protection aspects, notably for Education and Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA). NRC has budgeted to integrate three additional advocacy/protection staff within the North Kivu team.

2) *Strengthen the practice of other humanitarian actors in the DRC:* at the policy level, the work of NRC with the Protection Cluster of North Kivu (Goma) resulted in establishing a working group on engagement with armed groups and revision of their guidelines. This focus was advocated by the Cluster at higher levels, resulting in a stronger prevention emphasis in the 2014 *UN Strategic Response Plan* (SRP) for DRC. The notion of further reflection and tackling root causes of the conflict contributed to the thinking that led to the creation of the *Do More Good* (DMG) Network. It was also reported that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) used the advocacy report for their 2014 DRC strategy and to strengthen the protection component of the DRC Pooled Fund. In 2013, a protection specialist was assigned to the UNICEF-led Rapid Response to Movement of Population (RRMP) programme. Advocating for greater contact with armed groups was taken up by the Protection Cluster and NGOs in

North Kivu. When interviewed, some half (5 out of 10) of NGO participants of the armed groups workshops could provide examples of how they had either adapted their approaches or in some cases increased their contact with armed groups as a result of the training.

3) *Strengthen the approach of the wider international community:* Stakeholders reported that the external report fed into their thinking on non-military protection, and in some cases this extended beyond the humanitarian actors in DRC, for example to the wider protection community and donor governments. The external report was issued at a time when the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) had just introduced its new “active peacekeeping” with the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) which was met with considerable apprehension. Therefore, the international community was interested in alternative and complementary non-military approaches to protection, which resulted in a receptive response to the ideas of the report, for example when presented to the UN Security Council C34 Protection of Civilians Expert Group (largely responsible for drafting the MONUSCO mandate). Although no direct action to date was seen as a result within the international community, it was thought that NRC’s advocacy fed into their thinking and reflection on protection in DRC.

Additional results to those anticipated including strengthening its role within the Protection Cluster of North Kivu; heightened positioning of NRC as protection actor; and providing an input into NRC’s global protection policy.

This evaluation identified the following factors that facilitated or hindered results achieved:

<b>Facilitated</b>	<b>Hindered</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Timing:</i> the timing of the external report corresponded with the introduction of the FIB by MONUSCO which brought heightened interest in DRC and protection.</li> <li>• <i>Type of analysis:</i> the in-depth and thought-provoking analysis provided by the external report increased its distribution, consumption and use.</li> <li>• <i>Operational grounding:</i> the analysis and “asks” of both reports were drawn from field-based experiences providing credibility to the advocacy.</li> <li>• <i>Access to humanitarian organisations and coordinating mechanisms:</i> within North Kivu, NRC had ready access to the Protection Cluster and other coordinating forums, facilitating discussion and action.</li> <li>• <i>Openness of NRC programmes:</i> NRC programmes in Goma were mostly open and willing to discuss and consider changes to the protection aspects of their work.</li> <li>• <i>Use of outside protection experts:</i> the use of outside experts on protection and DRC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Message complexity:</i> the external report was long for an advocacy piece (50 pages), lacked an executive summary and contained multiple recommendations and asks (some 30) making it difficult for many to digest it in its entirety.</li> <li>• <i>Challenge to follow-up initiatives:</i> it proved challenging for NRC to follow up all initiatives launched and implement a more long-term strategy.</li> <li>• <i>Limited action in Kinshasa:</i> limited focus was put on actions in Kinshasa where potential influence would have been possible with humanitarian actors (e.g. UN).</li> <li>• <i>Limited action internationally:</i> the potential interest created at the global level was not fully capitalised on.</li> <li>• <i>“Success” of armed protection:</i> the reports were issued at a time when MONUSCO had little evidence to show that their “active peacekeeping” was successful. However, the withdrawal and surrender of the M23 in North Kivu in late</li> </ul>

<p>(Liam Mahony and Jason Stearns) provided additional credibility for the advocacy.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Credibility</i>: NRC is viewed as an effective and credible organisation; therefore the humanitarian community was also receptive to messages disseminated.</li> </ul>	<p>2013/14 created some renewed faith in armed protection and the need to revise thinking on non-military protection.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Inconsistency with NRC's Principles in Practice advocacy</i>: the external report advocated for a greater role of humanitarian actors in peace-building. NRC Brussels saw this as potentially inconsistent with NRC's Principle in Practice advocacy.</li> <li>• <i>NRC's position on non-military protection</i>: the advocacy reports were released under the Fieldview Solution name which created independent credibility. But for some, NRC's link to the report was not clear - to what extent NRC supported the analysis and "asks" of the reports.</li> </ul>
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*Longer term goals*: As the NRC's advocacy in DRC was launched less than a year ago, it is too early to estimate its specific contribution to NRC's longer-term advocacy. However, given the interest generated by the advocacy outside the DRC and its potential impact on NRC's approach to protection (through influencing NRC's policy and programmes), the evaluation is able to assert that the contribution has been positive to date. A more significant contribution and subsequent assessment will depend on the investment in further sustainable advocacy activities.

**Activities**: the advocacy reports were used proactively as a foundation for advocacy activities. The effectiveness of the activities was closely linked to their geographic location. Most successes were seen with activities in Goma where the Protection Advocacy Advisor (PAA) is based. Fewer activities (thus fewer results) were seen in Kinshasa as well as at the international level. Following is an assessment of the main activities as identified by this evaluation:

- *Advocacy reports*: the reports were considered as valuable by persons interviewed, particularly their thought-provoking analysis and "asks" even if long and complex. The research process used for the reports provided legitimacy for the resulting advocacy.
- *Press work*: a press release was issued for the release of the external report in April 2013 attracting coverage and an additional release during the capture of Goma by the M23 in November 2013, resulting in interviews with the international media. Apart from these two releases, there was no known press strategy or plan for the advocacy.
- *Lobby meetings*: the NRC staff together with the external consultant conducted various meetings to discuss the findings of the advocacy report with stakeholders in DRC, USA, and Europe. Participants saw these meetings as very positive and useful. Nevertheless for those held outside of Goma, some felt that there was little follow-up on the points discussed.

- *Workshops and training:* various workshops were held with Liam Mahony in DRC in June and November 2013. These workshops aimed to present the report and solicit feedback; to analyse armed groups; and to train humanitarian workers on protection mainstreaming and dialogue with armed groups. Feedback from the workshops was positive, particularly concerning the discussions around dialogue with armed groups.
- *Policy work:* the main policy work was in supporting the Protection Cluster in Goma with the revision of their guidelines on armed groups and providing input into the creation/revision of broader protection policies. The main challenge seen is this work was that there was limited monitoring as to NRC's contribution: into *what, when* and with *what results*.
- *Coalition-building:* the main coalition-building was carried out in collaboration with the Protection Cluster in Goma. There was little coalition-building outside of North Kivu, where the advocacy was perceived as a "solo" NRC operation.

**Management and coordination:** While the research and report writing phase was well thought out, planning was limited in that there was no known detailing/mapping of policies or key moments to influence and no updated plan of action. Given the relatively small team that worked on the initiative, the coordination worked well in terms of determining responsibilities and tasks to be carried out. There was no known tracking by NRC of progress made on the various "asks" in the report or the different initiatives taken. There was also no known summary of media coverage of the two press actions. A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) matrix was created for the broader access advocacy project but it was not used actively for this initiative (see section 6 for M&E proposals).

<i>Conclusion</i>	<i>Recommendation</i>
<p><b>A. Focus:</b> an analysis of the most concrete achievements to date illustrates that it was mostly found at the programme level. For example, NRC in emergency response and UNICEF's RRMP programme. It was also noted that the advocacy reports emphasized precise and specific "asks" for this. While not denying the potential long-term impact of the advocacy on broader reflection and issues, success to date was seen mostly with these specific "asks". The external report was also challenging in that it was broad in scope implying that not all messages and "asks" could have the same level of attention –and ultimately some would be "lost" in the mix.</p>	<p>Consider limiting the number of key messages and "asks" in future advocacy initiatives to a manageable number (e.g. under ten) with clear targets in mind – and as specific as feasible.</p>
<p><b>B. Plan of Action:</b> NRC's advocacy was seen as positively creating many derivatives with the potential to exert influence in different ways, for example, through training, direct policy work or coalition building. The feedback indicated that stakeholders are now expecting NRC to follow up on these various activities – mostly in Goma (both internally and externally). Given the potential created by NRC, this feedback would be worth considering. NRC in Goma will not be able to follow up on all activities to satisfy</p>	<p>Create a plan of action for the 2014 follow-up of the NRC advocacy in Goma extracting main priorities from the reports.</p>

<p>all stakeholders. Therefore each activity would have to be assessed and prioritized. For the basis of the advocacy, given the richness of the two advocacy reports, this evaluation believes it would not be necessary to commission further research; it would be more important to consider how the existing reports could be further broken down and updated extracting priority messages set (see next conclusion).</p>	
<p><b>C. Messages:</b> as noted above, NRC’s advocacy contained multiple messages and “asks”. Some of these messages were for broader long-term issues, such as root causes and other on more specific points such as field activities of NGOs. This evaluation found that the messages that resonated mostly with stakeholders were those that were considered to have potential to bring about change, i.e. at the policy and programme level of humanitarian organisations in DRC. Messages on conflict resolution and broader longer term issues were difficult to be acted upon by these actors. But the advocacy was seen as lacking sufficient focus on this level, i.e. political level in Kinshasa, Brussels or New York. Future advocacy may need to address these specific levels of focus and design activities accordingly. Messages should also be reconsidered in the light of the new situation in Kivu.</p>	<p>For future NRC advocacy in DRC, re-consider the focus of the messages and determine which messages should be considered as priority.</p>
<p><b>D. International/national level:</b> beyond the advocacy in Goma, NRC created some visibility and interest but could not yet fully capitalise on this. The fact that some points in the external report were taken into consideration for national level policies with humanitarian organisations illustrates the potential for influence at the Kinshasa level. At the international level, interest was expressed (i.e. with the GPC), not only concerning protection in DRC, but its potential for application in other contexts. This shows that NRC’s advocacy on protection could also feed further into global advocacy where its potential impact could be greater, but it would require further resources (staff) and clarity on NRC’s position (see below). This would also concern NRC’s work in global locations where it does not have a permanent presence, such as New York. This would imply greater involvement from NRC Geneva (who have responsibility for New York) and Brussels both in the strategy development and delivery.</p>	<p>For future NRC advocacy on non-military protection, consider the potential at the national and international level and allocate resources accordingly, both within the DRC operation and strategic locations such as Geneva, New York and Brussels.</p>
<p><b>E. Monitoring:</b> Similar to the challenges faced in follow-up of the various activities, difficulties were also detected with the monitoring progress. This meant that possible “wins” were missed and opportunities to progress further may have been overlooked. Suggestions for a basic monitoring approach are proposed in section six of this report.</p>	<p>Future NRC advocacy in DRC should consider the use of two basic monitoring tools as detailed in section six of this report.</p>

<p><b>F. NRC's position on non-military protection:</b> NRC's advocacy was based on the research and reports, which were identified as the Fieldview Solutions products. This had the advantage of giving NRC more flexibility how to utilize the analysis and various "asks" in the reports. At the same time, it was not clear if NRC supported all or some of the "asks" in the reports. This was revealed in the differences with NRC Brussels and the potential inconsistency with the NRC's Principle in Practice advocacy.</p>	<p>NRC at the global level should consider determining and clearly communicating its position on non-military advocacy and ensure that advocacy in DRC and elsewhere is consistent with it.</p>
<p><b>G. Protection mainstreaming and Do No Harm with NRC:</b> One of the significant achievements of NRC's advocacy in DRC was its ability to bring about change to NRC's programmes, notably introducing stronger protection elements in emergency response and planning to do so in other programmes. Matched with a greater staff awareness of Do No Harm, this indicates a potential for a strong protection-focused country operation. Considering that NRC is present in some 20 countries, the experience in DRC on strengthening its protection focus is worth considering for elsewhere.</p>	<p>NRC should reflect on the experience of strengthening protection within its programmes in DRC and see to what extent this could be applied to other countries where NRC operates.</p>



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# 1. Introduction

This report is an evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council's (NRC) 2012-13 advocacy and protection initiative in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The aim of this consultancy was to assess outcome level results and feed into developing strategy, tactics and monitoring mechanisms for future activities.

## 2. Evaluation Questions and Methodology

The following key objectives were defined for the evaluation:

- To assess to what extent the initiative's objectives and related outcomes were achieved;
- To determine the effectiveness of the different activities carried out;
- To provide conclusions and recommendations for the continuation of the initiative as well as NRC's global advocacy and protection work;
- To provide recommendations for the future monitoring of outcome indicators.

For each of these objectives, a series of questions were elaborated that formed the basis of this evaluation (as detailed in the Inception Report, annex 4).

The main methods used for this evaluation were semi-structured interviews, group discussions, document analysis and an onsite visit to DRC (Goma and Kinshasa). The evaluation endeavoured to estimate the level of contribution of the initiative to any changes seen at the outcome level. The evaluation essentially covered the 24 months period from January 2012 to December 2013.

In total, 59 persons were canvassed for this evaluation: 16 NRC staff and 43 external stakeholders, mainly in DRC but also other locations including Brussels, Geneva, London, New York, Oslo and Washington DC. A list of persons interviewed is found at annex 2. The interview guide used is found at annex 5. A list of the main documents consulted for this evaluation is found at annex 3. Information on the authors of this report can be found at annex 6.


## 3. Overview of the Initiative

Following decades of conflict in DRC, a variety of responses to protect civilians had met with limited success. Focus was increasingly placed on the deployment of peacekeepers and military actions, mainly in Eastern DRC, which had mixed results. Against this backdrop, NRC initiated a project in early 2012 to look at humanitarian access and non-military approaches to protection. The objectives of the project were to strengthen:

- NRC's own approach to protection on the ground;
- The practice of other humanitarian actors in the DRC; and
- The approach of the wider international community to include non-military protection approaches to complement the efforts of the UN peacekeepers.

A key foundation for this initiative was the commissioning of a research study on non-military protection strategies in DRC by an external protection specialist, Liam Mahony of Fieldview Solutions. This study, carried out in 2012, resulted in both an external report “*Non-military strategies for civilian protection in the DRC*” and an internal report for NRC use “*Direct protection impact, Protection Mainstreaming and “Do No Harm”: Reflections on NRC’s work in the eastern Congo*”. Both reports were issued under the Fieldview Solutions name and not as official NRC publications.

The findings of this research study were the basis for a range of advocacy activities launched by NRC in 2013, including presentations and briefings in DRC and concerned capitals with operational staff and policy-makers of governments, non-government organisations (NGOs), international organisations and United Nations (UN) agencies. The following timeline maps out the main research and advocacy activities carried out:



## 4. Findings

Overall, this evaluation found that the NRC advocacy created visibility for the issue of non-military protection in DRC provoking further reflection, which in some cases, led to changes in policies and practices, most notably within NRC and other humanitarian actors in North Kivu. This could be considered the most significant changes seen as a result of the advocacy. The next page contains the Theory of Change (ToC) for the broader access advocacy project, of which this advocacy was part of. The ToC is marked with comments on the main findings as they relate to this ToC.

**IMPACT: Greater protective impact of the efforts of the international community**

**OUTCOME: Actions taken by targets to improve performance**

Actions taken by target to advance the issue in line with NRC recommendations (establishment of WG, action points)

*Actions taken – mainly in Goma: NRC and Protection Cluster*

NRC recommendations reflected in targeted policies/actions plans/ strategies of targets

*Changes seen mainly in NRC Goma plans & UN plans for DRC on preventative & mainstreaming protection*

Implementation/enforcement of policy (funding allocations, roll-out plans developed/implemented)

*Implementation seen with NRC Goma programmes (e.g. emergency response), protection element with UNICEF RRMP & some NGO – armed groups dialogue*

*One element found not featured: key stakeholders aware of NRC main “asks” and incorporated in reflection*

**OUTCOME: Target knowledge of issue, solutions and incentives to act**

NRC’s key messages featured in targeted media and literature

*NRC’s messages found in specialized media – but not an important relay for this advocacy*

NRC’s key messages featured in events/trainings organised by others

*More than “messages featured” – NRC advocacy was main topic of training, e.g. Goma Cluster workshops*

Issue featured on the agenda and discussed in targeted fora

*Issue was discussed in key fora – limitation seen in moving to “action”*

**OUTPUT: Initiatives undertaken by NRC to promote change**

*Tailored briefs not developed*

Tailored briefs for different targets with clear recommendations for action and incentives to act

Electronic dissemination of materials and dissemination of hard copies

Lobby meetings with targets

«Launch» events of reports/ presentations of findings

DRC non-military solutions report (gaps in response and suggested improvements) + internal report

*Issue not pitched to web fora*

Issue pitched to web-based discussion fora

Outreach to targets to ensure issue is discussed in events and trainings

Workshops and seminars organised by NRC

Joint events organised with allies

*All activities described organised – most joint events done with Goma Protection Cluster*

## **4.1. Outcomes**

### **4.1.1. What progress has been made to achieving the objectives and related outcomes?**

Concerning visibility of the issues raised by NRC's advocacy, there was an impression that most people were more familiar with the overall *idea* of the external report rather than its precise content. The report was known by virtually all interviewed, particularly through the associated research interviews, workshops and outreach, and its reach seems to have been greater than for most advocacy policy papers, according to persons interviewed who receive regularly advocacy briefs and papers.

The points below summarise progress linked specifically to the three objectives of NRC's advocacy. More intangible aspects such as the impact on influencing approaches and provoking reflection about protection were more difficult to measure – but it is thought that the advocacy did have an impact in this regard - and are best summarised by the following direct quotes from interviewees:

*“Since this report has come out, every time we talk about protection, we emphasise the preventative element”* coordination role, humanitarian official

*“We need such critical independent thinking on protection to push for change”*  
MONUSCO official

*“The report articulated concerns and issues we had on protection in DRC”*  
Donor government

The evaluation was limited in its ability to assess other influences aside from NRC on the outcomes detailed below, particularly for those changes reported outside of North Kivu. Where other influences were identified, this is listed in annex 1.

#### **Objective 1: Strengthen NRC's own protection on the ground**

The internal advocacy report and the follow-up training and discussions resulted in the introduction of several changes by NRC in the following areas in DRC, most significantly:

- *Emergency response:* NRC has introduced a protection element into its multi-sectorial assessments (MSA). NRC is also planning a new protection approach for first entries into conflict areas, with a pilot underway which involves conflict sensitivity training with the NGO Search For a Common Ground (SFCG), as both organisations have funding to work in the pilot area.
- *Programmes:* according to NRC staff, NRC has reviewed its 2014 strategy and strengthened protection aspects (notably for Education and Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA), with the strategy currently with HQ for review.

- *Advocacy:* NRC has budgeted to integrate three additional advocacy/protection staff. It has also started to implement an expanded approach as a result, including more protection and “Do No Harm” training for staff.

The internal advocacy report contained many comments and suggestions for NRC’s protection approach in DRC. This evaluation extracted 14 direct main recommendations, (“asks”) from this list. Each of these “asks” was analysed, including an assessment of the change seen and an estimation of NRC’s contribution (see annex 1). This analysis indicates that the NRC advocacy was the main influence on the changes observed within NRC in DRC. According to NRC staff interviewed, the limited or no change for some “asks” was largely due to the fact that the actions proposed were perceived as being beyond NRC’s expertise and/or role (i.e. conflict resolution), or that the issues were considered to require a discussion at HQ level (i.e. extension of ICLA).

## ***Objective 2: Strengthen the practice of other humanitarian actors in the DRC***

The external advocacy report and associated activities contributed to strengthening practices of humanitarian actors, most significantly as follows:

- *Policy level:* the work of NRC with the Protection Cluster of North Kivu (Goma) resulted in establishing a working group on engagement with armed groups and revision of their guidelines on this matter. The focus on preventative protection was advocated by the Cluster at higher levels, resulting in a stronger prevention and mainstreaming focus in the 2014 *UN Strategic Response Plan (SRP)* for DRC compared to previous years<sup>1</sup>. The notion of further reflection and tackling root causes of the conflict contributed to the thinking that led to the creation of the *Do More Good (DMG) Network*, an initiative of World Vision and Mercy Corps to re-think humanitarian intervention in DRC. It was also reported that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) used the advocacy report for their 2014 DRC strategy and to strengthen the protection component of the DRC Pooled Fund (the multi-donor humanitarian fund linked to above-mentioned SRP).
- *Rapid Response to Movement of Population (RRMP) programme:* a strong recommendation in the external advocacy report was to incorporate a protection element into the UNICEF-led RRMP programme. In 2013, a protection specialist was assigned to RRMP at UNICEF for a period of six months. The specialist is currently finalising a protection element (tools, training and guidance) for the programme. Interviewees largely attributed this development to the NRC advocacy.
- *Field level practice:* advocating for greater contact with armed groups was taken up by the Protection Cluster in Goma and its members to varying degrees. For example, when interviewed, some half (5 out of 10) of NGO participants of the armed groups workshops in Kitshanga and Beni could provide examples of how they had either adapted their approaches or in some cases increased their contact with armed groups as a result of the training. Organisations encountered

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<sup>1</sup> Based on a comparison between the 2013 *UN Plan d’Action Humanitaire RDC* and the 2014 *UN Plan de réponse stratégique RDC*.

more challenges in taking discussions with armed groups beyond access issues to include protection. Although organisations understood the value of this, protection issues were identified by some as too sensitive with a number of these groups, as one NGO representative put it:

*“Particularly when it is linked to their raison d'être; their ability to terrorise the population is what keeps them in power”.*

The external advocacy report also contained many comments and suggestions for humanitarian actors in DRC. This evaluation extracted 11 direct main recommendations (“asks”) for these actors. Each of these “asks” was analysed, including an assessment of the change seen and an estimation of NRC’s contribution (see annex 1). There was limited reaction to the “asks” linked to a greater role for humanitarian actors in conflict resolution. An example seen where NRC, other humanitarian actors and peace-building NGOs (46 in total) did advocate in this area was on the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for DRC established in February 2013.<sup>2</sup>

***Objective 3: Strengthen the approach of the wider international community to include non-military protection approaches to complement the efforts of the UN peacekeepers***

As mentioned above, stakeholders reported that the external report fed into their thinking on non-military protection, and in some cases this extended beyond the humanitarian actors in DRC, for example to the wider protection community and donor governments. The external report was issued at a time when the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) had just introduced its new “active peacekeeping” with the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) which was met with considerable apprehension, according to persons interviewed and media reports. Therefore, the international community was interested in alternative and complementary non-military approaches to protection, which resulted in a receptive response to the ideas of the report, for example when presented to the UN Security Council (UNSC) C34 Protection of Civilians Expert Group (largely responsible for drafting the MONUSCO mandate). Although no direct action to date was seen as a result within the international community, it was thought that NRC’s advocacy fed into their thinking and reflection on protection in DRC.

The external advocacy report contained a series of “asks” targeting the international community, notably encouraging bolder advocacy to address key issues that drive the conflict. This evaluation didn’t find any evidence that the international community had altered its approach with regard to these specific “asks”. However, given the long-term nature of such “asks”, it may be too early to see any results (less than a year). Furthermore, this evaluation had limited contact with the “wider international community” to fully assess this point. Each of these “asks” was analysed, including an assessment of the change seen and an estimation of NRC’s contribution (see annex 1).

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<sup>2</sup> See main recommendations of the coalition: (February 2014), *A comprehensive response to the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo*: [https://www.jrs.net/assets/Regions/IOR/media/files/comprehensive\\_approach\\_final.pdf](https://www.jrs.net/assets/Regions/IOR/media/files/comprehensive_approach_final.pdf)

## **MONUSCO and NRC's advocacy**

The external report included an analysis of MONUSCO's protection approach, mainly commenting on their reliance on armed protection, the weakness in their advocacy towards the Congolese armed forces (known as their French abbreviation FARDC), their inability to control illegal mining practices – and concluded with a recommendation for an independent assessment of the net protective impact of MONUSCO and FARDC.

MONUSCO staff interviewed by this evaluation gave the impression that they did not feel that NRC's advocacy was targeted towards them. Interviewees emphasized that NRC's push for greater action by humanitarian actors was welcome and seen as complementary to MONUSCO's own protection work; military and non-military. MONUSCO staff did feel that the advocacy report contained some compelling points, such as the possibility of sustaining an indirect influence on armed groups and the need to strengthen MONUSCO's non-military protection strategies. Although MONUSCO staff thought that the situation had changed since the report's publication – notably with the defeat of the M23 - and as a consequence armed groups were less of a threat now (note: other stakeholders disagreed strongly with this view).

As detailed in annex 1, the recommendation for an independent assessment of MONUSCO does not appear to have been addressed by MONUSCO or the international community. One explanation may be the difficulty to influence MONUSCO and its mandate on a political level decision-making level. Further, given that this recommendation was just one of some 30 "asks" found in report it was not given any particular importance or priority by NRC.

### ***4.1.2. Have there been any additional results to those anticipated?***

The following additional results were identified by this evaluation:

*Role with the Protection Cluster of North Kivu:* NRC's advocacy strengthened its role within the Protection Cluster, to the extent where it was perceived as a proactive and positive counterpart for the Cluster, bringing expertise (i.e. on dialogue with armed groups) where it was felt needed by the Cluster and its members.

*Positioning of NRC as protection actor:* NRC's advocacy on DRC attracted attention beyond DRC, for example with donors, UNSC and the Global Protection Cluster (GPC). This in turn, led to a heightened profile for NRC and its protection advocacy at a global level, according to persons interviewed.

*NRC's global protection policy:* NRC's advocacy on DRC coincided with the development of NRC's global protection policy. As a result of his work on DRC, Liam Mahony was asked to review the draft protection policy, providing substantial input that were taken on board in the final version<sup>3</sup>, such as on the proactive protection approach, mainstreaming and the "Do No Harm" approach. Although this input was not only due to Liam's work on DRC (more so formed by his considerable experience with protection) - his work on DRC provided the opportunity to provide such input.

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<sup>3</sup> NRC. (December 2013). *NRC Protection Policy* (scheduled for submission to the NRC Senior Management Group for approval in early 2014).



#### 4.1.3. What were the factors that facilitated or hindered the results achieved?

This evaluation identified the following factors that facilitated or hindered results achieved:

##### Facilitated

- *Timing*: the timing of the external report corresponded with the introduction of the FIB by MONOSCO which brought heightened interest in DRC and protection.
- *Type of analysis*: the in-depth and thought-provoking analysis provided by the external report increased its distribution, consumption and use.
- *Operational grounding*: the analysis and “asks” of both reports were drawn from field-based experiences providing credibility to the advocacy.
- *Access to humanitarian organisations and coordinating mechanisms*: within North Kivu, NRC had ready access to the Protection Cluster and other coordinating forums, facilitating discussion and action.
- *Openness of NRC programmes*: NRC programmes in Goma were mostly open and willing to discuss and consider changes to the protection aspects of their work.
- *Use of outside protection experts*: the use of outside experts on protection and DRC (Liam Mahony and Jason Stearns) provided additional credibility for the advocacy.
- *Credibility*: NRC is viewed as an effective and credible organisation, therefore the humanitarian community was also receptive to messages disseminated.

##### Hindered

- *Message complexity*: the external report was long for an advocacy piece (50 pages), lacked an executive summary and contained multiple recommendations and asks (some 30) making it difficult for many to digest the entire report. Consequently, many only referred to the title or select sections.
- *Challenge to follow-up initiatives*: while NRC’s advocacy launched different initiatives, with the Protection Cluster in Goma for example, it proved challenging for NRC to follow up all these initiatives and implement a more long-term strategy.
- *Limited action in Kinshasa*: limited focus was put on actions in Kinshasa where potential influence would have been possible with humanitarian actors (e.g. UN).
- *Limited action internationally*: the potential interest created at the global level (e.g. with the GPC and UNSC) was not fully capitalised on.
- *“Success” of armed protection*: the reports were issued at a time when MONUSCO had little evidence to show that their “active peacekeeping” was successful. However, the withdrawal and surrender of the M23 armed group in North Kivu in late 2013/14 created some renewed faith in armed protection. Some interviewees felt that this new situation should be considered in relation to non-military protection (n.b. some interviewees also commented that this renewed faith was temporary and would change as soon as the next major armed clashes occurred).
- *Inconsistency with NRC’s Principles in Practice advocacy*: the external report advocated for a greater role of humanitarian actors in peace-building. NRC Brussels saw this as potentially inconsistent with NRC’s Principle in Practice advocacy that sees a distinct and principled role for humanitarian actors that does not extend to peace-building.
- *NRC’s position on non-military protection*: given that the advocacy reports were released under the Fieldview Solution name it created independent credibility. But for some stakeholders NRC’s position and link to this report was not clear - they could not identify to what extent NRC supported the analysis and “asks” of the reports.

#### **4.1.4. What has been the contribution to NRC's longer-term advocacy goals?**

As the NRC's advocacy in DRC was launched less than a year ago, it is too early to estimate its specific contribution to NRC's longer-term advocacy goal, i.e. to be an *"independent and courageous spokesperson for refugee and IDP rights"*<sup>4</sup>.

However, given the current interest generated by the advocacy outside the DRC and its potential impact on NRC's approach to protection (through influencing NRC's policy and programmes), the evaluation is able to assert that the contribution has been positive to date. A more significant contribution and subsequent assessment will depend on the investment in further sustainable advocacy activities.

## **4.2. Activities**

### **4.2.1. What activities were the most effective in achieving the outcomes achieved? Least effective?**

Overall, the advocacy reports provided an excellent basis for launching multiple activities – this in itself was a positive result; to proactively use the reports and their content as a foundation for advocacy activities instead of considering the reports themselves as the only "action".

Based on the analysis in section 4.1., the effectiveness of the activities were closely linked to their geographic location. Most successes were seen with activities in Goma, which is not surprising as this was the main focus of the advocacy and where the Protection Advocacy Advisor (PAA) is based. As mentioned above, fewer activities (thus fewer results) were seen in Kinshasa as well as at the international level. This evaluation found that this was due to both lack of follow-up and clear design for these activities, as discussed further below in section 4.2.2.

The following is an assessment of the main activities as identified by this evaluation:

*Advocacy reports:* the reports were considered as valuable by persons interviewed, particularly their thought-provoking analysis and "asks". Compared to other advocacy reports, the reports were found to be long and complex (as detailed in 4.1.3). The research process used for the reports (canvassing of stakeholders in DRC) was viewed as positive and provided legitimacy for the reports.

*Press work:* a press release was issued for the release of the external report in April 2013<sup>5</sup>. It focused on the then new role of FIB, which attracted coverage in the Norwegian media, some international media and specialised humanitarian media (e.g. IRIN News). NRC also issued a press release during the capture of Goma by the M23 in November 2013. This resulted in interviews with the international media. Apart from these two press releases, there was no known press strategy or plan for the advocacy.

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<sup>4</sup> NRC's advocacy goal: <https://www.nrc.no/?aid=9160690>

<sup>5</sup> 26 April 2013, "NRC warns against excessive faith in new force" <http://www.nrc.no/?did=9673870>

*Lobby meetings:* the NRC staff (PAA – Goma and the Global Access Advisor (GAA) – Oslo) together with the external consultant (Liam Mahony) conducted various meetings to discuss the findings of the advocacy report with stakeholders in DRC, USA, and Europe. Participants saw these meetings as very positive and useful. Nevertheless for those held outside of Goma, some felt that there was little follow-up on the points discussed during the meetings. For example, stakeholders expressed an interest to know the progress of the advocacy, the results to date and next steps.

*Workshops and training:* various workshops were held with Liam Mahony in DRC in June and November 2013. These workshops aimed to present the report and solicit feedback; to analyse armed groups; and to train humanitarian workers on dialogue with armed groups. Feedback from the workshops was positive, particularly concerning the discussions around dialogue with armed groups. Participants called for the workshops to provide more in-depth perspectives on issues such as negotiations with armed groups. They also stressed a need for follow-up training and support. Some interviewees were hesitant in encouraging NGOs to have a greater dialogue with armed groups, considering this needed to be limited and carried out by specialists. Then again, NGOs interviewed expressed a need for this training as they were in regular contact with armed groups in order to carry out their activities. A series of trainings on protection and “Do No Harm” were organised for NRC staff, initiated by Liam Mahony and continued by the PAA in Goma. These training sessions were seen as very useful for the NRC staff.

*Policy work:* the main policy work was in supporting the Protection Cluster in Goma with the revision of their guidelines on armed groups and providing input into the creation/revision of broader protection policies<sup>6</sup>. The main challenge seen is this work was that there was limited monitoring as to what was contributed by NRC: into *what*, *when* and with *what results*. At the international level, there was an opportunity to input into the new EU strategy on the Great Lakes but it could not be fully capitalised upon, mainly due to the perceived inconsistency that NRC Brussels team saw between the DRC advocacy and the *Principles in Practice* advocacy.

*Coalition-building:* the main coalition-building was carried out in collaboration with the Protection Cluster in Goma. This was positive in that it was mainly through the Cluster that the various meetings and workshops were organised in North Kivu, providing further legitimacy for the advocacy. Where there was little coalition-building was outside of North Kivu (i.e. in Kinshasa and internationally), where the advocacy was perceived as a “solo” operation by NRC – some stakeholders felt that a greater collaboration with other humanitarian actors could have increased the advocacy’s impact. Another example of coalition-building seen was with the 46 organisations around the above-mentioned advocacy on the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement, although it was apparently a one-off action more so than an ongoing initiative.

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<sup>6</sup> For example: UN, (October 2013), *UN System-Wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the DRC*; MONUSCO (April 2013), *POC Handbook, Practical Protection of Civilians Handbook for Peacekeepers*, MONUSCO Protection Working Group.

### **Messaging of NRC's advocacy**

NRC's advocacy (as seen in the press release and presentations made) drew multiple messages from the report, notably: urging an assessment of MONUSCO's protection impact; placing more focus on UN civilian protection; highlighting the lack of focus on root causes and long-term solutions; the need to strengthen support to local conflict management; and re-focus on preventative protection.

An analysis of the reactions to the advocacy report indicates that different stakeholders reacted to different messages: the Protection Cluster in Goma largely focused on the need for greater dialogue with armed groups; UN agencies focused on the need for more preventative protection; the DMG network took on board the message of long-term solutions; and the NRC in DRC focused on protection mainstreaming and "Do No Harm" in their programmes.

Positively, this illustrated that NRC's advocacy allowed stakeholders to "pick and choose" what message they wanted to focus on. The challenge was that there was no overarching key message or priority given to messages (and only some targets defined) which meant that it was difficult for NRC to give priority to one message over another. For example, the "ask" for an assessment of MONUSCO's protection impact gained little traction but nor was it followed up or emphasized by NRC in their consequent activities. Further, it was not clear if all or some of these messages had the full support of NRC as an institution.

#### **4.2.2. How effective was NRC's management and coordination of the initiative?**

**Planning:** NRC's advocacy was well thought out in the research and report writing phase, in that the NRC team had a clear idea of the consultative process needed and the product (i.e. report), that would be produced. NRC then detailed the follow-up activities in a document "*Advocacy strategy – non-military protection*". This document detailed the activities, location, who was responsible and when it was planned. Where the planning was limited was that there was no known detailing/mapping of precise policies to influence or key moments on the policy agenda to target. This meant that it was largely up to "targets" to determine the use of the advocacy report, for example in the case of the Protection Cluster of Goma it was their initiative to use the report for input into the *2014 UN SRP* and not that of NRC. Further, there was no updated plan of action or activities from mid-2013 onwards that prioritised activities and built on early successes.

**Coordination:** the main activities were carried out by the PAA in Goma and the GAA in Oslo with the support of the external consultant and NRC staff in Goma, Oslo, Brussels and Geneva. Given this relatively small team, the coordination worked well in terms of determining responsibilities and tasks to be carried out. There was also a strong interest from both Oslo and Goma to implement the advocacy. The PAA change in Goma in late 2013 meant that there was a lull in activities as the new PAA became familiar with the context and the advocacy projects. Given the absence of a more detailed plan of action, it was difficult for the different NRC staff to follow the development of the advocacy and to understand who was doing *what* and *when*.

**Monitoring:** A challenge identified for NRC's advocacy was their ability to monitor progress. There was no known tracking by NRC of progress made on the various "asks"

in the report or the different initiatives taken, e.g. NRC provided input into policy XY with AB results and next steps, etc. As a consequence, there was a risk that certain initiatives could be “lost” due to a lack of follow up by NRC or the involved actors. There was also no known summary of media coverage of the two press actions. A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) matrix was created for the broader access advocacy project but it was not used actively for this initiative. Suggestions for improved monitoring are found in section six of this report.

## 5. Conclusions and Recommendations

This evaluation found that in its first year, the NRC’s advocacy on DRC created visibility on the issue of non-military protection, provoked further reflection and resulted in some changes to policies and practices, most notably within NRC and other humanitarian actors in North Kivu. The evaluation found there was potential for further advocacy and influence, both in DRC and beyond, as delineated in the following conclusions and recommendations.

### 5.1. NRC’s advocacy in DRC

**A. Focus:** an analysis of the most concrete achievements to date illustrates that it was mostly found at the programme level. For example, NRC in emergency response and UNICEF’s RRMP programme. It was also noted that the advocacy reports emphasized precise and specific “asks” for this. While not denying the potential long-term impact of the advocacy on broader reflection and issues, success to date was seen mostly with these specific “asks”. The external report was also challenging in that it was broad in scope implying that not all messages and “asks” could have the same level of attention – and ultimately some would be “lost” in the mix.

*Recommendation:* Consider limiting the number of key messages and “asks” in future advocacy initiatives to a manageable number (e.g. under ten) with clear targets in mind – and as specific as feasible.

**B. Plan of Action:** NRC’s advocacy was seen as positively creating many derivatives with the potential to exert influence in different ways, for example, through training, direct policy work or coalition building. The feedback indicated that stakeholders are now expecting NRC to follow up on these various activities – mostly in Goma (both internally and externally). Given the potential created by NRC, this feedback would be worth considering. NRC in Goma will not be able to follow up on all activities to satisfy all stakeholders. Therefore each activity would have to be assessed and prioritized. For the basis of the advocacy, given the richness of the two advocacy reports, this evaluation believes it would not be necessary to commission further research; it would be more important to consider how the existing reports could be further broken down and updated extracting priority messages set (see next conclusion).

*Recommendation:* Create a plan of action for the 2014 follow-up of the NRC advocacy in Goma extracting main priorities from the reports.

**C. Messages:** as noted above, NRC’s advocacy contained multiple messages and “asks”. Some of these messages were for broader long-term issues, such as root causes

and other on more specific points such as field activities of NGOs. This evaluation found that the messages that resonated mostly with stakeholders were those that were considered to have potential to bring about change, i.e. at the policy and programme level of humanitarian organisations in DRC. Messages on conflict resolution and broader longer term issues were difficult to be acted upon by these actors. But the advocacy was seen as lacking sufficient focus on this level, i.e. political level in Kinshasa, Brussels or New York. Future advocacy may need to address these specific levels of focus and design activities accordingly. Messages should also be reconsidered in the light of the new situation in Kivu, which is telling in the headline of the Economist magazine of March 2014: “*With rebel fighters on the back foot, optimism is growing*”<sup>7</sup>.

*Recommendation:* For future NRC advocacy in DRC, re-consider the focus of the messages and determine which messages should be considered as priority.

**D. International/national level:** beyond the advocacy in Goma, NRC created some visibility and interest but could not yet fully capitalise on this. The fact that some points in the external report were taken into consideration for national level policies with humanitarian organisations illustrates the potential for influence at the Kinshasa level. At the international level, interest was expressed (i.e. with the GPC), not only concerning protection in DRC, but its potential for application in other contexts. This shows that NRC’s advocacy on protection could also feed further into global advocacy where its potential impact could be greater, but it would require further resources (staff) and clarity on NRC’s position (see below). This would also concern NRC’s work in global locations where it does not have a permanent presence, such as New York. This would imply greater involvement from NRC Geneva (who have responsibility for New York) and Brussels both in the strategy development and delivery.

*Recommendation:* For future NRC advocacy on non-military protection, consider the potential at the national and international level and allocate resources accordingly, both within the DRC operation and strategic locations such as Geneva, New York and Brussels.

**E. Monitoring:** Similar to the challenges faced in follow-up of the various activities, difficulties were also detected with the monitoring progress. This meant that possible “wins” were missed and opportunities to progress further may have been overlooked. Suggestions for a basic monitoring approach are proposed in section six of this report.

*Recommendation:* Future NRC advocacy in DRC should consider the use of two basic monitoring tools as detailed in section six of this report.

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<sup>7</sup> The Economist. (15 March 2014). *DRC – Green shoots amid the shooting* : <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21599023-rebel-fighters-back-foot-optimism-growing-green-shoots-amid>

## **5.2. Global implications**

**F. NRC's position on non-military protection:** NRC's advocacy was based on the research and reports, which were identified as the Fieldview Solutions products. This had the advantage of giving NRC more flexibility how to utilize the analysis and various "asks" in the reports. At the same time, it was not clear if NRC supported all or some of the "asks" in the reports. This was revealed in the differences with NRC Brussels and the potential inconsistency with the NRC's Principle in Practice advocacy.

*Recommendation:* NRC at the global level should consider determining and clearly communicating its position on non-military advocacy and ensure that advocacy in DRC and elsewhere is consistent with it.

**G. Protection mainstreaming and Do No Harm with NRC:** One of the significant achievements of NRC's advocacy in DRC was its ability to bring about change to NRC's programmes, notably introducing stronger protection elements in emergency response and planning to do so in other programmes. Matched with a greater staff awareness of Do No Harm, this indicates a potential for a strong protection-focused country operation. Considering that NRC is present in some 20 countries, the experience in DRC on strengthening its protection focus is worth considering for elsewhere.

*Recommendation:* NRC should reflect on the experience of strengthening protection within its programmes in DRC and see to what extent this could be applied to other countries where NRC operates.

## 6. Outcome Indicators

### 6.1. What outcome indicators best capture the progress and the contribution of NRC's work?

This analysis is based on the M&E matrix created for the broader access advocacy project (of which the DRC advocacy was part of), the ToC and the outcomes where progress was seen by this evaluation. At the level of outcome indicators, the progress can best be captured by using the categories of the M&E matrix, with some adaptation, as detailed in the following table:

<b>Advocacy level</b>	<b>Indicator (s)</b>	<b>Example from evaluation</b>	<b>Comment</b>
Visibility	# of instances where issue is featured in literature and targeted media  # of instances where issue is featured in events/trainings organised by others	- press release on report featured in 5 mainstream media (Reuters, New Times, Africa News) and 5 specialised (e.g. Enough Project security brief; IRIN)  - issues main theme of 6 workshops organised by Goma Protection Cluster	Need for simple media monitoring (e.g. using Google search) to record mentions of media. Only needed when report/news released.  Needs to be recorded over time as training/events occur. Indication of to what extent NRC issues featured would be of use.
Coalition-building	# of partners joining the initiative	- 2 "coalitions" known to be active on issues: DMG network (~35 members) and Goma cluster (~20)	Indicator needs to be adapted as NRC advocacy does not build a coalition but more so feeds into existing coalitions. This could be updated every 3 months.
Target recognition of issue	# of instances where issue is placed on the agenda of targets	- issue discussed at Humanitarian Advocacy Group, Kinshasa	NRC will be aware of most times when issues discussed.
Actions taken by target to advance the issue	# of initiatives undertaken by targets to address issue (est. of working groups, action points)	- establishment of working group by Goma Cluster	As above, NRC would be aware of most actions taken (but not all)
Adoption of new/improved policy	# of instances where NRC recommendations are reflected in strategies/policies/action plans/target reports	- NRC input into revised MONUSCO POC manual - Issues reflected in 2014 UN SRP.	This indicator would include both where NRC has had direct and where its advocacy has resulted in its inclusion in policy.
Implementation and enforcement of policy	# of instances and situations where policy is enforced (roll-out plans developed/implemented)	- RRMP piloting protection tools - 5 NGOs report changing approach for dialogue with rebel groups	This would need to be monitored by NRC and noted when implementation reported.



## 6.2. When and how monitoring data can be collected for the initiative?

The indicators table displayed on the previous page illustrate what indicators are appropriate to collect monitoring data on. However, as seen by this evaluation, it proved challenging for the NRC team to collect a minimum of monitoring data of the progress to date. If the NRC team would like to better collect monitoring data, then it needs to set aside time to do so. For example, it would be recommended that the PAA in Goma sets aside 1 to 2 hours a week for M&E. As a solution, two simple monitoring tools are proposed:

### 6.2.1. Advocacy tracking log

A tracking log is a simple tool created in excel that can be updated as monitoring information becomes available. As the lead for the advocacy in DRC, it would be managed by the PAA in Goma, with input from involved staff elsewhere. A log would be set up for a three months period (using worksheets/tab) of same excel file. The log would be largely based on the indicators table as follows (with fictive examples shown):

<b>Advocacy log - April – June 2014</b>		
<b>Level / Indicator (s)</b>	<b>Date entered</b>	<b>Instance description</b>
<b>Visibility</b> # of instances where issue is featured in literature and targeted media # of instances where issue is featured in events/trainings organised by others	3.4.14	Issue featured in article - EAC Vision website
	15.5.14	Issue featured in online security brief of World Vision
	5.5.14	NRC Goma speak on issue at Goma NGO forum
<b>Coalition-building</b> # of partners joining the initiative	4.6.14	NGO coalition in Beni active on issue (~20 members)
<b>Target recognition</b> # of instances where issue is placed on the agenda of targets	22.5.14	GPC place issue of non-military protection on its May meeting agenda
	2.6.14	Kinshasa Donor group discuss issue in June meeting
<b>Actions taken</b> # of initiatives undertaken by targets to address issue.	13.4.14	Establishment of working group on preventative protection by Goma Cluster
	15.5.14	Commissioning of related research by Oxfam
<b>Policy adoption</b> # of instances where NRC recommendations are reflected in strategies/policies/action plans/target reports	1.5.14	Input by NRC into policy brief of Protection Cluster
	29.6.14	Issues reflected in OCHA POA
<b>Policy implementation</b> # of instances and situations where policy is enforced	30.5.14	NRC ICLA programme piloting new protection component
	15.6.14	Diakonia NGO in Beni report using dialogue approach in field work

The advocacy log would then be useful for reporting and following progress on the different activities carried out and the results seen.

### 6.2.2. Quarterly M&E debrief

An M&E debrief would involve the PAA and possibly relevant Oslo, Brussels and Geneva staff to discuss progress of NRC's advocacy in DRC during a brief telephone conference call.

This would allow the NRC team to review the advocacy tracking log, assess progress and set short-term objectives for the next quarter. Scheduling a time every quarter to discuss M&E would also ensure that this component of the advocacy is covered sufficiently and the advocacy log is used and kept updated. The results could also be part of the quarterly report of the country office.

### 6.2.3. Advise on collecting monitoring data

<b>Level / Indicator (s)</b>	<b>Monitoring advice</b>
<b>Visibility</b> # of instances where issue is featured in literature and targeted media # of instances where issue is featured in events/trainings organised by others	Given the specificity of the advocacy, this would require having media alerts set up (for example with Google news alerts) to capture media mentions and following the blogs/websites on DRC. Monitoring training/events is more difficult – but it would require subscribing to relevant email updates (such as those of ALNAP) and more local lists, in addition to following in general developments in the civil society / UN / NGO agenda.
<b>Coalition-building</b> # of partners joining the initiative	As there is no specific coalition for this initiative, focus would be monitoring existing coalitions, their growth and involvement – most of these are known – such as DMG.
<b>Target recognition</b> # of instances where issue is placed on the agenda of targets	This will rely on a broader and regular sweep of the sources mentioned above – it would be helped by having a pre-selected list of potential “targets” to monitor.
<b>Actions taken</b> # of initiatives undertaken by targets to address issue.	Linked to above, a monitoring of pre-selected “targets” would be carried out in the same way.
<b>Policy adoption</b> # of instances where NRC recommendations are reflected in strategies/policies/action plans/target reports	This would be facilitated by identifying the potential policies and tracking their development. Consulting other sources – keeping a “watching brief” would support finding other instances of policy adoption.
<b>Policy implementation</b> # of instances and situations where policy is enforced	Linked to above, policy implementation monitoring would be carried out in the same way.

## Annex 1: Contribution analysis of main advocacy “asks”

This contribution analysis has been prepared on the basis of the interviews carried out and a document review. When reviewing the analysis, the representation of the different stakeholders in the interviews should be considered, i.e. three donor governments, six UN bodies, 7 International NGOs and 16 national NGOs/civil society organisations.

### Legend:

Change seen	Role of NRC advocacy
<b>Unknown</b> Evaluation was unable to assess if change had occurred (change may have occurred but we were not aware of it).	<b>Unknown</b> Evaluation was unable to assess if NRC had an influence on change (influence may have occurred but we were not aware of it).
<b>None</b> Evaluation found no evidence that change had occurred.	<b>None</b> Evaluation found no evidence of NRC influence.
<b>Low</b> NRC advocacy “ask” considered, possibly planned, but little change occurred to date.	<b>Low</b> NRC Influence was just one of many possible influences on target.
<b>Medium</b> NRC advocacy “ask” considered and some implementation seen (e.g. pilots), but not yet widespread or systematic.	<b>Medium</b> Influence of NRC was one of a limited number of possible influences on target.
<b>High</b> NRC advocacy “ask” considered and integrated; potential for sustainable and long-term change.	<b>High</b> NRC was the key or only influence on target.

<b>External report</b>			
<b>Ask</b>	<b>Reaction</b>	<b>Change seen</b>	<b>Role of NRC advocacy</b>
<b>Humanitarian organisations – policy level</b>			
Organisations should distinguish between post-abuse services and preventive actions, with more emphasis on the latter.	This and broader thinking developed by Goma Protection Cluster and fed into DRC SRP 2014 and other policies to focus equally on prevention in protection strategy.	Medium	Medium  (Other influences also advocated for greater focus on prevention)
Organisations need to ensure that pressure to move quickly does not marginalize commitment to longer-term work with more impact.	This and broader thinking of report taken on-board in creation of DRC DMG network.	Medium	Medium (NRC advocacy was one of many influences on DMG)
<b>Humanitarian organisations - field level</b>			
UNICEF and partners need to adapt RRMP to include assessment of protection needs.	UNICEF deployed protection specialist for six months to work with RRMP.	High	High

Field trips of organisations can include component of protective presence/visibility/communications.	Examples seen where organisations (e.g. NRC and national NGOs) have started to incorporate preventative protection element in their field trips and activities, but it is not yet widespread.	Medium	Medium  (as also advocated by others, e.g. ECHO & WFP)
Organisations should increase staff and train them to develop targeted & coordinated advocacy strategies for different armed actors and other influencers (Rwanda and Uganda).	Goma protection cluster initiated discussions, training and revision of guidance. Coordination desired but not all willing/able to collaborate. "Other influencers" considered outside reach of organisations.	Medium (on training, coordination & guidance)  None (on "other influences")	High  None
Organisations should be talking more with armed actors on protection issues and not only access.	Organisations understood this point but some expressed limits to implement it (e.g. protection issues often touched on <i>raison d'être</i> of armed groups).	Low	Medium  (discussion provoked by NRC)
Organisations should maximize field presence and contact with armed actors.	Organisations thought maximising field presence was desirable although for many, difficult to implement (security concerns). NRC advocacy did initiate renewed thinking on contact with armed groups and some NGOs reported revising their approaches.	Low (on field presence)  Moderate (on contact)	Medium  (discussion provoked by NRC)  High
<b>Humanitarian organisations - conflict resolution</b>			
Organisations to convene ongoing discussion groups to promote deeper analysis about new approaches to the conflict.	This "ask" was incorporated into approach of DMG network – not seen elsewhere by this evaluation.	Medium	Medium

Humanitarian and peacebuilding organisations work more with established community management groups.	Organisations recognise need to work more with existing groups but no major action seen yet.	Low	Medium
Organisations engage more with church-based peace-making efforts (and other civil society actors).	Organisations recognise need to work more with civil society actors and initiatives underway (e.g. World Vision mapping of churches) but not linked to NRC advocacy.	Low	Medium
Organisations to create confidential spaces to discuss ethnic tensions.	No evidence was found of this by the evaluation.	None	None
<b><i>International community</i></b>			
Need for international community to prioritise action, preventing the worst abuses and influencing perpetrators.	Although stakeholders interviewed agreed with this “ask”, general opinion was that they were already doing it or not able to address it at their level.	None	None
Encourage a wider range of advocacy actions addressing “too political” issues, i.e. impunity of perpetrators.	Point recognised by stakeholders but felt not possible to act at their level (i.e. Goma)	None	None
Humanitarian organisations encourage an independent impact assessment of the net protective impact of MONUSCO and FARDC.	Not adopted by NGOs or MONUSCO. Perceptions of Population project (regular surveys) on protection in communities initiated by MONUSCO, but not linked to NRC advocacy.	None	None
International institutions openly address key issues that drive the conflict.	Point recognised by stakeholders but the type of institutions not accessed by this evaluation.	Unknown	Unknown
International actors address and pressure the economic interests fuelling regional interventionism, including MONUSCO’s action on resource exploitation.	Point recognised by stakeholders and MONUSCO but the type of institutions not accessed by this evaluation.	Unknown	Unknown

<b>Internal report</b>			
<b>Ask</b>	<b>Reaction</b>	<b>Change seen</b>	<b>Role of NRC advocacy</b>
<b>NRC – field presence</b>			
NRC Field trips can include component of protective presence/visibility/communications.	NRC adapted field approach, notably in emergency response to incorporate further protection (see below).	Medium	High
Increase field presence and revise security policies accordingly.	NRC agreed field presence could be increased but needed to be balanced against security requirements.	Low	High (Discussion provoked)
<b>NRC – programmes</b>			
Willingness to move slower in assisting displaced persons by assessing protections risks before delivery.	Emergency response has incorporated a protection analysis. NRC piloting new approach for entering into new areas (e.g. Pinga) involving conflict sensitivity training with SFCG.	High	Medium  (as also advocated by others, e.g. ECHO & WFP)
Work with UNICEF and other RRMP partners to build protection component into multi-sector assessments (MSA).	Protection component incorporated in NRC MSA. UNICEF working on protection approach in RRMP (see above).	High	High
Consider how programming contributes to an overall protection strategy.	In 2014 planning, all programmes reviewed in reference to report – most changes to be implemented.	Medium	High
Mainstreaming protection in other NRC programmes (Education, Food security, Shelter/construction)	In 2014 planning, all programmes reviewed in reference to report, notably in education & food security.	Medium  (changes yet to be implemented)	High
Carry out regular workshops with NRC staff on Do No Harm concept.	Training has started with NRC staff but yet to be systematic.	Medium	High
Consider how ICLA can go beyond land disputes and address broader issues such as ethnic tension.	Point recognised but as it changes focus away from land and property, needs to be discussed further with HQ.	Low	High

Create confidential spaces to discuss ethnic tensions.	Point recognised but NRC debates if this is its role.	Low	High
Share best practices for new approaches in community conflict management.	Point recognised but NRC debates if this is its role.	Low	High
<b><i>NRC – advocacy programme</i></b>			
Invest more in advocacy analysis and planning with increased training and staff.	Advocacy staff will be increased by three (1 per region)	High	High
Develop advocacy strategies for each different armed actor.	Point taken but yet to be implemented (awaiting new staff)	Low	High
Openly addresses issues that drive the conflict, e.g. Rwanda's involvement.	NRC Goma more willing to speak on some root issues such as demobilisation. Root causes issue fed into coalition advocacy work on Peace Framework of February 2013.	Medium	High
Facilitate and encourage Congolese peace-making initiatives and develop partnerships with civil society, such as churches.	Initiative launched by NRC to have greater collaboration with conflict-transformation actors but no longer term approach adopted.	Medium	High

## Annex 2: List of persons interviewed

#	Name	Position	Organisation
<b>Goma:</b>			
1.	Sigve Ånderås	Programme Director	NRC
2.	Cheikh Ba	Country Director	NRC
3.	Chiara Gaburri	Programme Coordinator, Food Security	NRC
4.	Brooke Lauten	Protection and Advocacy Adviser	NRC
5.	Christophe Beau	North Kivu Protection Cluster Coordinator	UNHCR
6.	Gaele Chojnowicz	Emergency Specialist, Protection	UNICEF
7.	Hanna Cooper	Protection Policy Advisor	Oxfam
8.	Nicolas Coutin	Protection Adviser and Provincial Protection Cluster Co-Facilitator	World Vision
9.	Alex Knezevic	Civil Affairs Officer	MONUSCO
10.	Annarita Marcantonio	Chargé des Affaires Humanitaires	OCHA
<i>Participants of Goma discussion group for North Kivu NGOs:</i>			
11.	Emmanuel Baabo	Chef du projet	Heal Africa
12.	Bienvvenu Barayata	President – youth section	Community Hutu
13.	Aimee Kataliko	Representative	CAFED
14.	Despine Kavugho	Member	BARAZA
15.	Stéphane Lupao	Secretary	BARAZA
16.	Emmanuel Muhima	Coordinator	RACID
17.	Josué Poshombili	Media officer	CEREBA
18.	Faustin Shandere	Representative	Réseau ARDA
19.	Andarite Siva	Member	BARAZA
20.	Dufina Tabu	President	ASVOCO
<i>Participants of Beni NGO workshop on armed groups (November 2013) interviewed by phone:</i>			
21.	Leonard Mathe Basighanirya	Project Manager	PPSSP
22.	Wanzo Ben Geoleon	Field assistant	PAP-RDC
23.	Léotine Lwanzo	Focal point – protection	EMU
24.	Jeannine Mukunda	Project assistant	Diakonie
25.	Michel Musafiri	Researcher	ASADHO
<i>Participants of Kitshanga NGO workshop on armed groups (November 2013) interviewed by phone:</i>			
26.	Isidore Kattima	Focal Point - Protection	GRACE
27.	Charmant Kinyabuuma	Field Assistant	DRC
28.	Constantin Munyangi	Field Officer	Save the Children
29.	Papy Muzuri	Administrator	CNR
30.	Anicet Nzanzu	Community Liaison Officer	MONUSCO
<b>Kinshasa:</b>			
31.	Alastair Burnett	Humanitarian Adviser	DFID
32.	Scott Campbell	Director	UN Joint Human Rights Office
33.	F. Javier Cepero	Chef Adjoint Delegation - Operations	ICRC
34.	Tanja Cisse	Coordinatrice Protection	ICRC
35.	Yannick Creoff	JHRO Protection Unit	MONUSCO
36.	Michel Kassa	Founder	Initiative pour un leadership cohésif



37.	Ariana Pelham	Emergency Preparedness & Response Unit	OCHA
38.	Godelieve Sipula	Assistant Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA
39.	M. Koffi E. Wogomebou,	Observateur des Droits de l'homme Coordinateur de bureau conjoint des droits de l'homme-	MONUSCO
<b>Oslo:</b>			
40.	Silje Besseberg Bråten	DRC Desk	NRC
41.	Laura Cuinal	ICLA programme	NRC
42.	Marit Glad	Global Access Advisor	NRC
43.	Tine Ramstad	(former) Head of Advocacy	NRC
44.	Tiril Skarstein	Media Officer	NRC
45.	Matthew Stephensen	(former) PAA Africa	NRC
46.	Rolf Vestvik	Director of Advocacy and Communications	NRC
47.	Cara J. Winters	Adviser, Monitoring and Evaluation	NRC
48.	Cedric de Conig	Senior Research Fellow	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
49.	Hilde Salvesen	Senior Adviser	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>USA:</b>			
50.	Hilde Klemetsdal	Counsellor	Norwegian Permanent Mission, Washington DC
51.	Michael Heller Chu	Best Practices Section	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, NY
52.	Liam Mahony	Co-Director	Fieldview Solutions, USA
53.	Darlene Maudlin	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance	USAID, Washington DC
<b>Other locations:</b>			
54.	Deborah Bagogle	Humanitarian Adviser	DFID, London
55.	Sarah Khan	Protection Officer, GPC	UNHCR, Geneva
56.	Olivia Kalis	(former) PAA Goma	NRC, Beirut
57.	Ingrid Macdonald	Resident Representative	NRC, Geneva
58.	Sara Tesorieri	EU Policy Advisor	NRC, Brussels
59.	Erin Weir	(former) PAA Middle East	NRC, Mali

### **Annex 3: List of documents consulted**

DMG Network. (2013). *Do More Good – Rethinking humanitarian interventions in a protracted crisis and fragile environment – DRC.*

Mahony, L. (March 2013). *Non-military strategies for civilian protection in the DRC.* Fieldview Solutions.

Mahony, L. (January 2013). *Direct protection impact, Protection Mainstreaming and “Do No Harm”: Reflections on NRC’s work in the eastern Congo.* Fieldview Solutions.

MONUSCO. (April 2013), *POC Handbook, Practical Protection of Civilians Handbook for Peacekeepers,* MONUSCO Protection Working Group.

NRC. (2013). *Indicator Matrix – Access project.*

NRC. (July 2013). *Changing field practice through advocacy - Interim summary of the strengthening protection response initiative in the DRC.*

NRC. (December 2013). *NRC Protection Policy.*

NRC. (2013). *Advocacy Strategy – non-military protection.*

UN. (October 2013). *UN System-Wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the DRC.*

UN. (2013). *UN Plan d’Action Humanitaire RDC.*

UN. (2014). *UN Plan de réponse stratégique RDC.*

Various authors. (February 2014), *A comprehensive response to the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.*

# Annex 4: Inception Report

## 1. Introduction

This document is an inception report for a consultancy to assess and document outcome level results of NRC's 2012/13 advocacy and protection initiative in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The objectives and purpose of the consultancy, evaluation framework, timetable, suggested list of interviewees and interview guide are detailed in this document.

## 2. Background

Following decades of conflict in DRC, a variety of responses to protect civilians had met with limited success. Focus was increasingly placed on the deployment of peacekeepers and military actions, mainly in Eastern DRC, which had mixed results. Against this backdrop, NRC initiated a project in early 2012 to look at humanitarian access and non-military approaches to protection. The objectives of the project were to strengthen:

- NRC's own approach to protection on the ground;
- The practice of other humanitarian actors in the DRC; and
- The approach of the wider international community to include non-military protection approaches to complement the efforts of the UN peacekeepers.

A key foundation for this initiative was the commissioning of a research study on non-military protection strategies in DRC. This study resulted in both an external report and an internal report (for NRC's own protection response in DRC). The findings of the study were the basis of a range of advocacy activities launched by NRC, including presentations and briefings in DRC and concerned capitals with operational staff and policy-makers of governments, NGOs, international organisations and UN agencies.

## 3. Objectives and purpose

The aim of this consultancy is to assess and document outcome level results of NRC's 2012/13 advocacy and protection initiative in DRC, with the following objectives:

- 1) To assess to what extent the initiative's objectives and related outcomes were achieved;
- 2) To determine the effectiveness of the different activities carried out;
- 3) To provide conclusions and recommendations for the continuation of the initiative as well as NRC's global advocacy and protection work;
- 4) To provide recommendations for the future monitoring of outcome indicators.

For each of these objectives, a series of questions have been developed that that will form the basis of the consultancy, as detailed below in the evaluation framework.

**Time period:** The consultancy will cover the 24 months period from January 2012 to December 2013. The consultancy will also examine relevant documents and information outside of this period as necessary.

**Focus:** The consultancy will focus on activities that were targeted within DRC mainly towards humanitarian actors (Goma and Kinshasa), those that targeted donors and UN bodies in key capitals (New York, Geneva and Oslo) and those targeted internally – within NRC.

**Approach:** The consultancy will use a process tracing/contribution analysis approach to estimate the level of contribution of the initiative to any changes seen at the outcome level. As far as feasible, the consultancy will be an inclusive and participatory process involving the relevant NRC staff, partners and other stakeholders.

#### **4. Evaluation framework**

The following chart details the evaluation methodology and matches the objectives to key indicators and data collection tools.

<b>Assessment criteria</b>	<b>Proposed indicators</b>	<b>Proposed tools</b>
<p><b>1. Outcomes</b></p> <p>What progress has been made to achieving the objectives and related outcomes?</p> <p>Have there been any additional results to those anticipated?</p> <p>What were the factors that facilitated or hindered the results achieved?</p> <p>What has been the contribution to NRC's longer-term advocacy goals?</p>	<p>- Level of progress towards the three objectives and defined outcomes (visibility, coalition building, target recognition, action taken, policy change, policy implementation)</p> <p>- Identification of additional results</p> <p>- Identification of factors: hindering &amp; facilitating</p> <p>Identification of contributions to longer-term goals</p>	<p>- Document and media review</p> <p>- Interviews</p> <p>- Field visit</p> <p>- Contribution analysis</p>
<p><b>2. Activities</b></p> <p>What activities were the most effective in achieving the outcomes achieved?</p> <p>What activities were the least effective in achieving the outcomes achieved?</p> <p>How effective was NRC's management and coordination of the initiative?</p>	<p>- Identification of most effective activities</p> <p>- Identification of least effective activities</p> <p>- Effectiveness of management and coordination</p>	<p>- Document and media review</p> <p>- Interviews</p> <p>- Field visit</p>
<p><b>3. Conclusion &amp; recommendations</b></p> <p>What conclusions and recommendations are proposed to improve and advance further: 1) the initiative 2) global advocacy and protection work?</p>	<p>-Identification of recommendations for the initiative and globally</p>	<p>- Document and media review</p> <p>- Interviews</p> <p>- Field visit</p>
<p><b>4. Outcome indicators</b></p> <p>What outcome indicators best capture the progress and the contribution of NRC's work?</p> <p>When and how monitoring data can be collected for the initiative?</p>	<p>-Identification of best suited outcome indicators</p> <p>- Identification of when/how monitoring data can be collected</p>	<p>- Document and media review</p> <p>- Interviews</p> <p>- Field visit</p>

The consultancy will be carried out through analyses of various sources of information and the deployment of a number of research tools. The following table provides further information on the data collection tools:

<i>Data collection Tool</i>	<i>Number planned</i>	<i>Sources of information</i>
<i>Document and media review</i> Review of relevant internal and external documents, media reports - analysing no. of mentions of the reports and/or messages reflected	1	Media releases/statements, speeches, NRC internal planning documents, donor/project and monitoring reports, training documents, and any other relevant materials.
<i>Semi-structured interviews</i>	Approx. 20  (not including those carried out during field visit)	Targets and stakeholders outside of DRC.
<i>Field visit</i>	1	Targets and stakeholders in Goma and Kinshasa.
<i>Contribution analysis</i> Estimation of contribution of NRC initiative to changes seen in defined outcomes and other areas	1	Drawn from all of the above sources.

## 5. Timetable

The following chart illustrates the scheduling of the key tasks of the consultancy. Based on this schedule, the following milestones are established:

- 31 December 2013: delivery of inception report (this document)
- 28 February 2014: delivery of draft report
- 15 March 2014: delivery of final report

Key steps marked with an asterisk (\*) involve the validation by NRC.

<i>Key steps</i>	31 Dec.	6-12 Jan.	13-19 Jan.	20-26 Jan.	27-31 Jan.	3-9 Feb.	10-16 Feb.	17-23 Feb.	24-28 Feb.	3-9 March	10-16 March
Delivery of inception report											
Finalisation of inception report*											
Document review											
Interviews with stakeholders											
Field visit – DRC											
Compilation & data analysis											
Delivery of draft report											
Comments on draft report*											
Delivery of final report											

## 6. Deliverables

The follow are the key deliverables for this consultancy:

- Inception report (this document)
- Draft report (Word document)
- Final report (Word document)

All deliverables will be in English.

The proposed outline for the final report is found at annex 1.

## **Annex 5: Interview Guide**

### **A. Introduction**

1. Please explain your current role in your organisation?
2. What has been your interaction with the NRC protection and humanitarian access work in DRC? How often and when? What Initial impressions did you have?

### **B. Outcomes**

3. To what extent do you think NRC's initiative has influenced the protection response in DRC?
4. The NRC initiative sought to have influence in different areas/levels. Have you seen its influence on any of the following:
  - Visibility of non-military/humanitarian protection approaches in the protection of civilians debate
  - Actors/Organisations indicating support of non-military/humanitarian protection approaches
  - Recognition of non-military/humanitarian protection approaches in the protection of civilians debate
  - Organisations taking action (e.g. establishment of working groups, focal points, commissioning of research/reports, etc.).
  - Changes to policies/practise of organisations (NRC and other humanitarian actors)
  - Implementation of policy/practices (impact on the ground, e.g. increased dialogue with armed groups)
5. Have you:
  - Personally taken any action/made changes as a consequence of the initiative?
  - Seen your organisation take action/make changes?
  - Seen other actors/organisation?
  - If you/your organization did not, were there things that NRC could have done that would have motivated such action?



6. What do you think have been the factors that have 1) facilitated achievements of the NRC initiative to date 2) hinder achievements to date?
7. In the past two years, what other influences (actors, events, initiatives, etc.) aside from the NRC initiative have been important in what people think and do about protection in DRC?

### **C. Activities**

8. How effective were the activities carried out by NRC for this initiative?
  - The Fieldview Solutions report (external)
  - The Fieldview Solutions internal report for NRC [only relevant for NRC staff]
  - Media release and coverage on report
  - Presentations and discussions on report's findings (DRC & elsewhere)
  - Follow-up work with Goma Protection Cluster (i.e. revision of humanitarian engagement strategy, setting up of working group, armed groups analysis workshop, etc.)
  - Protection mainstreaming training for NRC staff
  - Collaboration with conflict transformation actors
  - Training workshops for civil society in Kivu
  - Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_
9. Related to the above question, what did NRC do well? Less well?
10. Were NRC's messages ("asks") on non-military approaches to protection clear and understandable?
11. How has the initiative been managed and coordinated by NRC with regard to the following aspects:
  - Preparation of initiative
  - Consultation with stakeholders
  - Coordination within NRC
  - Adjustment to initiative based on how it was received
  - Monitoring of results
  -

### **D. Conclusions & Recommendations**

12. How do you feel NRC could have engaged further on this initiative to increase its impact?

13. What would you recommend to NRC as next steps to build on achievements to date?

[Depending upon profile of interviewee, suggestions can be asked for either/or externally or internally within NRC].

14. Any other comments/feedback on the initiative?

## **Annex 6: About the Authors**

**Glenn O’Neil, team leader:** As founder of Owl RE, Glenn has led some 100 evaluations, research and communication projects for international organisations and NGOs in over 40 countries with a specialization in the communications, advocacy and media areas. His skills are in managing multi-country evaluations and supporting organisations in developing evaluation frameworks and methodologies. Glenn has an Executive Masters in Communications Management from the University of Lugano and is currently undertaking a PhD in research and evaluation methodology at the Methodology Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Glenn is Swiss/Australian and speaks French and English.

**Patricia Goldschmid, evaluation consultant:** Patricia has a specialisation in communications, online tools and media with experience in evaluating programmes globally as both a team leader and consultant. As a consultant, instructor, trainer and coach in social media and strategic communications, Patricia has developed key expertise in these areas. She has an Executive Masters in Communications Management from the University of Lugano. Patricia is Swiss/Peruvian and speaks English, French, German and Spanish.